{
  "id": 8656128,
  "name": "JOHN HALLIBURTON, et al. v. JOE PHIFER",
  "name_abbreviation": "Halliburton v. Phifer",
  "decision_date": "1923-05-02",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "366",
  "last_page": "368",
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      "cite": "185 N.C. 366"
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    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:46:28.944101+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "JOHN HALLIBURTON, et al. v. JOE PHIFER."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Stacy, J.\nThe defendant entered into a valid contract to purchase from plaintiffs a lot of land in the City of Charlotte; but, on tender of deed in due form purporting to convey same in fee simple, defendant refused to accept the deed and pay the purchase price, alleging and contending that plaintiffs were not seized in fee of said premises and could not convey an indefeasible fee-simple title to the locus in quo.\nThe agreed facts with reference to the title, as appear from the record, are as follows:\n1. Plaintiffs are the only heirs at law and sole devisees of Mrs. Lucy A. Halliburton, their widowed mother, who died in December, 1919, seized of a good and indefeasible fee-simple title to the land in question and leaving a will in holographic form, which was duly admitted to probate and which reads as follows:\n\u201cThis is to certify that I, Lucy Halliburton, will, that Alexander Halliburton, the younger son of same, shall have two-thirds of my income until he, Alexander Halliburton, is twenty-one years of age. Then the income shall be divided in one-half, each getting equal part, until Alexander Halliburton is twenty-five years old, after that time it shall be divided in one-half, and given one-half to each of my two sons, John Halliburton, and Alexander Halliburton, or, if they die leaving heirs, it shall go to the heirs of same.\n\u201cThis is my desire and will.\n\u201cSigned by their mother, Lucy Alexander Halliburton.\n\u201cAug. 23, 1911.\u201d\n2. John Halliburton is thirty-two years of age and Alexander Halliburton attained the age of twenty-five years during the month of June, 1922.\n3. It is agreed that if plaintiffs, as the sole devisees and heirs at law of the testatrix, acquired an indefeasible fee-simple title to the said \u25a0lot of land they now have and can convey such title.\nHis Honor, being of the opinion that the title offered was sufficient to convey a fee-simple estate, rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, and defendant appealed.\nThe objection urged by the defendant is that only the income and not the corpus of the property in question is devised to the plaintiffs under their mother\u2019s will. \"While, as a matter of technical syntax, the word \u201cit\u201d should probably be construed as taking the place of the antecedent noun \u201cincome,\u201d when the testatrix says \u201cafter that time it shall be divided in one-half,\u201d etc., yet we think it is manifest that she was here speaking of the corpus of her property. Her first desire seems to have been to give her younger son two-thirds of the income from her estate during his minority. Her next desire was to hold her estate intact until Alexander, the younger son, reached the age of twenty-five. She provided that when he had reached the age of twenty-one \u201cthe income shall be divided in one-half, each getting equal part, until Alexander is twenty-five years old, after that time it shall be divided in one-half, and given one-half to each of my two sons.\u201d If the word \u201cit\u201d be held to mean income, then the last part of this quotation would be but a bare repetition of the first. The testatrix undoubtedly intended to provide for a different disposition of her estate after Alexander reached the age of twenty-five than for the period between his ages of 21 and 25. To accomplish this end, tbe disposition necessarily mnst consist of something more than an equal division of the income between the two sons. The more rational construction and the only one which will give meaning to the whole will and every part thereof would seem to be that, upon Alexander\u2019s arriving at the age of twenty-five, \u201cit\u201d \u2014 the property itself and not the mere income \u2014 is to be divided into halves and given, that is, turned over, to the two sons equally. The use of the word \u201cgiven\u201d would seem to be significant when considered in connection with the prior provisions. Until he arrived at the age of twenty-one, Alexander was to \u201chave\u201d two-thirds of the income; then the income was to be divided equally, each \u201cgetting equal part\u201d until Alexander reached the age of twenty-five; but after that time \u201cit\u201d was to be divided and given equally to each. The word \u201cgiven\u201d in this connection would seem to connote a final surrender and disposition of the whole estate \u2014 a giving without further restriction. The provision that, in the event \u201cthey die leaving heirs, it shall go to the heirs of same,\u201d has reference, we think, to the death of one or both of the first takers before the arrival of the time when the property was to be \u201cgiven\u201d; that is, before the arrival of Alexander at the age of twenty-five.\nFurthermore, it has been held in a number of cases that a devise in perpetuity of the rents and profits, or of the income, of land passes the land itself in the absence of anything to indicate a contrary intention. Reed v. Reed, 9 Mass., 373; Manners v. Manners, 20 N. J. L., 142; Mayes v. Karn, 115 Ky., 264; 40 Cyc., 1536. See, also, Kornegay v. Morris, 122 N. C., 199.\nThe judgment of the Superior Court will be upheld.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Stacy, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Julia M. Alexander for plaintiffs.",
      "Clarkson, Taliaferro & Clarkson for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "JOHN HALLIBURTON, et al. v. JOE PHIFER.\n(Filed 2 May, 1923.)\n1. Wills \u2014 Devise\u2014Intent\u2014Income\u2014Heirs\u2014Estate.\nA will of the mother bequeathing two-thirds of the income from her estate to the youngest of her two sons until he is twenty-one years of age, and until he should reach the age of twenty-five, an equal division of this income between the two sons, and thereafter \u201cit\u201d was to be divided and equally given to each, is interpreted as changing the disposition of the whole estate after the youngest son has reached the age of twenty-five, at which time the corpus of the estate and not its income is to be given, or handed over to the two sons in equal parts, and held the provision that in the event \u201cthey die . . . leaving heirs, it shall go to the heirs of same,\u201d refers to the death of one or both of the sons before the time designated for the final disposition of the estate itself.\n2. Wills \u2014 Devise\u2014Rents\u2014Perpetuities\u2014Estates\u2014Lands.\nA devise in perpetuity of the rents and profits, or the income of land, passes the land itself in the absence of anything to indicate the testator\u2019s contrary intent.\nAppeal by defendant from Long, J., at April Term, 1923, of MECKLENBURG.\nControversy without action, submitted on an agreed statement of facts. The case involves the construction of a will.\nFrom a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, the defendant appealed, assigning errors.\nJulia M. Alexander for plaintiffs.\nClarkson, Taliaferro & Clarkson for defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0366-01",
  "first_page_order": 432,
  "last_page_order": 434
}