{ "id": 8653543, "name": "GEORGE W. GOLDING v. FOSTER & CAVINESS", "name_abbreviation": "Golding v. Foster", "decision_date": "1924-09-24", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "216", "last_page": "218", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "188 N.C. 216" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "184 N. C., 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11269457 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/184/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N. C., 607", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8657224 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/182/0607-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 N. C., 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11272757 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/153/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 N. C., 743", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12117519 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/64/0743-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N. C., 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8649935 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/114/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 N. C., 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11269524 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/184/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Mich., 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 1542116 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich/126/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 N. C., 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8653519 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/180/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 N. C., 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8660213 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/168/0407-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 415, "char_count": 6344, "ocr_confidence": 0.478, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.719567370958748e-08, "percentile": 0.29674046633606826 }, "sha256": "7ef0e042fa04420f7a7b93fe091d5613048291260ad98e6948db2bf2cfb742d1", "simhash": "1:43b3148c2ecde210", "word_count": 1065 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:44:41.585516+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GEORGE W. GOLDING v. FOSTER & CAVINESS." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Stacy, J.\nPlaintiff, a resident of Carteret County, brings this action against Foster & Oaviness, partners, doing business in the city of Greensboro, N. 0., to recover the value of 150 barrels of sweet potatoes shipped by plaintiff to defendants on 10 February, 1923.\nAfter exchanging telegrams relative to the price of Porto Rico potatoes for prompt shipment, the defendants, on 2 February, sent the plaintiff the following message: \u201cShip hundred fifty barrels Porto Ricos today. Wire car number.\u201d In reply to this order, plaintiff answered on the same day: \u201cWill ship Monday.\u201d The potatoes were not shipped on Monday,. 5 February. Whereupon defendants wired plaintiff, on Wednesday, 7 February, as follows: \u201cWhen are you going to ship potatoes? Booked shipment. Answer quick.\u201d Plaintiff did not answer this telegram, but shipped the potatoes on 10 February, three days thereafter. Defendants declined to accept the potatoes, when notified of their arrival by the railroad company on 14 February, because not shipped according to instructions and as they were compelled to go upon the market and purchase other potatoes to supply their trade.\nIn explanation of why he failed to answer defendants\u2019 telegram of 7 February, plaintiff said he had written a letter on Tuesday, 6 February, advising defendants that he was unable to ship on account of weather conditions. There was evidence on behalf of the defendants that they never received this letter. Plaintiff also testified that he wired defendants on Saturday, 10 February, at time of shipment, giving car number, as requested, but receipt of this message was denied by defendants.\nAssuming the jury found that plaintiff\u2019s letter of 6 February was received by the defendants, there is nothing on the record to show its contents, other than stated above, and such was not sufficient to relieve the plaintiff from the necessity of answering defendants\u2019 telegram of 7 February. No binding contract had been made prior to that time (13 C. J., 281), and the defendants\u2019 message, in terms, called for \u201canswer quick.\u201d Nor would plaintiff\u2019s telegram of 10 February suffice, even if sent and delivered, which is denied. Leffel v. Hall, 168 N. C., 407.\nDefendants\u2019 order of 2 February was for 150 barrels of potatoes, to be shipped that day. Plaintiff\u2019s reply that he would ship on the following Monday, three days later, amounted to a refusal to accept the offer as made, and constituted a counter-proposal to ship at a later date. Wilson v. Lumber Co., 180 N. C., 271; U. S. Heater Co. v. Applebaum, 126 Mich., 296. There was no acceptance of this counter-proposal, unless the defendants\u2019 silence could be taken as equivalent to assent. May v. Menzies, 184 N. C., 150. But even if this be true, the plaintiff failed to ship according to his own offer. The defendants\u2019 telegram of 7 February called for an immediate answer, and there is nothing on the record to justify plaintiff\u2019s delay in this respect. 6 R. C. L., 614. The minds of the parties never met, and no binding contract has been established upon which plaintiff may recover.\nSpeaking to a similar situation, in Cozart v. Herndon, 114 N. C., 252, Shepherd, C. J., said: \u201cIt is well-settled that in order to constitute a contract there must be \u2018a proposal squarely assented to.\u2019 If the proposal be assented to with a qualification, then the qualification must go back to the proposer for his adoption, amendment or rejection. If the acceptance be not unqualified, or go to the actual thing proposed, then there is no binding contract. A proposal to accept, or acceptance based upon terms varying from those offered, is a rejection of the offer. 1 Wharton Cont., 4. \u2018The respondent is at liberty to accept wholly, or reject wholly, but one of these things he must do; for if he answer, not rejecting, but proposing to accept under some modification, this is a rejection of the offer.\u2019 1 Parson Oont., 476. Tt amounts to a counter-proposal, and this must be accepted and its acceptance communicated to the proposer; otherwise there is no contract.\u2019 Pollock Cont., 10.\u201d\nAnd of like tenor is the language of Mr. Justice Washington, in Eliason v. Henshaw, 17 U. S., p. 228: \u201cIt is an undeniable principle of the law of contracts that an offer of a bargain by one person to another imposes no obligation upon the former until it is accepted by the latter, according to the terms in which the offer was made. Any qualification of, or departure from, those terms invalidates the offer, unless the same be agreed to by the person who made it. Until the terms of the agreement have received the assent of both parties, the negotiation is open, and imposes no obligation upon either.\u201d\nThe case is unlike Crook v. Cowan, 64 N. C., 743, the \u201ccarpet case,\u201d for there a contract had been consummated and the parties were not dealing with perishable goods to be sold to the trade, as in the instant case.\nThe principles of law applicable to the facts here presented are stated, with citation of authorities, in Green v. Grocery Co., 153 N. C., 409; Rucker v. Sanders, 182 N. C., 607, and Jeanette v. Hovey, 184 N. C., 140. An examination of these cases, and the principles they illustrate, will suffice to show that the plaintiff here has failed to establish any enforceable contract. 23 R. C. L., 1280. Upon the record, the defendants\u2019 motion for judgment as of nonsuit should have been allowed.\nReversed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Stacy, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "0. JR,. Wheatley for plaintiff.", "Graham W. Duncan for defendants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GEORGE W. GOLDING v. FOSTER & CAVINESS.\n(Filed 24 September, 1924.)\nContracts \u2014 Vendor and Purchaser \u2014 Conditional Acceptance of Order of Purchase \u2014 Carriers.\nAn offer to buy does not become a contract unless unconditionally accepted, or, when the acceptance is upon condition, until this condition is accepted by the proposed purchaser; and where a carload of potatoes has been ordered by telegraph to be shipped that day, but were shipped several days thereafter without further agreement, the proposed purchaser may refuse to receive it from the common carrier, and no contractual liability will attach to him.\nAppeal by defendants from Daniels, J., at June Term, 1924, of Car-TERET.\nCivil action to recover the price of a carload of potatoes.\nUpon denial of liability and issues joined, there was a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff. Defendants appeal, assigning errors.\n0. JR,. Wheatley for plaintiff.\nGraham W. Duncan for defendants." }, "file_name": "0216-01", "first_page_order": 286, "last_page_order": 288 }