{ "id": 8619177, "name": "STATE v. B. C. JAYNES", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Jaynes", "decision_date": "1930-05-28", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "728", "last_page": "730", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "198 N.C. 728" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "3 O. S., 3411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio St.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "135 S. E., 771", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 N. C., 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626062 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/192/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 S. E., 448", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 N. C., 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8604175 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/194/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 S. E., 436", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 N. C., 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8603540 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/194/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 S. E., 650", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 N. C., 687", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8658416 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/183/0687-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 S. E., 830", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 N. C., 762", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11272294 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/184/0762-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 S. E., 190", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 N. C., 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11272133 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/184/0701-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 408, "char_count": 6404, "ocr_confidence": 0.455, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.4719659648430906e-07, "percentile": 0.8066223165906584 }, "sha256": "0c6b4f7bef21973cbb27baa934401c8743038311ba4aee9f6893c32b44002776", "simhash": "1:5392d78d5e116f4a", "word_count": 1095 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:53:28.956258+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BROGDEN, J., dissenting." ], "parties": [ "STATE v. B. C. JAYNES." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Stacy, C. J.,\nafter stating the case: The second sentence of 3 C. S., 3411(d) is as follows: \u201cIt shall be unlawful to have or possess any liquor or property designated for the manufacture of liquor intended for use in violating this article, or which has been so used, and no property rights shall exist in any such liquor or property.\u201d The word \u201cdesignated,\u201d appearing herein, was evidently intended for \u201cdesigned,\u201d and may be so regarded. S. v. Bell, 184 N. C., 701, 115 S. E., 190. We omit any consideration of the clause, \u201cor which has been so used,\u201d as it is unnecessary to decide its meaning or validity on the present appeal.\nWhile it does not appear that the Volstead Act, 41 U. S. Statutes at Large, 305, contains a provision exactly like the one under which the defendant has been indicted (Danovitz v. U. S., decided 5 May, 1930), and notwithstanding the Turlington Act, eh. 1, Public Laws 1923, was ostensibly adopted \u201cto make the State law conform to the National law in relation to intoxicating liquor,\u201d nevertheless it is the generally accepted view that the several States may legislate more stringently on the subject than the Congress has done. S. v. Lassiter, ante, 352, This power existed in the States prior to the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment and the passage of the Yolstead Act, and such power is. still preserved to them under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. S. v. Harrison, 184 N. C., 762, 114 S. E., 830.\nIt is true that in the instant case the defendant\u2019s evidence, if believed,, would have warranted an acquittal, but the State\u2019s evidence, considered in its most favorable light, the accepted position on a motion to nonsuit,, was apparently sufficient to carry the case to the jury. In this respect,, we find no error. The defendant is not charged with an attempt to commit a crime (S. v. Addor, 183 N. C., 687, 110 S. E., 650), but with having in his possession certain utensils designed and intended for use in the unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquor. The fact that they had not been completely assembled or arranged for the purpose would seem to make no difference under the language of the statute.\nThe form of the judgment would seem to be objectionable. S. v. Gooding, 194 N. C., 271, 139 S. E., 436; S. v. Schlichter, 194 N. C., 277, 139 S. E., 448. Prayer for judgment may not be continued over the defendant\u2019s objection. S. v. Burgess, 192 N. C., 668, 135 S. E., 771. Here the defendant did object touts continuance. Hence, the judgment,, as entered, will be stricken out and the cause remanded for a valid judgment.\nError, and remanded.\nBROGDEN, J., dissenting.", "type": "majority", "author": "Stacy, C. J.," } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney-General Brummitt and Assistant Attorney-General Nash for the State.", "W. A. Self and Newland & Townsend for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE v. B. C. JAYNES.\n(Filed 28 May, 1930.)\n1. Intoxicating Liquor A a: Constitutional Law B a \u2014 State may enact more stringent laws in regal'd to prohibition than Volstead Act,.\nUnder the inherent powers the State retains in matters not delegated to the Federal Government, the State may enact a statute more stringent than the Federal Statute relating to intoxicating liquor when not in conflict with the Eighteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution or with Federal statutes, although the State law was enacted to conform to the Federal Statute.\n2. Intoxicating Liquor C c \u2014 Possession of property designed for manufacture of intoxicants is unlawful under C. S., 3411 (d).\nIn the interpretation of C. S., 3411(d), making it unlawful to possess any property \u201cdesignated\u201d for use in manufacturing intoxicating liquor, the word \u201cdesignated\u201d is construed to mean \u201cdesigned,\u201d and so used it is held in this case that evidence of the defendant\u2019s guilt of possessing parts of a still designed and intended for the purpose of manufacturing intoxicating liquor was sufficient to be submitted to the jury and to sustain their verdict of guilty, and the fact that the parts had not been assembled into a distillery is immaterial under the language of the statute.'\n3. Same \u2014 Charge of possession of property designed for manufacture of intoxicants is not charge of an attempt to commit a crime.\nAn indictment charging the defendant with a violation of C. S., 3411(d), in that he had in his possession property designed for the manufacture of intoxicating liquor is not identical with a charge of an attempt to commit a crime.\n4. Criminal Law K b \u2014 Prayer for judgment may not he continued over objection of defendant.\nWhere the verdict finds a defendant guilty of a criminal offense, prayer for judgment may not be continued over the objection of the defendant.\nBbogden, J., dissents.\nAppeal by defendant from Oglesby, J., at November Term, 1929, of Caldwell.\nCriminal prosecution tried upon an indictment charging the defendant with having in his possession \u201ccertain utensils and contrivances, to wit, distilling outfit, jars, jugs, worm, beer, malt, barrels, etc!, designed and intended for tbe use in the unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquors,\u201d contrary to the provisions of 3 O. S., 3411(d).\nThe evidence for the State tends to show that on the afternoon of 7 February, 1928, two officers of Caldwell County were out in the woods looking for a still; they found the defendant about 300 yards from his house; he had a spade digging a place in the side of a branch, while near by was a big sheet-iron vessel with a wooden bottom in it, \u201ca big sheet-iron distillery,\u201d as the witness described it, about three feet deep, holes punched in the top to nail a head on, capacity apparently 100 gallons. On seeing the officers, the defendant ran away and did not return until about three hours thereafter.\nThe defendant testified that the receptacle he had was intended for use in watering his tobacco plants; that it was unfit for distilling purposes ; that the branch, so called, was only a drain and had no water in it at the time; that he did not run from the officers; and that he was not preparing or intending to make any liquor.\nMotion for judgment as in case of nonsuit; overruled; exception.\nVerdict: Guilty.\nJudgment: \u201cPrayer for judgment continued two years upon condition that the defendant pay a fine of $50.00 and the costs, and upon further condition that he does not violate the prohibition laws and upon further condition that he does not take a drink.\u201d Objection and exception.\nDefendant appeals, assigning errors.\nAttorney-General Brummitt and Assistant Attorney-General Nash for the State.\nW. A. Self and Newland & Townsend for defendant." }, "file_name": "0728-01", "first_page_order": 798, "last_page_order": 800 }