{
  "id": 11256504,
  "name": "STATE v. EDGAR FRADY",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Frady",
  "decision_date": "1916-12-13",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "978",
  "last_page": "980",
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
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    "name": "N.C."
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      "reporter": "N.C.",
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      "category": "reporters:state",
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    {
      "cite": "61 N. C., 473",
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      "reporter": "N.C.",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:21:58.562423+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STATE v. EDGAR FRADY."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Pee CueiaM.\nIt appears from the testimony that one D. P. Lance, a merchant in the town of Arden, received a letter through the mail on 21 June, 1915, demanding $300, and asking him to leave that sum on 24 June, at 12 midday between Arden and Calvary Church on the public road goiug from Arden towards Fletcher. He was instructed to drop the money on the road on hearing certain signals. Lance immediately turned the letter over to the sheriff. On 27 July, Sunday, Mr. Lance\u2019s warehouse was burned about 4 o\u2019clock in the morning. There had been no fire in it the day before.\nOn 4 August Lance received another letter, instructing him to start from Arden on 6 August at 12 o\u2019clock with $400, to go down the road towards Calvary Church, and to drop the money on hearing certain signals. This letter referred to the previous letter, and to the burning of the warehouse,\u2022 as it stated: \u201cI think I have proved that I meant business, so I am going to give you one more chance.\u201d This letter was also turned over to the sheriff. The sheriff organized two posses, who were stationed in hiding along the highway, and Lance walked out at the time and in the direction indicated in the last letter.\nThe defendant, Martin Eickman, and Myrtle Pressley are charged in the bill. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as to appellant Frady, not guilty as to Pressley, and were unable to agree as to Eiek-man.\nThe motion to nonsuit was properly overruled. While the evidence is circumstantial, in our opinion, it has sufficient probative force to justify the judge in submitting the matter to the judgment of the jury. The exception to evidence is without merit. The exception to the charge cannot be sustained. The instructions of the trial judge are full, clear, and correct.\nThe charge as to the weight of circumstantial evidence and the consideration the jury should give to it is supported by the precedents.\nIn S. v. Parker, 61 N. C., 473, Chief Justice Pearson said: \u201cNo set of words is required by the law in regard to the force of circumstantial evidence. All that the law requires is that the jury shall be clearly instructed that unless after due consideration of all the evidence they are \u2018fully satisfied\u2019 or \u2018entirely convinced\u2019 or \u2018satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt\u2019 of the guilt of the defendant, it is their duty to acquit, and every attempt on the part of the courts to lay down a formula for the instruction of the jury by which to \u2018gauge\u2019 the degrees of conviction has resulted in no good.\u201d\nThese words have been quoted with approved in S. v. Adams, 138 N. C., 688, and S. v. Neville, 157 N. C., 597.\nIn the Adams case, supra, the Court said: \u201cIf the judge charges the jury in substance that the law presumes the defendant to be innocent, and tbe burden is upon tbe State to show bis guilt, and that upon all of tbe testimony tbey must be fully satisfied of bis guilt, be bas done all that the law requires of him, tbe manner in which it shall .be done being left to bis sound discretion, to be exercised in view of tbe facts and circumstances of tbe particular case.\u201d\nTbe charge is also substantially in accord with the formula approved in S. v. Flemming, 130 N. C., 688.\nNo error.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Pee CueiaM."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney-General Biclcett and Assistant Attorney-General Galvert for the State.",
      "J. Scroop Styles, R. M. Wells for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE v. EDGAR FRADY.\n(Filed 13 December, 1916.)\n1. Criminal law \u2014 Blackmailing \u2014 Circumstantial Evidence \u2014 Trials \u2014 .Questions for Jury.\nLetters demanding a sum of money from the prosecutor, the first requiring that he drop the amount along the road at a certain place at a designated time and at a certain signal, followed by the burning of the prosecutor\u2019s barn on his failing to comply; and the second one referring to this fact and making the same demand, and the apprehension of the defendant at the place at the time appointed, as he appeared after the signals' were given, though circumstantial evidence, is adjudged sufficient under an indictment for blackmailing to sustain a conviction. Revisal, sec. 3428.\n2. Instructions \u2014 Circumstantial Evidence \u2014 Trials.\nThe charge of the court as to the weight of circumstantial evidence and the consideration the jury should give it, upon the trial in this case for blackmailing, is approved.\nINDICTMENT for blackmailing (section 3428, Revisal) tried at February Term, 1916, of Buncombe; Harding, J.\nThe defendant was convicted and sentenced, and from the judgment Tendered appealed.\nAttorney-General Biclcett and Assistant Attorney-General Galvert for the State.\nJ. Scroop Styles, R. M. Wells for defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0978-01",
  "first_page_order": 1044,
  "last_page_order": 1046
}