{ "id": 8629353, "name": "WELLINGTON-SEARS & COMPANY v. DIZE AWNING AND TENT COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Wellington-Sears & Co. v. Dize Awning & Tent Co.", "decision_date": "1929-03-20", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "748", "last_page": "752", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "196 N.C. 748" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "195 N. C., 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628146 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/195/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 N. C., 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627684 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/195/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 N. C., 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11252811 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/141/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 N. C., 614", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11271344 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/173/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N. C., 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11271135 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/171/0519-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 507, "char_count": 9598, "ocr_confidence": 0.456, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.281867043184689e-07, "percentile": 0.6177058971391768 }, "sha256": "531fcf1e16948be8b7d149413a4d5b00803557733ceed04e1f6ab8f34067557d", "simhash": "1:cade7e2dc9fe2acd", "word_count": 1617 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:28:30.620798+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "WELLINGTON-SEARS & COMPANY v. DIZE AWNING AND TENT COMPANY." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Adams, J.\nThe appellant has abandoned all assigned grounds of demurrer except its position in reference to the last two sentences (b and c) in the written instrument which is the subject of the controversy. It is contended that these clauses make the plaintiff\u2019s promise illusory; that the plaintiff reserved complete protection against total nonperformance on its part; and that it retained the privilege of refusing to make any shipment to the defendant unless it chose to extend credit upon its own terms. To these contentions the appellant seeks to apply the principle that where a contract consists only of mutual promises there must be mutuality of obligation, and that where performance is dependent upon the will of one party the purported agreement does not constitute a contract. We do not concur in this interpretation.\nIf a contract is susceptible of two constructions one of which will make it enforceable and the other unenforceable, the former construction will generally be preferred. Torrey v. Cannon, 171 N. C., 519; Edwards v. Ins. Co., 173 N. C., 614. And as between two possible constructions, one of which makes the instrument an executory contract and the other an option the latter will be rejected because by the other construction mutual rights are conferred upon the contracting parties. 4 Page on Contracts, see. 2050.\nMutuality of promises means that promises to be enforceable must each impose a legal liability upon the promisor. Each promise then becomes a consideration for the other. Want of mutuality is merely one form of want of consideration. But a single consideration may support several promises; it is not necessary that each promise have a separate consideration. Hence, a covenant which imposes obligations upon one party only may be enforceable if it is part of an entire contract which is supported by a sufficient consideration. 1 Page on Contracts, secs. 525, 565 et seq.j 1 Williston on Contracts, sec. 141.\nThe paper is not lacking in mutuality of consideration. Mutuality of promises is manifest. The plaintiff contracts to sell to the defendant 50,000 yards of army duck on certain terms, and the defendant contracts to accept the goods and to pay the price. The parties evidently did not contemplate a shipment of all the goods at one time or in one bulk. The specifications were to be furnished by 15 November, 1925, so that the goods might be shipped not later than 27 February, 1926. One shipment was made 30 December, 1925, and another 5 January, 1926. The words \u201cany delivery\u201d imply the possibility of more than one shipment. To meet this situation the defendant agreed that delay or defect in quality in a single delivery of the duck should not be cause for cancellation of the entire contract, or a cause of action for breach of the entire contract; but he did not contract against his right to bring suit for any loss caused by tbe plaintiff\u2019s delay in making \u201ctbe delivery in question,\u201d or by any defect in tbe quality of tbe goods.\nTbis agreement is not a discharge of tbe plaintiff from liability for breach of bis contract; it is not a covenant not to sue. Nor is it a unilateral promise similar to that in Rankin v. Mitchem, 141 N. C., 277. There tbe contested claim was held to be unilateral because it was not intended to bind tbe defendant and did not purport to impose upon him any obligation; but here tbe obligation assumed by tbe defendant is only a part of an entire contract which is supported by a valuable consideration. Tbe contract does not, as we understand it, confer upon tbe plaintiff an unlimited right to determine tbe nature or extent of bis performance so as to make bis promise illusory. He is bound by tbe terms of bis contract and is liable in damages for its breach. Fortes v. Mill Co., 195 N. C., 51.\nTbe sentence relating to the extension of credit must be construed in connection with other parts of tbe contract. If, as we have said, tbe parties contemplated tbe probable delivery of tbe goods in installments, a stipulation that tbe seller should regulate or limit tbe amount of tbe unpaid installments would not avoid tbe contract or render it unenforceable ; and tbis, we apprehend, is as distinctly one of tbe purposes of tbe provision as a desire to guard against tbe possible intervening insolvency of tbe debtor. Slater Refining Corporation, 110 S. E. (Ga.), 759; Mendel v. Converse & Co., 118 S. E., (Ga.), 587, 879; Seed Co. v. Jennette Bros., 195 N. C., 173.\nTbe judgment of tbe Superior Court overruling tbe demurrer is\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Adams, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "J. E. Alexander amd L. M. Butler for plaintiff.", "Ratcliff, Hudson & Ferrell for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WELLINGTON-SEARS & COMPANY v. DIZE AWNING AND TENT COMPANY.\n(Filed 20 March, 1929.)\n1. Contracts \u2014 Construction and Operation \u2014 General Buies of Construction.\nIf a contract is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will make it enforceable and the other unenforceable, the former construction will generally be preferred.\n2.Same.\nIf an instrument is susceptible of two constructions, one of wliich makes it an executory contract and the other an option, the latter will be rejected because by the other construction mutual rights are conferred.\n3. Contracts \u2014 Requisites and Validity \u2014 Consideration\u2014Executory Contracts \u2014 Mutual Promises.\nWhere an executory contract contains several promissory covenants on both sides, it is not necessary that each promise on one side be supported by an obligation or .promise on the other if it is a part of an entire contract which is supported by sufficient consideration.\n4. Same \u2014 Covenants Not To Sue \u2014 Terms of Credit.\nWhere there is a contract for the sale of certain goods at a stipulated price with the provision that if the production of the mill manufacturing them should be curtailed by strikes or unavoidable cause, deliveries thereunder were to be made in proportion to production, with further agreements that delay or defect in quality in any delivery should not be cause for canceling any portion of the contract other than the delivery in question, and that the contract should be subject to regulation by the seller of the amount of credit to be extended: Held,, the contract is entire and supported by sufficient consideration, and is binding on both parties.\nAppeal by defendant from MacBae, Special Judge, at May Term, 1928, of Foesyth.\nAffirmed.\nTbe parties duly executed the following paper:\nNo. 3011.\nOffice of\nWellingtoN-Seaes & Oo.\n93 Franklin St., Boston. 66 Worth St., New York.\nSold to Dize Awning & Tent Company, Winston-Salem, N. C.\nAbout fifty thousand (50,000) Yds. 30-in. 8.42 oz. Army Duck.\nPrice. 25%c per yard.\nTerms: 2% 10 days net 60 \u2014 FOB Mill, actual freight allowed to destination not exceeding $1 per cwt.\nDelivery: Specifications to be furnished by 15 November, 1925, for shipment not later than 27 February, 1926.\nShipping Directions: Dize Awning & Tent Co., Winston-Salem, N. C.\nIf the production of the mill making these goods shall be curtailed during the life of this contract by strikes, lockouts or any unavoidable cause, deliveries shall be made and accepted in proportion to the production. Buyer agrees that delay, or defect in quality, in any delivery shall be no cause for canceling any portion of this contract, other than the delivery in question. It is expressly agreed that this order is subject to regulation by the seller of the amount of credit to be extended hereunder.\nAccepted: WelLINGTON-SeARS & COMPANY.\nBy (S) J. W. Proctor.\n(S) Dize Awning & Tent Co.\n(S) E. G. Dize.\nBoston, 24 October, 1925.\nThe plaintiff brought suit upon the defendant\u2019s failure to comply with the contract, setting up two causes of action, one under the law of the forum, and the other under the law of what is claimed to be the place of the contract \u2014 i. e., the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. It is alleged in the complaint that the defendant accepted and paid for 9,813 yards of army duck and refused to accept and pay for 40,187 yards, and that by reason of this refusal and the decline in the market price the plaintiff suffered a loss of $2,712.62. The plaintiff asks judgment for this amount with interest from 18 October, 1926.\nThe action was brought in the Forsyth County court, and after the jury had been empaneled the defendant demurred ore terms to the complaint on the following grounds: (1) The paper-writing sued on does not constitute a contract binding upon the defendants for the reason that the specification of the amount of goods to be purchased is too indefinite to be enforceable. (2) The following provisions made the contract void for want of mutuality: (a) \u201cIf the production of the mill making these goods shall be curtailed during the life of this contract, by strikes, lockouts, or any unavoidable cause, delivery shall be made and accepted in proportion to the production, (b) Buyer agrees that delay or defect in quality in any delivery shall be no cause for canceling any portion of this contract other than the delivery in question, (c) It is expressly agreed that this order is subject to regulation by the seller of the amount of credit to be extended hereunder.\u201d (3) If the paper-writing is a contract governed by the law of Massachusetts, the plaintiff\u2019s remedy is under section 52, paragraph 3, chapter 106 of the General laws 1921 of that Commonwealth, and it appears upon the face of the pleadings that the plaintiff has elected to bring suit under section 54 for rescission. On the plaintiff\u2019s appeal to the Superior Court the judgment of the county court was reversed and the cause was remanded for trial. The defendant excepted and appealed.\nJ. E. Alexander amd L. M. Butler for plaintiff.\nRatcliff, Hudson & Ferrell for defendant." }, "file_name": "0748-01", "first_page_order": 828, "last_page_order": 832 }