{
  "id": 8621868,
  "name": "STATE v. JAMES JEFFREYS",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Jeffreys",
  "decision_date": "1926-10-20",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "318",
  "last_page": "321",
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    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:52:38.190415+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STATE v. JAMES JEFFREYS."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "BeogdeN, J.\nThere are seven exceptions appearing in the record. The first exception is to the following question and answer: \u201cHow soon after be was arrested?\u201d (wben State\u2019s witness identified defendant) A. \u201cNext morning.\u201d\nThis exception is without merit, because the identity of defendant was one of the main questions in the case, and the fact that the officer testified that the \u201cState\u2019s witness identified the defendant soon after he was arrested was corroborative of the evidence of the State\u2019s witness, Mrs. Griffin, who testified that she did identify the defendant at the jail the next morning after he was arrested.\nThe second exception was to the following question and answer in reference to the physical condition of prosecutrix immediately after the assault: \u201cDid she complain?\u201d .A. \u201cYes; she said she could hardly sit up.\u201d\nThis evidence was competent to prove that an assault had actually been committed. Certainly, if the State\u2019s witness had not been assaulted, there was no crime, and the proof of a crime was an essential part of the State\u2019s case.\nTherefore, the bodily condition of Mrs. Griffin was competent. \u201cWhenever the bodily or mental feelings or condition of an individual are material to be proved, the usual expression of such feelings are admissible as original evidence.\u201d S. v. Hargrave, 97 N. C., 457; Sherrill v. Tel. Co., 117 N. C., 353; Lockhart\u2019s Hand Book of Evidence, sec. 209; Howard v. Wright, 173 N. C., 339.\nThe third and fifth exceptions are taken because of the refusal of the trial judge to nonsuit the case. These exceptions cannot be sustained. The defendant was positively identified by the prosecutrix, who also testified that he was the man who had assaulted her. It was, therefore, necessary to submit the case to the jury.\nThe fourth exception is to the following question asked the defendant on cross-examination: \u201cWhy didn\u2019t you ask that man out at Mordecai what he wanted you for and what did they arrest you on Hills-boro street one time for?\u201d This exception cannot be sustained. The question was for the purpose of impeaching the witness and was therefore competent. S. v. Lawhorn, 88 N. C., 634; S. v. Holder, 153 N. C., 606; S. v. Winder, 183 N. C., 776.\nThe sixth exception is to the refusal of the trial judge to give the following instruction: \u201cThat evidence of the good character of a witness for defendant, introduced to establish an alibi, shall be not only considered as affecting the credibility of such witness, but as substantive evidence of the truth of the alibi relied upon by the defendant.\u201d The court properly declined to give this instruction. In no aspect of the law could evidence as to the good character of a witness tend to prove that a defendant or some other person was not at a particular place at a particular time. The purpose of character evidence is to enable tbe jury to place tbe proper estimate upon tbe testimony of a witness. S. v. Cloninger, 149 N. C., 567; S. v. Morse, 171 N. C., 777.\nTbe seventh exception is as follows: \u201cThat it was tbe duty of tbe court to charge tbe jury that, defendant having relied upon an alibi, tbe burden was upon tbe State to show conclusively and decisively that tbe defendant was tbe person that committed tbe offense, and that be was present at tbe time and place when said offense was committed. And tbe court erred in charging the jury that upon tbe evidence in tbe case tbe jury would be justified in finding that some other than defendant committed tbe offense. There was no admission on part of defendant or bis counsel that would give weight to this charge by bis Honor.\u201d This is a broadside exception to tbe charge of tbe court without specifying any particular error. \u2022\nWe have examined tbe charge of tbe court with great care, and this examination discloses that tbe charge presented every phase of defendant\u2019s defense, fully and impartially, and is free from legal error.\nTbe alibi of the defendant was strong and supported by witnesses of good character, and, upon tbe evidence offered in bis behalf, if believed, be was not guilty. But tbe weight of tbe evidence is for tbe jury and not for tbe court. Tbe jury, upon competent evidence, has convicted tbe defendant of a capital offense, and tbe judgment as a matter of law must be upheld.\nNo error.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "BeogdeN, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "F. T. Bennett for defendant.",
      "Attorney-General Brummitt and Assistant Attorney-General Nash for the State."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE v. JAMES JEFFREYS.\n(Filed 20 October, 1926.)\n1. Rape \u2014 Assault\u2014Evidence\u2014Identity.\nWhere in an action for rape the defense is an alibi, and the prosecutrix has positively identified the prisoner as her assailant, and her testimony was corroborated by the other State\u2019s witnesses, evidence that the defendant was identified as the assaulter the next morning after he was arrested, was not erroneously admitted.\nS. Same \u2014 Declarations.\nIn an action for rape, testimony that the prosecuting witness said soon after the assault \u201cshe could hardly sit up,\u201d is competent to show the assault had been committed, when the identity of the defendant has been shown.\n3. Evidence \u2014 Nonsuit\u2014Criminal Daw.\nWhere the assault and the identity of the prisoner have been directly testified to, defendant\u2019s motion as of nonsuit upon the evidence is properly denied, upon his defense of an alibi.\n4. Evidence \u2014 Corroboration\u2014Criminal Daw.\nHeld, in this action for rape, the admission of certain testimony tending to impeach the defendant\u2019s testimony, was not erroneous.\n5. Evidence \u2014 Character\u2014Substantive Evidence.\nThe evidence of the good character of a witness who has testified for the defendant in an action for rape, cannot be considered as substantive evidence to sustain an alibi he has set up as a defense.\n6. Appeal and Error \u2014 Objections and Exceptions \u2014 Broadside Exceptions.\nAn exception that does not particularize as to the error complained of in the admission of evidence, is objectionable as a broadside exception.\nIndictmeNT for rape, tried before Barnhill, Judge Presiding, and a jury, at May Term, 1926, of 'Wake.\nTbe evidence for the State tended to show that on Saturday morning, 19 December, 1925, between eight and nine o\u2019clock, Mrs. Sarah Griffin, a white woman, about fifty years of age, was assaulted near the city rock quarry in Raleigh.\nMrs. Griffin testified that she had seen the said defendant on Friday morning when he had passed by her on the road, and she also testified that she had never seen the man before. She further testified that the defendant \u201chad an old light overcoat on and a cap and was a yellow man; that the same man sits there. I know he is the man. I don\u2019t believe anything about it. If I were to live as old again as I am I would know him.\u201d She also testified: \u201cHe had that overcoat on, light yellow-looking coat like the one he has on.\u201d There was also evidence tending to show that she described her assailant as a \u201ctall, yellow negro\u201d with scar and freckles, did not know which, and had a \u201cmean-looking eye.\u201d .\nThe defendant was arrested by police officers in April, 1926, and, while in custody, Mrs. Griffin was asked to come to- the jail and see whether or not the defendant was the person who assaulted her. She identified the prisoner.\nThe defendant denied the assault or that he had ever seen the prosecuting witness; and further asserted that, on 19 December, he was working for Mr. W. H. Harris; that he reached the home of Mr. Harris about seven o\u2019clock and was there on his premises cutting wood until four o\u2019clock in the afternoon. Both Mr. Harris and his wife corroborated the defendant, and Mrs. Harris testified: \u201cDo not think they left there because the axes were running all the time. . . . They first called for the axes between seven and seven-thirty.\u201d . . . The home of Mr. Harris was about a mile from the Rock Quarry road where the assault took place.\nIn regard to the overcoat which the defendant had on, Mr. I. M. Bailey testified that it was his overcoat and was in his possession until about 1 January, 1926, when he gave the coat to a negro named Spencer Thomas. Thomas testified that he got the coat from Mr. Bailey about the second week in January and loaned it to the defendant, Jim Jeffreys, the day before he was arrested.\nMessrs. W. B. Hunter, E. B. Crow, Carey X. Durfey and J. T. Mallard testified as to the good character of Mr. and Mrs. Harris.\nV. E. Lane, witness for the defendant, testified that on Saturday before Christmas he saw Jim Jeffreys and John Jeffreys, together with their mother, pass the railroad shop between six and seven o\u2019clock, and that he asked them to cut wood for' him, but that the mother said they were cutting wood for Mr. Harris.\nThere was also testimony as to the good character of the State\u2019s witness, Mrs. Griffin.\nThe jury rendered a verdict of guilty, and thereupon judgment was entered sentencing the defendant to death as provided by law,- from which judgment the defendant appealed.\nF. T. Bennett for defendant.\nAttorney-General Brummitt and Assistant Attorney-General Nash for the State."
  },
  "file_name": "0318-01",
  "first_page_order": 392,
  "last_page_order": 395
}
