{
  "id": 11253121,
  "name": "J. H. DAVIS v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY",
  "name_abbreviation": "Davis v. Norfolk Southern Railroad",
  "decision_date": "1916-10-11",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "209",
  "last_page": "211",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "172 N.C. 209"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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    {
      "cite": "163 N. C., 415",
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    {
      "cite": "122 N. C., 1002",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:21:58.562423+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "J. H. DAVIS v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Hoke, J.\nOn the trial the question of liability between these parties was made to depend upon whether the cotton had been received and held by defendant company under a contract of shipment or whether it had been left on defendant\u2019s platform with a view of being shipped at a later date. Under the charge of his Honor, the issue was submitted to the jury as a question of fact. They have accepted plaintiff\u2019s version of the transaction, and we find no reason for disturbing the result.\nThe evidence of plaintiff tended to show that the cotton had been left on defendant\u2019s platform and was received and held by defendant under a contract of shipment, but the witness stated that no bill of lading had been issued by the company at the time; that the company\u2019s agent gave the witness who acted for plaintiff in the matter two tags with plaintiff\u2019s name on them, with instructions to put same on the bales, and it was chiefly urged for error that since the Carmack Amendment and rules of Interstate Commerce Commission applicable there could be no valid contract by a common carrier for interstate shipment without the issuance of a written bill of lading; but the position is without merit.\nWhile a bill of lading is the usual evidence of a contract of shipment with a common carrier by rail, and such carrier is usually required to issue one on demand, it has never been considered an .essential of such a contract. Berry v. R. R., 122 N. C., 1002; 1 Hutchison on Carriers (3 Ed.), sec. 152; 6 Cyc., pp. 416-417.\nIn Hutchison it is said: \u201cNo receipt or bill of lading or writing of any kind is required to subject the common carrier to the duties and responsibilities of an insurer of goods. As soon as they are delivered to him for present carriage, and nothing necessary to their being forwarded remains to be done by the owner, the law imposes upon him all the risks of their safe custody as well as the duty to carry as directed,\u201d etc. And, in tbe citation to Cyc., supra, p. 417: \u201cAn instrument issued by tbe carrier to tbe consignor, consisting of a receipt for tbe goods and an agreement to carry them from tbe place of shipment to tbe place of destination, is a bill of lading. Of course, it is not essential tbat a bill of lading be issued, for, in tbe 'absence, of any sucb instrument, tbe rights of tbe shipper and tbe duties of tbe carrier are to be determined by tbe common law.\u201d Tbe act of Congress amending section 20, Interstate Commerce Act, approved 29 June, 1906, and appearing in 34 IT. S. Statutes, cb. 3591, see. 7, was enacted chiefly for tbe purpose of imposing on tbe initial carrier responsibility for tbe entire carriage of an interstate shipment, and while it requires tbe issuance of a bill of lading in evidence of such contract and responsibility, there is nothing inhib-itive in its terms or purpose. Tbe requirement for a bill of lading is imposed primarily for tbe benefit of tbe shipper, and, in our opinion, it does not and was not intended to relieve tbe carrier from liability who may have entered into a contract of shipment without it. A position not dissimilar has been approved and applied with us in several cases against insurance companies where a policy issued in violation of some requirement, established for tbe protection of tbe policyholder only, was held a binding obligation on the company, and recovery thereon was sustained. Morgan v. Fraternal Assn., 170 N. C., pp. 75 and 80; Robinson v. Life Ins. Co., 163 N. C., 415.\nWe find no error in the record, and\u2019 tbe judgment for plaintiff is affirmed.\nNo error.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Hoke, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "W. R. Wheatley and Abernethy & Drnis for plaintiff.",
      "J. F. Duncan, Moore & Dv/nn, and G. M. Bain for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "J. H. DAVIS v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY.\n(Filed 11 October, 1916.)\n1. Carriers of Goods \u2014 Contracts of Shipment \u2014 Bills of Lading' \u2014 Evidence.\nWhile a bill of lading is the usual evidence of a contract of shipment between a consignor of goods and a common carrier by rail, and the carrier is usually required to issue one on demand, it is not essential to such contract that a bill of lading therefor should have been issued by the carrier.\n\u2022 2. Same \u2014 Interstate Commerce Acts \u2014 Amendment.\nThe act of Congress amending section 20, Interstate Commerce Act, 84 U. S. Statutes, ch. 3591, sec. 7, requiring the issuance of a bill of lading by the carrier to the consignor of a shipment, is not inhibitive in its terms or purpose; and the statute, being enacted chiefly for the purpose of imposing on the initial carrier responsibility for the entire carriage of an interstate shipment, does not relieve the carrier from liability under a contract of shipment entered into without it.\nCivil ACTION tried on appeal from court of justice of peace, before Devin, J., and a jury, at June Term, 1916, of Oarteeet.\nThe action was to recover the value of two bales of cotton destroyed by fire on the platform or in the warehouse of defendant company at New Bern, N. 0., in October, 1910.\nDefendant denied having received the cotton for shipment; claimed it was only with defendant as warehouseman, as bailee, for plaintiff\u2019s accommodation, and, if so, there was no evidence of default on part of defendant. On issues submitted there was verdict for plaintiff, judgment on verdict, and defendant excepted and appealed.\nW. R. Wheatley and Abernethy & Drnis for plaintiff.\nJ. F. Duncan, Moore & Dv/nn, and G. M. Bain for defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0209-01",
  "first_page_order": 275,
  "last_page_order": 277
}