{ "id": 2217726, "name": "GEORGE LOCKHART v. PILOT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, and FLORENCE HAILEY, Interpleader", "name_abbreviation": "Lockhart v. Pilot Life Insurance", "decision_date": "1927-01-12", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "8", "last_page": "12", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "193 N.C. 8" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "129 N. C., 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8661310 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/129/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 N. C., 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8661172 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/132/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N. C., 683", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8657656 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/182/0683-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 U. S., 195", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3533634 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/128/0195-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 477, "char_count": 12481, "ocr_confidence": 0.458, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8528249187408582e-07, "percentile": 0.7237557093096934 }, "sha256": "acbd5fa050aff3e0f198d1e8bfefd011373db6cb2606f0f5febc349610d93dab", "simhash": "1:0721f8e084c12c97", "word_count": 2169 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:08:43.639996+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GEORGE LOCKHART v. PILOT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, and FLORENCE HAILEY, Interpleader." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Clarkson, J.\nThe defendant, Pilot Insurance Co., introduced no evidence, but admitted that it owed the amount of the policy either to plaintiff or the intervener. It made no appeal to this Court. The policy of insurance was not introduced in evidence by any of the litigants. Plaintiff\u2019s main contentions are: \u201cThat he was entitled to an instruction that upon the whole evidence he should recover: (a) Having proved by admission of tbe defendant tbat tbe policy was issued; (b) tbat the plaintiff was tbe beneficiary; (c) tbat tbe insured was dead and tbe policy was in full force and effect; (d) tbat tbis established a vested right in tbe plaintiff as beneficiary and there being no proof tbat the insured, much less tbe defendant company, bad reserved any right to change tbe beneficiary and such attempt, if any was made, was void; (e) tbat tbe only evidence tbe interpleader offered was not admitted against tbe plaintiff and so announced by tbe court.\u201d\nTbe intervener contends: \u201cTbe main question in tbis case is tbat of identity of beneficiary at tbe time of insured\u2019s death. Tbe plaintiff proved tbat 'at the time of the issuance of the policy\u2019 be was beneficiary, and stopped bis proof there.\u201d\nWe think tbe only question involved in tbe appeal \u2014 -who was entitled to tbe $300.00 on tbe death of plaintiff\u2019s wife, Millie Lockhart? Tbe defendant Insurance Company admitted tbe policy, when issued, was payable on tbe death of Millie Lockhart, to plaintiff. So far as plaintiff\u2019s rights are concerned there was no evidence introduced to show tbat tbe company bad any provision in tbe policy to change tbe beneficiary. Tbe mere fact tbat tbe Insurance Company alleges \u201ctbat prior to tbe death of tbe said Millie Lockhart tbe beneficiary in said policy was duly changed or attempted to be changed to Florence Hailey,\u201d etc., cannot affect tbe plaintiff\u2019s vested right without proof.\nThere is no allegation or proof in tbe record by tbe Insurance Company or tbe intervener, to show tbat tbe Insurance Company bad a right, under tbe provisions of tbe policy, to change tbe beneficiary from plaintiff in favor of tbe intervener, Florence Hailey.\nIn Wooten v. Order of Odd Fellows, 176 N. C., at p. 56, it is held: \u201cTbe general rule is tbat tbe right to a policy of insurance, at least to one of tbe ordinary character, and to tbe money which may become due under it, vests immediately, upon its being issued, in tbe person who is named in it as beneficiary, and tbat tbis interest, being vested, cannot be transferred by tbe insured to any other person (Central National Bank v. Hume, 128 U. S., 195) without bis consent. Tbis does not bold true, however, when tbe contract of insurance provides for a change of tbe beneficiary by tbe insured, or such a right arises in some other way, for in such a case tbe right of tbe beneficiary vests conditionally only, and is subject to be defeated by tbe terms of tbe very contract, or instrument, which created it, and is destroyed by tbe execution of tbe reserved power. These principles, we take it, are well settled by tbe highest authority and great weight of judicial opinion,\u201d citing numerous cases.\nIt is well settled by a long line of decisions tbat tbe burden is on tbe intervener and he or she is entitled to but one issue: \u201cDoes tbe fund belong to her?\u201d Maynard v. Ins. Co., 132 N. C., p. 711.\nIn Hill v. Patillo, 187 N. C., at p. 532, it is held: \u201cIn such a proceeding the intervener is not called on or required, and indeed he is not permitted to question the validity of plaintiff\u2019s claim against defendant, nor to file any answer thereto which denies or tends to deny its validity. On the contrary, the intervener has himself become the actor' in the suit and on authority is restricted to the issue whether his claim of right and title is superior to that of the original plaintiff. Mitchell v. Talley, 182 N. C., 683; Maynard v. Ins. Co., 132 N. C., 711; Cotton Mills v. Weil, 129 N. C., 452.\u201d Sitterson v. Speller, 190 N. C., p. 192.\nThe fact that the court below put the burden on plaintiff and he made no exception, is immaterial under the facts in this case. The laboring oar was on the intervener to show title to the insurance money. From the evidence, plaintiff had vested interest in the fund and the burden was on the intervener to show, by competent evidence, that it was divested and she was entitled to it. This was not done and the charge of the court below cannot be sustained.\nIn Lanier v. Insurance Company, 142 N. C., at p. 18, it is held: \u201cUnder the terms of the policy sued on, plaintiff had such an interest as entitled her to recover upon the death of the insured if the premiums had been paid and the policy was otherwise in force, unless the defendant company could show it had been lawfully surrendered by her consent, or that the insured had duly and legally exercised the power reserved in the clause quoted, entitled \u2018change of beneficiary.\u2019 . . . To successfully resist a recovery upon such ground the burden of proof is on defendant to show a strict compliance by the insured with the provisions of such clause in the policy before the rights of the plaintiff could be divested without her consent.\u201d\nIn its answer the insurance, company is practically a stakeholder, admitting it owed either the plaintiff or the intervener. The burden was on the intervener.\nFor the reasons given there must be a\nNew trial.", "type": "majority", "author": "Clarkson, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "R. B. Redwine for plaintiff.", "Vann & Millilcen for intervener." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GEORGE LOCKHART v. PILOT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, and FLORENCE HAILEY, Interpleader.\n(Filed 12 January, 1927.)\n1. Insurance, Life \u2014 Policies\u2014Contracts\u2014Vested Rights.\nWhere a life insurance policy is in full force at the time of the death of the insured, and issued in favor of a designated beneficiary by name, such beneficiary having acquired a vested right under the policy contract may recover thereon as against the right of another to whom the policy has on its face been attempted to have been changed, there being no evidence that the policy itself authorized a change of this character to be made, or that the original beneficiary had thereto assented.\n2. Same \u2014 Change of Beneficiary \u2014 Evidence.\nWhere a policy of life insurance has matured upon the death of the . insured, and on its face the beneficiary appears to have been changed, the interpleader, relying upon this change, has the burden of proof to establish it.\n3. Same \u2014 Burden of Proof.\nWhere a life insurance company acknowledges that it is obligated for the payment of its policy of insurance, but that it is claimed by two different persons as beneficiary, and one of them interpleads in the action, and founds her right to recover on the ground that the policy contract had been changed to her as the beneficiary, the burden rests upon her to establish her right.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Lane, J., and a jury, at August Term, 1926, of Union. New trial.\nPlaintiff brought this action against defendant to recover $300 on an insurance policy, No. L51477, issued by it 18 August, 1924, on the life of plaintiff\u2019s wife, Millie Lockhart. The policy was made payable to plaintiff on the death of his wife, who died 1 January, 1926. Due proof of death, in accordance with terms of policy, was furnished the defendant insurance company. The plaintiff kept all the premiums paid, as required by the policy, and the policy was in full force and effect at tbe death of Millie Lockhart. Demand was duly made by plaintiff on defendant for the amount of the policy, $300. These facts are not disputed by the defendant insurance company, but in its further answer it says: \u201cThat prior to the death of the said Millie Lockhart, the beneficiary in said policy was changed or attempted to be changed to Florence Hailey, a sister of the said Millie Lockhart, and the said change in beneficiary was duly endorsed on the policy issued on the life of the said Millie Lockhart, and that the said Florence Hailey has made demand upon this defendant for the payment of said $300, the amount of the policy, to her. That the defendant admits that it is liable in the amount of' three hundred dollars, the amount of said policy, either to George Lockhart the plaintiff, or to Florence Hailey, the other claimant, and that it is ready, willing and anxious to pay said amount to the proper party, but that demand has been made, both by the plaintiff and the said Florence Hailey, each claiming as beneficiary under said policy, and this defendant is therefore advised and believes that it is necessary that the said Florence Hailey should be made a party to this proceedings, so that she may come in and assert her rights in said cause, so that the amount of the policy may be paid to the party entitled thereto.\u201d\nFlorence Hailey intervenes or interpleads, and says: \u201cPrior to her death the said Millie Lockhart, with the consent of the Pilot Life Insurance Company, changed the beneficiary named in said policy, to wit, the plaintiff George Lockhart, to this interpleader, and this interpleader is the beneficiary of said policy and is entitled to the proceeds thereof.\u201d\nIn answer to the interplea, the plaintiff alleges: (1) Mental incapacity on part of Millie Lockhart and undue influence and fraud on part of Florence Hailey to induce Millie Lockhart to change the policy; (2) an agreement with his wife as to a policy on his life payable to her at his death; \u201cand he,'the plaintiff was to pay all the premiums, assessments or dues on said policy so long as she might live with the distinct understanding that the policy on the life of his said wife should be paid to him upon the death of his said wife, and he did keep all the assessments, dues or premiums on both of said policies paid to the death of his said wife in keeping with his said agreement, and therefore has the right to the benefit of said policy as the defendant should well know.\u201d\nOn the trial the court below ruled that plaintiff proceed to prove his case \u2014 to this there was no exception by plaintiff. The plaintiff introduced the complaint and answer showing admissions as before set forth. This evidence was admitted against the insurance company, but not against the intervener. The plaintiff rested.\nFlorence Hailey, the intervener, testified: That she was the person to whom the policy in question was alleged to have been changed; that she never received anything from the defendant on said policy. She introduced paragraph one of the defendant\u2019s further defense and further answer, as follows: \u201cThat it is true that on 18 August, 1924, it issued a policy in the amount of $300 on the life of Millie Lockhart, payable to George Lockhart, her husband, as beneficiary, and that all premiums due on said policy were paid up to the time of the death of Millie Lock-hart; the defendant further says, however, that prior to the death of the said Millie Lockhart, the beneficiary in said policy was duly changed or attempted to be changed to Florence Hailey, a sister of the said Millie Lockhart, and that the said Florence Hailey has made demand upon this defendant for the payment of the said $300, the amount of the policy, to her.\u201d The court stated that this paragraph was admitted as against the defendant, but not as against the plaintiff. Interpleader Florence Hailey rested.\nThe plaintiff tendered issue as follows: \u201cIn what amount, if any, is the defendant, Pilot Insurance Company, indebted to the plaintiff?\u201d\nThe plaintiff requested the court to charge the jury that if they believed the evidence, they would answer the above issue submitted by him \u201c$300, with interest from 2 March, 1926, until paid.\u201d The court refused to submit the issue tendered or to give the instruction, to which ruling the plaintiff excepted and assigned error.\nThe court submitted to the jury the issue, as follows: \u201cIn what amount, if any, is the Pilot Life Insurance Company indebted to the interpleader, Florence Hailey?\u201d\nThe court charged the jury that if they believed the evidence, they should answer the issue submitted that the defendant was indebted to the interpleader in the sum of $300 with interest from 1' January, 1926. This was the only instruction given by the court to the jury. To the court\u2019s submitting the issue and instruction, the plaintiff excepted and assigned error.\nThe jury answered the issue according to the court\u2019s instruction in favor of the interpleader, to which plaintiff excepted and assigned error. Judgment was rendered on the verdict and plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court.\nR. B. Redwine for plaintiff.\nVann & Millilcen for intervener." }, "file_name": "0008-01", "first_page_order": 86, "last_page_order": 90 }