{ "id": 8653643, "name": "S. W. CARROLL v. VICTOR MANUFACTURING COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Carroll v. Victor Manufacturing Co.", "decision_date": "1920-11-17", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "366", "last_page": "368", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "180 N.C. 366" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "4 N. C., 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12125234 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/4/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 N. C., 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8683751 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/7/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 N. C., 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2098137 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/38/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 N. C., 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8693166 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/55/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 N. C., 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8683397 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/88/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 N. C., 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8685285 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/54/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 N. C., 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11277286 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/9/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 N. C., 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2101554 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/40/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 N. C., 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 N. C., 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11277507 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/63/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 N. C., 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8687998 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/56/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 N. C., 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2092629 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/67/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N. C., 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11273367 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/95/0156-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 471, "char_count": 8135, "ocr_confidence": 0.445, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.516764497825289e-08, "percentile": 0.4470723968849149 }, "sha256": "044ef9954fe265c47d39d085b9d22f2aef3265726fa77ea7ffa71b3d987abc1c", "simhash": "1:b0a1c477832367db", "word_count": 1453 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:30:08.757715+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "S. W. CARROLL v. VICTOR MANUFACTURING COMPANY." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Walker, J.,\nafter stating the ease: The will in question is the one considered at this term in Carroll v. Herring, post, 369, but our opinion was withheld, at the request of counsel for plaintiff in this appeal, so that we might have additional argument before deciding the question raised. We complied with the request, and after considering the briefs of counsel supplemented by an able, learned and most ingenious argument of counsel for the plaintiff, to which we listened with great interest, and also after hearing counsel of defendant in reply, we discover no reason for reversing our former opinion, and the judgment based upon it. It is very plain to us that James Carroll, Sr., intended that his will, with respect to this particular clause, should be considered and read as follows: \u201cI devise the two tracts of land (describing them) to my son, James A. Carroll, in fee; but if he die possessing the two tracts, or either of them, and without heirs, with remainder to the heirs of J. W. Carroll.\u201d Counsel for plaintiff contended that the expression, \u201cif he die without heirs possessing the land,\u201d means without heirs \u201cto possess\u201d the land, that is, if he die without heirs \u201ccapable of possessing\u201d the land. But this construction is wholly inadmissible. All heirs are supposed to be capable of inheriting from their ancestor, and the word \u201cheirs\u201d implies as much. The \u201cheirs of a person\u201d are those who can, or will, inherit his property from him if he die intestate. It is so defined in the dictionaries. So that we cannot adopt the contention of counsel. Such a construction would not only change the language of the will, by interpolating words not to be found therein, but it completely alters the sense or'meaning of it, and, therefore, it would be an unnatural and unreasonable interpretation of it. Counsel then fell back upon their second line of attack, and referred to the first item of the will (quoted in our statement of the case), and argued that it showed clearly what was meant by the item now under consideration. In the first item the testator devised land to his daughter in fee, and if she died without heirs of her body, and owning the land, then over. They, therefore, contended that the difference in phraseology indicated that the testator intended a difference in meaning. But we do. not think so, and the two items, when read together, plainly show that the testator intended to devise the land in fee to Ms children, with the right of disposal by them, but if they failed to dispose of it, then the land should go over as provided by him. He did not wish to handicap them, as his devisees, and the primary objects of his bounty, by giving them practically the bare possession and use of the land during their lives without the power of disposition, which is the most valuable right incident to a fee-simple estate. The provision \u201cif she dies owning the same,\u201d and \u201cif he dies without heirs possessing the lands, or either tract,\u201d were intended to be synonymous, the word \u201cpossessing\u201d referring to the devisee, James A. Carroll. But there are words in that clause of the will which settle this question, and they are \u201cpossessing these tracts of land, or either of them \u201d which manifestly mean that James A. Carroll should have the power of disposal of both tracts or either of them. If he disposed of only one, the other should go over, but not the one he had sold, and it follows, of course, that if he disposed of both, there should be no remainder. This view was not met by counsel in argument, because it could not be. It was the testator\u2019s intention that the words \u201cpossessing the land\u201d should refer to his son, J. A. Carroll, and not to the heirs, so that it would read, \u201cif he should die without heirs and owning the land,\u201d the remainder should pass to J. W. Carroll.\nIn construing a will we must look at the text and context, Campbell v. Crater, 95 N. C., 156, and if it is ungrammatical, or not punctuated, it should be read so as to make it consistent and sensible, Hoyle v. Whitener, 67 N. C., 252, and words of similar import or meaning should be construed alike, Lockhart v. Lockhart, 56 N. C., 205-206, and as the chief object is to ascertain the intention of the testator, words may be supplied, abstracted, and the grammatical arrangement disregarded, and clauses transposed in order to do so. Taylor v. Johnson, 63 N. C., 381; Baker v. Pender, 50 N. C., 352; Ward v. Sutton, 40 N. C., 421; Turner v. Whitted, 9 N. C., 613; Dew v. Barnes, 54 N. C., 149; Howerton v. Henderson, 88 N. C., 597; Lowe v. Carter, 55 N. C., 377; Williams v. McComb, 38 N. C., 450-453. \"We should construe the will by its context, where necessary, in order to arrive at the testator\u2019s intention, which must prevail, when it can fairly be found within the four corners of the instrument and the language he employed to express it, and provided it is not in contravention of any rule of construction or any principle of the law. Edens v. Williams, 7 N. C., 27; Williams v. Lane, 4 N. C., 246; Clement v. Collins, 2 Term (Eng.), 498-503.\nWe may compare one clause with another, so that \u201cevery string must give its sound\u201d without any discord, but in perfect harmony with the whole.\nThe Court adheres to its first opinion of the case, and approves the judgment.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Walker, J.," } ], "attorneys": [ "A. M. Moore for plaintiff.", "Oates & Herring and Rose & Rose for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "S. W. CARROLL v. VICTOR MANUFACTURING COMPANY.\n(Filed 17 November, 1920.)\n1. 'Wills \u2014 Estates\u2014Devise\u2014Fee\u2014Power of Sale \u2014 Remainders.\nA devise to a son in fee of two tracts of land, with power of sale and limitation, \u201cbut if lie die without heirs possessing the land, or either tract,\u201d to the heirs of another of his sons, tafeen in connection with the will in this case construed as a whole: Held, a devise of the land with the power to convey a fee-simple title during the devisee\u2019s life, which, in the event of his not conveying either or both tracks, would carry the limitation over, as directed in the will, and the expression \u201cwithout heirs possessing the land\u201d referred to the ownership of the title of the first taker at the time of his death.\n2. Same \u2014 Children\u2014-Equal Division \u2014 Synonymous Terms.\nIn construing the several devises in a will to ascertain whether or not it was the intent of the testator to divide his lands equally among his children, and to give to each the right to convey a fee, otherwise with limitation over: Held, under the will in this case, the terms, \u201cif she died without heirs of her body, and owning the land,\u201d then over, and \u201cto a son in fee if he die without heirs possessing the lands,\u201d etc., then over does not indicate that the testator intended a different meaning by a difference in phraseology, and the terms are synonymous.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Allen, J., at April Term, 1920, of Gumbek-LAND.\nThis was originally a petition for partition, begun before the clerk of Superior Court of Cumberland County, and upon the plea of sole seizin transferred to the Superior Court in term time. The matter was heard upon a case agreed as appears in the record, the pertinent facts being: James Carroll, Sr., who-owned the land in dispute, devised the same to his son, James A. Carroll, \u201cin fee,\u201d with the following limitation: \u201cBut if he die without heirs possessing these lands or either tract, with remainder to the heirs of J. W. Carroll.\u201d In the first item of the will, he gives certain property to his daughter, under the same condition, but using a different phraseology, to wit: \u201cBut in the event of her death without heirs of her body, I devise said lands, if she owns same at her death, to the heirs of my son, J. W. Carroll,\u201d etc. During his lifetime James A. Carroll, the devisee, sold and conveyed both tracts of land, and defendants claim under Ms grantee by mesne conveyances. Tbe devisee died intestate, without issue, and not in possession of the land, and the plaintiff, who is one of the heirs at law of J. W. Carroll, and has purchased the interest of the other heirs in the land which passed by the will now asserts that he owns the same. The court rendered judgment for defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.\nA. M. Moore for plaintiff.\nOates & Herring and Rose & Rose for defendant." }, "file_name": "0366-01", "first_page_order": 424, "last_page_order": 426 }