{
  "id": 11255542,
  "name": "M. F. TEETER v. POSTAL TELEGRAPH-CABLE COMPANY",
  "name_abbreviation": "Teeter v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co.",
  "decision_date": "1916-12-22",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "783",
  "last_page": "787",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "172 N.C. 783"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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    {
      "cite": "130 N. C., 513",
      "category": "reporters:state",
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      "case_paths": [
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    {
      "cite": "133 N. C., 225",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:21:58.562423+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "M. F. TEETER v. POSTAL TELEGRAPH-CABLE COMPANY."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Hoke, J.\nIt is not denied by defendant that the telegraph line superimposed upon a railroad right of way is an additional burden which entitled the owner to compensation, Hodges v. Tel. Co., 133 N. C., 225; Phillips v. Tel. Co., 130 N. C., 513; but objection is made to the validity of plaintiff\u2019s recovery on the ground, chiefly, that his Honor should have held as a conclusion of law that, on the facts in evidence, plaintiff\u2019s cause of action is barred by the three years statute of limitations, Revisal, sec. 395, subsec. 3, the language being as follows: \u201cActions shall be brought within three years for trespass on real property. When the trespass is a continuing one, within three years from the original trespass, and not thereafter.\u201d\nSpeaking to this section in Sample v. Lumber Co., 150 N. C., pp. 165-166, action for wrongful entry and cutting timber on another\u2019s land, the Court said: \u201cTrue, the statute declares that actions for trespass on real estate shall be barred in three years, and when the trespass is a continuing one such action shall be commenced within three years from the original tespaiss, and not thereafter; but this term, \u2018continuing trespass/ was no doubt used in reference ,to wrongful trespass upon real property, caused by structures permanent in their nature and made by companies in the exercise of some quasi-public franchise. Apart from this, the term could only refer to cases where a wrongful act, being entire and complete, causes continuing damage, and was never intended to apply when every successive act' amounted to a distinct and separate renewal of wrong.\u201d\nReferring to the language of the section and the interpretation of it suggested in that decision, the Court is inclined to the opinion that this is a continuing trespass within the meaning of the law, and for damages'incident to the original wrong, and for that alone, no recovery could be sustained. But this is a suit for permanent damages, and on recovery and payment, so far as plaintiff is concerned, confer\u00eds on the defendant the right to maintain its line on plaintiff\u2019s land- for an indefinite period and to enter on the same whenever reasonably required for the \u201cplanting, repairing, and preservation of its poles and other property.\u201d Caviness v. R. R., ante, 305. It is a suit to recover for the value of the easement, which can pass to defendant only by grant or by proceedings to condemn the property pursuant to the statute, Revisal, secs. 1572-1573, or by adverse and. continuous user for the period of twenty years.\nIn ease of railroads, by section 394 of the Revisal this- period has been reduced to five years, but there being no such statute as to telegraph companies, the common-law period of twenty years is required. Geer v. Water Co., 127 N. C., pp. 349-353.\nIt was objected further for defendant that plaintiff, in giving his opinion as to the amount the value of the land was decreased by the imposition of the easement, was allowed, in describing his property, to base his estimate upon its value both for farming lands and its eligibility for factory sites, the land being used then only for farming; but tbe objection is without merit.\nIn Brown v. Power Co., 140 N. C., 333, in reference to such an estimate, it was held, among other things: \u201cIn estimating its value, all the capabilities of the property and all the uses to which it may be applied or for which it is adapted may be considered, and not merely the condition it is in at the time and the use to which it is then applied by the owner.\u201d\nIn R. R. v. Armfield, 167 N. C., pp. 464-466, the Court quotes, with approval, from Pierce on Rys., p. 217, as follows: \u201cThe particular use to which the land is applied at the time of the taking is not the test of its value, but its availability for any valuable or beneficial uses to which it would likely be put by men .or ordinary prudence should be taken into account. It has been well said that the compensation \u2018is to be estimated by reference to the uses for which the property is suitable, haring regard to the existing business and wants of the community, or such as may reasonably he expected in the immediate future.\u2019 But merely possible or imaginary uses, or the speculative schemes of its proprietor, are to be excluded.\u201d And the principle is applied and fully approved in the recent case of R. R. v. Mfg. Co., 169 N. C., 156.\nWe find no error in the proceedings, and the judgment for plaintiff is affirmed.\nNo error.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Hoke, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "J. W. Keerans, M. H. Caldwell, and L. T. Hartsell for plaintiff.",
      "J. Lee Crowell and H. S. Williams for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "M. F. TEETER v. POSTAL TELEGRAPH-CABLE COMPANY.\n(Filed 22 December, 1916.)\n1. Telegraphs \u2014 Easements\u2014Rights of Way \u2014 Additional Burden \u2014 Compensation \u2014 Damages.\nThe construction of a telegraph company\u2019s lines upon a railroad right of way imposes an additional burden upon the fee-simple title to the lands which entitles the owner to compensation.\n2. Telegraphs \u2014 Easements\u2014Rights of Way \u2014 Requisition of Right.\nA telegraph company can only acquire an easement in lands for construction and maintenance of its lines by grant, or pursuant to the statutes, Revisal, secs. 1572, 1573, or by adverse and continuous use for twenty years, the period, of the acquisition by such user for five years, allowed to railroad companies by Revisal, sec. 394, not extending to telegraph companies.\ng. limitation of Actions \u2014 Trespass \u2014 Continuous Trespass \u2014 Independent Acts.\nThe statutory requirement that an action for damages for continuing trespass on lands shall he barred after three years from the date of the original trespass, by the use of the words \u201ccontinuing trespass,\u201d refers to trespass upon real property, caused by structures- permanent in their nature where the wrongful act, being continued and complete, causes continuing damages; or where injuries from like sources are caused, or by companies in the exercise of some quasi-public franchise, and was not \u2022intended to apply when every successive act amounted to a distinct and separate renewal of wrong.\n4. Same \u2014 Telegraphs\u2014Easements\u2014Bights of Way.\nWhere a telegraph company has constructed its line of poles and wires along a railroad right of way on the lands of the owner more than three years next before the commencement of the owner\u2019s action for trespass, but within three years has constructed an additional line of its wires thereon and repaired its old line, replacing some of the old poles with new ones, in the same holes: Held, the plaintiff\u2019s right to damages for the construction of the old line is barred by the statute, but the wrongful maintenance of the old and the building of the new line was a separate and independent trespass for which permanent damages may be awarded it. Revisal, sec. 395 (3).\n6. Telegraphs \u2014 Easements\u2014Bights of Way \u2014 Permanent Damages \u2014 Bight to Bepair.\nUpon payment of a recovery for permanent damages for a right of way in plaintiff\u2019s action of trespass against a telegraph company, the defendant, so far as the plaintiff is concerned, acquires the right to maintain its lines on the land for an indefinite period, and to enter on the same whenever reasonably required for the planting, repairing, and preservation of its poles and other property.\n6. Telegraphs \u2014 Easements\u2014Bights of Way \u2014 Measure of Damages \u2014 Prospective Values.\nIn admeasuring the damages for the imposition of an additional burden upon the'plaintiff\u2019s land by the construction and maintenance upon a railroad right of way by the defendant telegraph company of its line of poles and wires, the inquiry is not confined to the diminution in value of the land as then used, but is extended to all the uses for which it is adapted or applied and which may be reasonably anticipated in the further use or development of the property; and under the circumstances of this case it is Held, that the inquiry should not be confined to the diminution of plaintiff\u2019s land as farming lands, but that its availability for factory sites was properly considered.\nCivil actioN to recover permanent, damages for tbe erection and maintenance of a telegraph line, poles, wires, etc., on plaintiff\u2019s land, tried before Long, and a jury, at April Term, 3916, of Cabakrus.\nDefendant denied liability and pleaded the three years statute of limitations, Eevisal, sec. 5, subsec. 3.\nThe summons seems to have been issued in December, 1914, or January, 1915, and there was evidence tending to show that the poles were originally placed on plaintiff\u2019s land and on the right of way of the North Carolina Eailroad Company more than four years before that date, and that in 1909, owing to the fact that the Southern Eail-way, lessee of North Carolina Eailroad, had constructed a double track, the defendant moved its poles and lines further out into plaintiff\u2019s field, where it was still maintained and operated, and that in 1914, not long before action instituted, defendant had repaired the portion of its line situate on plaintiff\u2019s land, putting in several new poles, these being put in the same holes as formerly and causing further damage and injury to said land.\nOn issues submitted, the jury rendered the following verdict:\n1. Is the plaintiff M. F. Teeter the owner and in the possession of the lands over which the defendant constructed its telegraph line within the right of way of the railroad company? Answer: \u201cTes.\u201d\n2. Is the plaintiff\u2019s cause barred by the statute of limitations, as alleged in the answer? Answer: \u201cNo.\u201d\n3. \"What permanent damages, if any, is plaintiff entitled to recover of the defendant for the erection and maintaining of said telegraph line on his land as existing and in operation? Answer: \u201c$250.\u201d\nJudgment on the verdict, and defendant excepted and appealed.\nJ. W. Keerans, M. H. Caldwell, and L. T. Hartsell for plaintiff.\nJ. Lee Crowell and H. S. Williams for defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0783-01",
  "first_page_order": 849,
  "last_page_order": 853
}
