{
  "id": 8652696,
  "name": "W. T. HUDNELL v. EAST CAROLINA LUMBER COMPANY",
  "name_abbreviation": "Hudnell v. East Carolina Lumber Co.",
  "decision_date": "1920-09-22",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "48",
  "last_page": "50",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "180 N.C. 48"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "178 N. C., 154",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        11271517
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/178/0154-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "169 N. C., 728",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 346,
    "char_count": 6490,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.456,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 5.3291202332302674e-08,
      "percentile": 0.3356892621925062
    },
    "sha256": "c4c716ec6c7850b1e037131827ee79d81ed66902b192b079d1b514e29effa4ea",
    "simhash": "1:35b2249b5f895adf",
    "word_count": 1124
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:30:08.757715+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "W. T. HUDNELL v. EAST CAROLINA LUMBER COMPANY."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "AileN, J.\nTbe authorities in this State sustain the doctrine for which the plaintiff contends, that deeds conveying timber, with a time specified for cutting, pass \u201can estate of absolute ownership, defeasible as to all timber not cut and removed within the specified period,\u201d and that a clause inserted in such deeds extending the time for cutting, upon the performance of certain conditions by the vendee, \u201cis in the nature of an option, and it is held by the great weight of authority that contracts of this character do not of themselves create any interest when the conditions are not performed and work a forfeiture when not strictly complied with.\u201d\nWe do not think, however, these principles have any application to the deed now before us. No condition is imposed on the vendee, nor is it required to pay money or do any other act before exercising the right to cut within five years from the date of the deed, and the right to do so is granted as a present interest'hy the deed-.\nThe two terms of two and five years are mentioned in the deed because the plaintiff was anxious to have the timber cut as soon as practicable, and the defendant thought it might require five years, and the consideration for the longer term was not something to be done thereafter by the purchaser, but the price agreed to be paid for the timber.\nUndoubtedly it was the duty of the defendant to exercise ordinary care to cut the timber within two years, because the longer period is given only in the event that it may be necessary, but his Honor finds, and we approve the finding, that the defendant commenced cutting, as soon as possible,- and prosecuted the work diligently, and that \u201cthe defendant was unable to cut and remove all said timber during the term of two years from 28 January, 1918, and additional time is necessary for the removal of the same.\u201d\nThese findings, while not binding on the parties if issues should be submitted to a jury, and are not conclusive on us, were properly made by the judge on a motion to dissolve a restraining order.\nTaylor v. Manger, 169 N. C., 728, and Ricks v. McPherson, 178 N. C., 154, furnish illustrations of cases where the 3,\u2019ight to cut during the longer period mentioned in a deed passed by the deed, and was self-executing without action on the part of the purchaser. In the deed before us, the purchaser is not required to pay anything or to give notice or do any other act before exercising the right to cut during the full period.\nWe are of opinion, therefore, the defendant had the right to continue cutting after the first period of two years expired, and that the restraining order was properly dissolved.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "AileN, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Small, MacLean, Bragaw & Rodman for plaintiff.",
      "Aydlett & Simpson for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "W. T. HUDNELL v. EAST CAROLINA LUMBER COMPANY.\n(Filed 22 September, 1920.)\n1. Deeds and Conveyances; \u2014 Timber Deeds \u2014 Contracts\u2014Cutting and Removing Timber.\nA contract for tbe sale or purchase of timber standing upon lands specifying a certain size, when cut, then standing, or which may be standing or growing during the term of two years from its date, or such time as may be necessary for the removal of the timber not exceeding five years, vests the title and the right to cut and remove the timber in the purchase for the five year period, when he had begun to cut it within the time specified in the contract, and the delay was not caused by any default of his own, but by conditions he could not control.\n3. Same \u2014 Extension Period for Cutting \u2014 Conditions Precedent.\nWhere five years is given \u00e1 purchaser of timber growing upon lands, if without delay attributable to him, it cannot be cut and removed in two years, the principle requiring the performance of a condition precedent or notice, within the first period, as upon the exercise of an option, has no-application.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Connor, J., by consent, at Wilson, on 20 May, 1920, from Pamlico.\nThis is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment dissolving an order restraining the defendant from cutting certain timber.\nOn 28 January, 1918, the plaintiff (now sole owner of the timber in controversy), together with E. L. M. Bonner (then owning one-half interest therein), conveyed, by timber deed or lease, certain timber of the size of 12 inches in diameter, 18 inches from the ground \u201cwhen cut, now standing, or growing, or which may he standing or growing, during the term of two years from the date hereof, or such time as may he necessary for the removal of said timber, not exceeding five years,\u201d on the land described in the deed. The consideration was $3 per thousand feet stumpage, and the defendant agreed to commence cutting within ninety days from 28 January, 1918, or as soon thereafter as possible.\nUpon the expiration of the two-year term specified in the contract, the defendant, not having cut and removed all the timber from the land, without request for additional time, and with no notice 'to plaintiff that additional time was necessary or desired, continued to cut and remove timber from said land, and now insists that its term is, substantially, five years.\nThe plaintiff contended that the deed passed the right to cut within two years with an option to extend to five years, and the defendant took the position that by the terms of the deed it had a full five-year term, instead of a two-year term.\nPlaintiff obtained a temporary order, and an order to .show cause, on 20 May, 1920, and upon the hearing the order was made dissolvidg the restraining order, and the plaintiff appealed.\nThe affidavits on file fully support the findings of his Honor, as follows: \u201cThat defendant commenced the cutting and logging of said, timber within ninety days from 28 January, 1918, or as soon thereafter as was possible, and has continued cutting 'and logging the said timber since such commencement; that owing to delays caused by temporary suspensions of operations for necessary repairs, to its mill and equipment, by its inability to secure sufficient and adequate labor for carrying on said operations, and\u2019by other unavoidable conditions incident to the cutting and logging the said timber, the defendant was unable to cut and remove all of said timber during the term of two years from 28 January, 1918, and additional time is necessary for the removal of the same.\n\u201cThat defendant did not request of plaintiff additional time for the removal of said timber, nor did it notify plaintiff that additional time was necessary prior to 28 January, 1920.\u201d\nSmall, MacLean, Bragaw & Rodman for plaintiff.\nAydlett & Simpson for defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0048-01",
  "first_page_order": 106,
  "last_page_order": 108
}