{ "id": 8657675, "name": "STATE v. CLEVELAND ROGERS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Rogers", "decision_date": "1914-10-21", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "112", "last_page": "116", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "168 N.C. 112" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "106 N. C., 696", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 N. C., 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8683865 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/29/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 N. C., 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11269368 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/166/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N. C., 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8697835 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/79/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 N. C., 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11275644 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/98/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 N. C., 664", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11274796 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/130/0664-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 N. C., 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N. C., 803", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N. C., 645", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8651386 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/101/0645-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 N. C., 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11276265 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/98/0753-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 N. C., 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N. C., 1135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N. C., 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8653651 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/117/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 N. C., 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8661370 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/126/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N. C., 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N. C., 779", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11275156 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/92/0779-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 N. C., 745", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8661106 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/123/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 N. C., 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2092703 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/67/0025-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 583, "char_count": 10975, "ocr_confidence": 0.473, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.82786902858476e-07, "percentile": 0.7203095624493938 }, "sha256": "3029526b0f540069fae290a29660ea3408e32e978c9595c21dbc1b2159b62a6d", "simhash": "1:b65ea3fec3a4c59f", "word_count": 1877 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:05:21.378028+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE v. CLEVELAND ROGERS." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Clark, C. J.\nThe defendant was convicted on an indictment for \u201cwillfully and feloniously setting fire to a certain ginhouse, the property of W. B. Hopkins, with intent to burn and destroy the same.\u201d S. v. Purdie, 67 N. C., 25; S. v. Pierce, 123 N. C., 745. The indictment was sufficient both under Revisal, 333.6 and 3341, and it was immaterial under which, as the punishment inflicted was within the limits prescribed for either. Revisal, 3336, covers a willful attempt to burn a \u201ccotton gin,\u201d which from the context evidently means the same thing as a \u201cginhouse.\u201d Eevisal, 3341, makes punishable the willful burning of any \u201cginhouse.\u201d Here the ginhouse was set fire to, but not consumed. The form here used was held sufficient in S. v. Green, 92 N. C., 779, and is substantially the same as that used in the other two cases above cited.\nThe tendency formerly prevailing in criminal proceedings was checked by the statutes, now Eevisal, 3254 and 3255, which prohibit such proceedings to be \u201cquashed \u201cor judgment reversed by reason of any informality or refinement, if they express tbe charge in a plain, intelligible, and explicit manner.\u201d The whole course of this trial shows that the defendant was fully informed of the charge against him and for what he was being tried. He was at no disadvantage on that ground, and there is no other object in the indictment. The motion in arrest of judgment was properly denied. The '\u201ccharring\u201d was sufficient proof of a \u201cburning,\u201d even in a charge for arson. S. v. Hall, 93 N. C., 573.\nThe witness Hopkins was permitted to use a map \u201cfor the purpose of explaining the testimony of the witness.\u201d This was competent, and is very often resorted to, both in civil and criminal procedure. Arrowood v. R. R., 126 N. C., 629; Tankard v. R. R., 117 N. C., 558; Riddle v. Germanton, ib., 389, and cases there cited; S. v. Wilcox, (murder) 132 N. C., 1135, and S. v. Harrison, 145 N. C., 411 (for kidnapping). Both these latter cases were thoroughly contested, but the Court affirmed its previous ruling on this point in S. v. Whiteacre, 98 N. C., 753, and Dobson v. Whisenhant, 101 N. C., 645. It is true the witness said the map was \u201capproximately correct.\u201d It could hardly have been otherwise, being made at the time and merely to illustrate his evidence. This did not render the map incompetent as a part of his testimony, for the defendant doubtless made the most of it by arguing that therefore his whole testimony was only approximately correct. But that was a matter for the jury.\nThe witness stated that on discovery of the fire, which was blazing up 2 feet or more, he ran to the ginhouse and saw the defendant running away, \u201cwhom he distinctly recognized, aided by the light from the fire; that he was well acquainted with defendant, having known him ever since he was a little boy.\u201d The solicitor then asked: \u201cHave you any doubt as to the defendant being the man?\u201d The objection made was overruled, and the witness answered, \u201cNo.\u201d The testimony was competent. S. v. Lytle, 117 N. C., 803. Nor can we sustain exception 3, which pointed to no particular part of the testimony. Exceptions to evidence must be specific. S. v. English, 164 N. C., 508. At most, the evidence was merely irrelevant, and hence possibly a needless consumption of the time of the court, but it was not legally prejudicial to the defendant.\nThe evidence in regard to the defendant being refused credit at the store of the owner of the ginhouse, and the defendant\u2019s remarks about it, was competent as tending to show motive, taken in connection with other evidence offered for the same purpose. The testimony of King that Hopkins told him on the night of the fire that the defendant had fired his ginhouse was competent as corroborative evidence. S. v. Maultsby, 130 N. C., 664; S. v. Rowe, 98 N. C., 629; S. v. Parrish, 79 N. C., 610.\nThe defendant excepted to the solicitor\u2019s argument containing strictures upon defendant\u2019s counsel, because calculated to iDrejudice the jury against the defendant. The judge states in the case on appeal that \u201cdefendant\u2019s counsel in his argument referred to what he knew personally in regard to the location and surroundings, without having given it in evidence, and had criticised the testimony of the prosecutor because at variance with the result of his own untestified knowledge of the location. That thereupon the solicitor gave the counsel \u2018notice that if he persisted in that line of argument, he (the solicitor) would reply to it.\u2019 But counsel for defendant continued to refer to what he knew personally of the location and surroundings, and criticised the conduct of the prosecuting witness (Hopkins), contending that he was offended because he (the counsel) had gone on his premises to make an inspection.\u201d The solicitor, in reply, contended that the conduct of the counsel in riding over the prosecutor\u2019s premises in a buggy \u201cwith a negro, inspecting them without the consent of the owner and driving away in disregard of the owner when he had attempted to stop him for the purpose of ascertaining their business, was calculated to irritate.\u201d There was more on both sides of this kind of argument (if it can be so styled). It was improper in defendant\u2019s counsel to use his personal knowledge of the locality without its being given in testimony. This case differs from S. v. Lee, 166 N. C., 250, where counsel was merely drawing inferences from the testimony.\nFrom the facts as stated by his Honor, it seems that the defendant\u2019s counsel made the first transgression. He ought to have been restricted to the evidence given in to the jury. We do not feel called upon to pass upon the query as to which side offend\u00e9d the most against the orderly proceedings of the court and that dignity and seemliness which should always surround a trial in a court of justice. If the defendant did not profit by this unseemly debate we cannot see that he can complain when it was caused by his own counsel. We cannot see that he was in any way prejudiced by it, for the jury were doubtless intelligent enough to understand that they were to try the cause upon the evidence as deposed to by the witnesses and upon the law as laid down by the court. Such controversies should be barred not only by the judge, but by the respect of the counsel on both sides for the occasion. This was, as is usual, merely what Chief Justice Pearson styled \u201ccross-firing with small shot.\u201d There is no evidence in the record that the defendant\u2019s counsel received worse than he dealt, nor that his client was prejudiced in any way.\nThe last exception is that the court in its charge said: \u201cNow, I grant you it might have been better (and I am not criticising him) if the defendant\u2019s attorney had gone to the man\u2019s house and represented to him that he was there for the purpose of making measurements or preparing the case for trial.\u201d This was not an intimation of any \u201copinion whether a fact is fully or sufficiently proven,\u201d wbicli is forbidden by chapter 452, Laws 1796, now Revisal, 535. It has been often held that the \u201cfacts\u201d referred to are those in dispute on which the liability of defendant depends. S. v. Angel, 29 N. C., 27; S. v. Jacobs, 106 N. C., 696, and cases there cited.\nWe find nothing in the transcript which convinces us that the defendant was in any wise prejudiced by the rulings excepted to.\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "Clark, C. J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney-General Bickett and Assistant Attorney-General Calvert for the State.", "B. C. Beckwith for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE v. CLEVELAND ROGERS.\n(Filed 21 October, 1914.)\n1. Indictment \u2014 Criminal Law \u2014 Unlawful Burning \u2014 Ginhouse\u2014Interpretation of Statutes.\nAn indictment for \u201cwillfully and feloniously setting fire to a certain ginhouse, the property of IV. B. H., wjth intent to bum and destroy the same,\u201d is sufficient for conviction of the offense charged under Revisal, secs. 3836, 3341, the word \u201cginhouse\u201d meaning the same as \u201ccotton gin\u201d; and where the punishment inflicted was within the limits prescribed by either section, it becomes immaterial under which section the conviction was had.\n2. Same \u2014 Evidence\u2014\u201cCharring.\u201d\nWhere the defendant has been tried and convicted under an indictment charging that he willfully and feloniously set fire to a certain \u201cginhouse,\u201d etc., it is held that the evidence of \u201ccharring\u201d is sufficient proof of \u201cburning\u201d to sustain the sentence; and it is further held that the motion in arrest of judgment was properly denied under the circumstances, the objection relating to informalities and refinement, and the defendant having been fully informed of the charge against him. Revisal, secs. 3254, 3255.\n3. Witnesses \u2014 Maps\u2014Evidence\u2014\u201cApproximately Correct.\u201d\nA witness is permitted to make a map, while on the stand, and explain his testimony therefrom, though he testifies that the map was \u201capproximately correct.\u201d\n4. Criminal Law \u2014 Unlawful Burning \u2014 Questions\u2014Identification\u2014Appeal and Error.\n\u2022 Upon a trial for setting fire to a certain ginhouse, etc., a witness testified that he knew the prisoner well, and saw the defendant running away from the ginhouse, which was ablaze, and recognized him in the light of the fire. The defendant objected to a question of the solicitor, asking if the witness had any doubt that the prisoner was the man whom he saw, tlie question with the answer held to be no error.\n5. Appeal and Error \u2014 Objections and Exceptions \u2014 Immaterial Evidence.\nExceptions to the admissibility of evidence should be specific, nor will they be regarded on appeal when the evidence excepted to is merely irrelevant, but not prejudicial.\n6. Trials \u2014 Evidence\u2014Corroboration.\nWhere a witness has testified to certain material matters, it is competent for another witness to testify what the former witness had said to him, it being corroborative of the witness who has testified.\n7. Trials \u2014 Speeches to Jury \u2014 Improper Argument \u2014 Appeal and Error.\nUpon his argument to the jury the counsel for the defendant, being tried for unlawfully setting fire to a ginhouse, told of his having gone on the prosecutor\u2019s premises, and of his own knowledge, of facts and circumstances relating to the locality, which had not been testified to, and were at variance with the testimony of one of the State\u2019s witnesses. The prisoner\u2019s counsel excepted to certain language used by the solicitor in reply, and under the circumstances of this case it is held that the prisoner\u2019s counsel cannot be heard to complain; and the Supreme Court reminds counsel that from respect for the occasion they should abstain from controversies of this character; and the courts, that they should prohibit them.\n8. Courts \u2014 Expression of Opinion \u2014 Speeches to Jury \u2014 Interpretation of Statutes \u2014 Appeal and Error. .\nIn this ease it is held that the remarks of the trial judge made with reference to the argument of defendant\u2019s counsel in his address to the jury were not an intimation of opinion upon the facts, and not held for error. Eevisal, sec. 585.\nAppeal by defendant from Cooke, J., March Term, 1914, of Wake.\nAttorney-General Bickett and Assistant Attorney-General Calvert for the State.\nB. C. Beckwith for defendant." }, "file_name": "0112-01", "first_page_order": 168, "last_page_order": 172 }