#### STATE v. LAURA SINGLETON.

(Filed 15 March, 1922.)

Instructions — Verdict Directing — Criminal Law — Appeal and Error— Prejudicial Error.

Except in instances oí admissions or evidence requiring explanation or reply of defendant, tlie burden of showing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is upon the State, and it is reversible error for the judge to instruct the jury, against the presumption of defendant’s innocence, that should they “believe the evidence,” though all for the State, to find the defendant guilty of the offense charged. The language of the charge is again disapproved.

Appeal by defendant from Crammer, J., at November Term, 1921, of "Wathe.

Criminal prosecution, tried upon an indictment charging tbe defendant with having willfully and unlawfully rented rooms in her bouse for purposes of prostitution in violation of Public Laws 1919, cb. 215.

Tbe State offered three witnesses, policemen of tbe city of Goldsboro, who testified in effect that they bad seen men going in and out of defend*739ant’s bouse; tbat ber reputation was bad, and tbat one Mira Brown bad been beard to swear, in tbe presence of tbe defendant, tbat sbe occupied one of ber rooms for immoral purposes. Tbe officers witnessed no acts of immorality.

Tbe defendant offered no evidence.

There was a verdict and judgment against tbe defendant, from wbicb sbe appealed, assigning errors.

Attorney-General Manning and Assistant Attorney-General Nash for the State.

J. F. Thompson for defendant.

Stacy, J.

At tbe close of tbe evidence bis Honor charged tbe jury as follows: “Gentlemen of tbe jury, you bave beard tbe evidence of tbe witnesses. If you believe tbe evidence, I instruct you tbat you will find tbe defendant Laura Singleton guilty.” To tbis instruction tbe defendant excepted, and tbe same is assigned as error. We think tbe exception is well taken, and under a uniform line of decisions it must be beld for reversible error. S. v. Alley, 180 N. C., 663; S. v. Boyd, 175 N. C., 793; Brooks v. Mill Co., 182 N. C., 260, and cases there cited.

Tbe defendant entered on tbe trial with tbe common-law presumption of innocence in ber favor. Her plea of not guilty east upon tbe State tbe burden of establishing ber guilt, not merely to tbe satisfaction of tbe jury, but beyond a reasonable doubt. Tbe evidence bere was not' compelling. Tbe jury might bave believed it and yet acquitted tbe defendant. Furthermore, it is error for tbe trial judge to direct a verdict in a criminal action, where there is no admission or presumption, calling for explanation or reply on tbe part of tbe defendant. S. v. Hill, 141 N. C., 769; S. v. Riley, 113 N. C., 651. See, also, S. v. Falkner, 182 N. C., 793.

We feel sure tbat tbe language employed was only an inadvertence on tbe part of tbe learned judge who tried tbe case; but again we are constrained to call attention to tbe fact tbat tbe form of expression, “If you believe tbe evidence,” should be eschewed in charging tbe juries in both criminal and civil actions. Merrell v. Dudley, 139 N. C., 58.

New trial.