Pursuant to tbe Municipal Finance Act (C. S., cb. 56, Art. 23) tbe city council of tbe city of Greensboro passed an ordinance providing for tbe sale of bonds in an amount not exceeding $65,000 for tbe purpose of buying a site and erecting tbereon and equipping an abattoir for tbe benefit of tbe city; providing also for tbe annual levy and collection of a. tax to pay tbe interest as it accrues and tbe bonds as tbey mature. Tbe ordinance bas not been submitted to and approved by a majority of tbe qualified voters in tbe city, and it is tbe intention of tbe city council immediately to advertise and sell tbe bonds without calling an election. Tbe suit was brought to enjoin tbe city from issuing tbe bonds on tbe ground that an abattoir is not a necessary municipal expense. His Honor adjudged that it is a necessary expense; so tbe only point for decision is tbe correctness of bis judgment.
“No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall contract any debt, pledge its faith or loan its credit, nor shall any tax be levied or collected by any officers of tbe same except for tbe necessary expenses thereof, unless by a vote of tbe majority of tbe qualified voters therein.” Const., Art. VII, sec. 7. In Henderson v. Wilmington, ante, 269, we bad occasion to say: “Tbe decisions heretofore rendered by tbe Court make tbe test of a ‘necessary expense’ tbe purpose for which tbe expense is to be incurred. If tbe purpose is tbe maintenance of tbe public peace; if it partakes of a governmental nature or purports to be an exercise by tbe city of a portion of tbe State’s delegated sovereignty; if, in brief, it involves a necessary governmental expense — in these cases tbe expense required to effect tbe purpose is ‘necessary’ within tbe meaning of Art. VII, sec. 7, and tbe power to incur such expense is not dependent on tbe will of tbe qualified voters.” Tbe immediate inquiry, therefore, is *593whether the purchase of the site and the building of an abattoir is a governmental expense.
In his complaint the appellant says that the proposed abattoir is to be used as a place where animals may be inspected and slaughtered; also where meat may be inspected before it is exposed to sale on the market. Such inspection may be referred to the exercise by the city of the delegated police power of the State. That this power may be delegated to a municipal corporation is no longer to be questioned. S. v. Austin, 114 N. C., 855; S. v. Vanhook, 182 N. C., 831; Gunter v. Sanford, 186 N. C., 452; S. v. Weddington, 188 N. C., 643. The enforcement of police regulations is a governmental function, 19 R. C. L., 697(a), and it has been said that upon the exercise of this power depend the life, safety, health, morals, and the comfort of the citizen, the enjoyment of private and social life, the beneficial use of property, and the security of social order. Slaughterhouse cases, 16 Wall, 62. It is upon this principle that the expense of providing water, sewerage, a fire department, a markethouse, an incinerator, and similar improvements is deemed to be the necessary governmental expense of a city or town. We see no sound reason why the principle should not extend to and include an abattoir, which is intended as a protection against disease. Henderson v. Wilmington, supra; Storm v. Wrightsville Beach, 189 N. C., 679; Scales v. Winston-Salem, ibid., 469; Dayton v. Asheville, 185 N. C., 12. We think the judgment should be
Affirmed.