{
  "id": 11255487,
  "name": "C. E. GROVE et al. v. JOHN A. BAKER et al.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Grove v. Baker",
  "decision_date": "1917-12-12",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "745",
  "last_page": "748",
  "citations": [
    {
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      "cite": "174 N.C. 745"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "105 N. C., 192",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "94 N. C., 362",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
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    {
      "cite": "112 N. C., 607",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "111 N. C., 695",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
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      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
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    {
      "cite": "98 N. C., 517",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        11275203
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      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/98/0517-01"
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    {
      "cite": "157 N. C., 616",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "164 N. C., 337",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "172 N. C., 491",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "150 N. C., 542",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:13:24.898604+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "C. E. GROVE et al. v. JOHN A. BAKER et al."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Clark, C. J.\nThe defendants contend that the appeal from the order setting aside the finding on the third issue and awarding a new trial as to that is fragmentary and premature. This would be so if the partial new trial had been granted as a matter of discretion (Billings v. Observer, 150 N. C., 542, but the plaintiffs appealed from the refusal of their motion for judgment upon the verdict. The finding upon the third issue was set aside as a matter of law and not of discretion. The right to a judgment is a substantial right,- and from its erroneous refusal an appeal lies.\nAs the court found upon adequate evidence that the finding upon the third issue \u201cfrom 4 to 3 referred to those figures upon the map made by the county surveyor under order of the court, which was referred to by the court in its charge, blue-prints of which were given to the jury under such instructions,\u201d it was error to hold as a matter of law that the response to the third issue was too indefinite to justify judgment thereon.\nThe verdict of-the jury, taken in connection with the evidence in the case and the findings of fact by the judge, is entirely definite and entitled the plaintiffs to judgment in accordance therewith.\nIn Reynolds v. Express Co., 172 N. C., 491, it is said: \u201cIt is a recognized principle- in our system of procedure that a verdict may be interpreted and allowed significance by proper reference to the pleadings, the evidence, and the charge of the court.\u201d\n\u201cA verdict should be liberally and favorably construed with a view to sustaining it if possible, and in order to a proper apprehension of its significance resort may be had to the pleadings, the evidence, and the charge of the court.\u201d Donnell v. Greensboro, 164 N. C., 337. \u201cThe meaning of a verdict may be found by reference to the charge of the court.\u201d S. v. Murphy, 157 N. C., 616.\nIn this case the blue-prints which the jury had before them in deliberating upon their verdict and in returning the same was the official plat. A ease almost exactly in point is Smith v. Fite, 98 N. C., 517, an action of ejectment, where the jury found that the plaintiff was the owner of the land in dispute \u201cup to the red line upon our plat.\u201d The defendant moved for a new trial and to set aside tbe verdict for uncertainty. Tbe court rendered judgment in favor of tbe plaintiff up to tbe red line in accordance with tbe finding of tbe jury, and on appeal tbis Court affirmed tbe judgment, saying: \u201cTbe verdict refers to tbe plat wbicb, it is manifest was before tbe jury and tbe court, and wbicb bad, as tbe record shows, been prepared under an order of survey previously made in tbe cause, and we must assume tbat tbe reference to tbe- plat rendered tbe verdict intelligible and certain, upon wbicb tbe court could render judgment. Tbis is made plain by tbe reference to tbe verdict \u25a0contained in tbe judgment.\nIn tbis case tbe judge finds as a fact tbat tbe answer of tbe jury to tbe third issue \u201cfrom 4 to 3\u201d referred to tbe figures 4 to 3 as laid down \u25a0on tbe plat of tbe official court surveyor.\nIf the verdict was rendered in open court, the counsel for the defendants should then and there have made the objection for the alleged indefiniteness of the words \u201c4 to 3\u201d in the response to the third issue, and the court, of course, would at once have referred the matter to the jury. S. v. Whitson, 111 N. C., 695. Not having done so, the objection was waived. Indeed the jury could be reassembled. Luttrell v. Martin, 112 N. C., 607; Petty v. Rousseau, 94 N. C., 362.\nIt may be, though it does not appear here, tbat tbe jury could not be reassembled, but tbe judge, if such was tbe case, must be presumed to have acted upon testimony in making bis finding above set out. There is no allegation tbat there was no evidence to sustain such finding, and we must presume it to be correct.\nTbe appeal from tbe judgment is a sufficient assignment of error and no case on appeal is necessary.\nThe judgment setting aside the third issue as a matter of law for indefiniteness is therefore set aside, and the case is remanded tbat judgment may be entered in accordance with the verdict and the facts as found by the judge. When the judgment is so entered, the defendants will be entitled to appeal upon any exceptions taken by them at the trial if they have preserved such exceptions by filing them in the record. Bazemore v. Bridgers, 105 N. C., 192.\nReversed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Clark, C. J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Martin, Rollins & Wright for plaintiffs.",
      "M. W. Brown, James R. Merrimon, and J. M. Gudger, Jr., for defendants."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "C. E. GROVE et al. v. JOHN A. BAKER et al.\n(Filed 12 December, 1917.)\n1. Appeal and Error \u2014 Verdict Set Aside \u2014 Refusal of Judgment.\nWhere judgment upon the verdict has been asked and the judge sets aside an answer to one of the issues as a matter of law, and not within his discretion, the right demanded is a substantial one, and an appeal from its refusal will presently lie, and is not fragmentary.\n2. Verdicts \u2014 Answer to Issues \u2014 Definiteness\u2014Courts\u2014Findings of Fact. Where on a trial in ejectment a court map has been introduced and used by the parties and referred to in the court\u2019s instruction to the jury, and the true divisional line between the lands is in dispute, an answer to the issue that the line is between \u201c4 to 3\u201d is sufficiently definite upon which to render judgment, it being found as a fact by the trial judge that the response referred to'these figures upon the official map.\n3. Same \u2014 Waiver\u2014Presumptions\u2014Evidence. Where a verdict is rendered in open court, a party should then object to the indefiniteness of an answer to an issue, so the judge could submit it to the jury again, or he will be deemed to waive his objection; and when this course has not been taken and the judge has found sufficient facts upon which its definiteness is made to appear on appeal, his finding will be presumed to have been upon sufficient evidence, nothing else appearing.\n4. Appeal and Error \u2014 Refusal of Judgment \u2014 Verdict\u2014Objections and Exceptions \u2014 Case.\nWhere the trial judge erroneously sets aside an answer to an issue as a matter of law and refuses judgment upon the verdict the appellate court will reverse such action; but appellant\u2019s other exceptions, if properly taken, will be preserved to him.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from Shaw, J., at March Term, 1917, of Buk-combe.\nEjectment. The jury responded to the issues as follows:\n1. Are the plaintiffs the owners and entitled to the possession of the tract of land described in the complaint ? Answer: Yes.\n2. Are the defendants in the wrongful possession of said land, or any part thereof? Answer: Yes.\n3. Where is the true dividing line between the lot claimed by the plaintiff and that claimed by the defendant? Answer: 4 to 3.\n4. What damages, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled to recover? Answer: One dollar.\nThe plaintiffs moved for judgment upon the verdict. The defendants moved to strike out the response to the third issue as too indefinite and to grant a new trial on that issue. The court being of that opinion so ordered, \u201csimply as a matter of law, and not in the exercise of any discretion.\u201d\nThe court found the facts as follows: \u201cO. L. Israel, the county surveyor who had been appointed by order of the court to make a survey showing the lines in controversy and the contentions of the parties, was introduced as a witness on behalf of the plaintiffs. The said Israel, under the order appointing him surveyor, was ordered by the court to make maps and blue-prints, and they were used by him in explaining his testimony to the jury and were also used by the court and referred to by the court in its charge to the jury. The court also used said blueprints or maps in stating the contentions of the parties. The court finds as a fact that the answer of the jury to the third issue 'from 4 to 3? referred to the figures 4 to 3 as laid down on the plat of the official surveyor made by O. L. Israel, court surveyor, a copy of said map being-hereto attached and made a part of this judgment.\u201d\nThe plaintiffs appealed.\nMartin, Rollins & Wright for plaintiffs.\nM. W. Brown, James R. Merrimon, and J. M. Gudger, Jr., for defendants."
  },
  "file_name": "0745-01",
  "first_page_order": 801,
  "last_page_order": 804
}