#### MARTIN WOOLAND v. SAMUEL DEAN.

The act of 1822 (1 Rev. Stat. c. 58, sec. 7,) for the relief of insolvent debtors, extends only to debts arising ex contractu, and not to those incurred for a penalty, or ex delicto.

The plaintiff, as overseer of a road, warranted the defendant, one of his hands, for the penalty incurred by the latter, in failing to work on the road, obtained a judgment, and had a capias ad satisfaciendum issued thereon. The defendant, upon being taken by the ca. sa., gave a bond for his appearance at the next County Court, and notified the plaintiff of his intention to apply for the benefit of the act of 1822, (1 Rev. Stat. c. 58, sec. 7,) passed for the relief of insolvent debtors. The plaintiff appeared, and opposed the application, upon the ground that this case did not come within the act. The Court being of that opinion, refused to administer the oath; and the defendant appealed to the Superior Court. At Beaufort, on the last Circuit, his Honor Judge Dick, decided that the defendant was entitled to the benefit of the act; and the plaintiff appealed.

Neither of the parties were represented in this Court.

Daniel, Judge.

The debt in this case, for which the plaintiff obtained a judgment, was incurred by the defendant as a penalty inflicted by the law, for omitting to do a public duty, viz., working on the road. The legislature did not intend to extend the benefit of the act of 1822 to every description of debtors, who should be arrested under a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum. It was intended for the benefit of those who had voluntarily contracted or assented to a debt for which they might by law be arrested under a ca. sa. Where the judgment on which theca, sa. issues is founded on any “ debt contracted either by note, bill, bond, open account or otherwise,” the defendant in guch case shall be entitled to the benefit of the act. Debts incurred by persons in violating any of the statutes im*491posing penalties, or debts upon judgments in causes of action arising ex delicto, are not within the provisions of the act of 1822. Only such persons whose indebtedness arose in cases ex contractu were intended to be aided by the act. The defendant’s case is not embraced either in the words of the act, or in the meaning of the legislature that passed it. We are of the opinion that the judgment must be reversed.

PeR Curiam. Judgment reversed.