{ "id": 11270881, "name": "NANCY EASELEY v. GILES EASELEY", "name_abbreviation": "Easeley v. Easeley", "decision_date": "1917-05-16", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "530", "last_page": "532", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "173 N.C. 530" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "135 N. C., 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8659800 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/135/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 N. C., 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11268722 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/138/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 N. C., 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8682859 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/89/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 N. C., 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11272777 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/92/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N. C., 926", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8654319 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/118/0926-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N. C., 672", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8661619 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/170/0672-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 261, "char_count": 3722, "ocr_confidence": 0.474, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.9904886238872708e-07, "percentile": 0.7417071419993985 }, "sha256": "a276aac7b665a38d56e2547ed7e2358e258d413b9de4be270552c1cbba80442b", "simhash": "1:ad83cd86600d6e30", "word_count": 639 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:49:44.051040+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "NANCY EASELEY v. GILES EASELEY." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "IIoke, J.\nThe complaint, properly verified, seems to contain facts sufficient to justify a decre on tlie ground claimed, and on motion for alimony pendente lite there were supporting affidavits on the part of plaintiff and very full affidavits in denial on the part of the defendant. After argument of counsel and on consideration of the affidavits, there was decree allowing alimony, the court adjudging that the \u201cplaintiff has made out a prima facie case on the issue of abandonment.\u201d This statement contained in his Honor\u2019s judgment is all the finding that was made by him on the question submitted, and, in our opinion, it is entirely insufficient to sustain the order allowing alimony. The statute, controlling the question, Revisal, see. 1566, provides that on a hearing of this character alimony should be allowed when plaintiff shall, in her complaint, set forth such facts \u201cwhich upon application for alimony shall be found by the judge to be true and to entitle her to the relief demanded in the complaint,\u201d and in numerous decisions construing the statute it has been held that the judge must find the essential and issuable facts and set them out in detail so that this Court can determine from the facts as found whether the order for alimony can be upheld as the correct legal conclusion. Garsed v. Garsed, 170 N. C., 672; Moody v. Moody, 118 N. C., 926; Lassiter v. Lassiter, 92 N. C., 129; Morris v. Morris, 89 N. C., 113. In Moody\u2019s case it was held: \u201cAn order allowing alimony is erroneous if made without a finding of facts by the judge.\u201d In Lassiter v. Lassiter, supra, it was held: \u201cIn applications for alimony pendente lite it is competent for the husband to controvert the allegations of the complaint by affidavit or answer, and the judge must find the facts and set them forth in the record.\u201d While these findings and the order predicated thereon are not finally conclusive on the parties nor receivable in evidence on the trial of the issues before the jury, unless modified on further notice and hearing, they are conclusive for the purposes of the motion, and, operating as they do to presently deprive a defendant of his property, they should be decided and set out in conclusive form and in such detail that the appellate court, as stated, may be able to determine whether they justify the order made. We have ferquently held that the term \u201cprima facie\u201d is evidential and not conclusive. Furniture Co. v. Express Co., 144 N. C., pp. 639-644; Stewart v. Carpet Co., 138 N. C., 60; Womble v. Grocery Co., 135 N. C., 474; and the findings of his Honor in the present case, are defective both in failing to find and set out the relevant facts and in finding that the allegations -were only prima facie established.\nThere is error, and this will be certified, that the judgment awarding alimony be set aside and the questions and cause be proceeded with in accordance with law.\nError.", "type": "majority", "author": "IIoke, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "No counsel for plaintiff.", "Avery & Huffman for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NANCY EASELEY v. GILES EASELEY.\n(Filed 16 May, 1917.)\nMarriage and Divorce \u2014 Alimony\u2014Findings\u2014Appeal and Error \u2014 Statutes.\nTo sustain on appeal an order of the trial judge allowing alimony to ' the wife pendente lite, in an action for divorce a mensa, it is necessary for the judge to have found the facts, upon conflicting evidence, upon which he had based his order; and his finding only that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of abandonment is insufficient. Revisal, sec. 1566.\nCivil .actioN to obtain a divorce from bed and board on account of abandonment, beard on motion for alimony pendente lite, before Ferguson, J., at December Term, 1916, of Burke.\nThere was judgment allowing alimony, and defendant, having duly excepted, appealed.\nNo counsel for plaintiff.\nAvery & Huffman for defendant." }, "file_name": "0530-01", "first_page_order": 588, "last_page_order": 590 }