The questions involved (1) Is the board of education of Buncombe County a department of the county government within the meaning of chapter 91, Public Laws 1927? We think not. (2) Is the board of education of Buncombe County a separate and distinct corporation and a part of the State-wide system of education ? There is a dual relationship.’ We do not think it necessary to set forth to any great extent the constitutional provisions and the acts of the General Assembly dealing with the powers and duties of the board of education and the *328board of county commissioners. It is sufficient to say, from a careful examination of the Constitution and acts of the General Assembly, that it has been the policy of this State to guard with jealous care its school system to a great extent free from partisan strife.
Chapter 91, Public Laws 1927, the title is “An act to provide improved methods of county government.” The preamble, in part: “Whereas, in the organization of the county government it is intended that the board of county commissioners shall be the central governing body, with the right to supervise and control the different departments of the county government, to levy taxes, and to control the finances of the county.”
Section 12 of the act, in part, is as follows: “It shall be the duty of the board of commissioners to provide for the purchasing of supplies for the different departments of the county government,” etc. There is nothing said in this act in reference to the board of education.
Chapter 95, Michie N. C. Code, 1927, Anno., under “Education,” gives the incorporation of the Slate Board of Education and its powers, responsibilities and duties. C. S., 5394, et seq. It also gives the incorporation of the County Board of Education and its powers, responsibilities and duties. 0. S., 5410, &t seq. Large discretion is given the county board of education in the direction and supervision of the school system. 0. S., 5474: “It is the duty of the county board of education to provide suitable supplies for school buildings under its jurisdiction, such as window shades, fuel, chalk, erasers, blackboards, and other necessary supplies, and provide standard high school with reference books, library, maps and equipment for teaching science, and the teachers and principal shall be held responsible for the proper care of the same during the school term.” This, and other sections, give the board the right to purchase supplies and do all that the vouchers or warrants indicate, in this action they did do. See Wiggins v. Board of Education, ante, 301.
O. S., 5585, is as follows: “It shall be the duty of the county board of education of each county to make a fair estimate in accordance with law of the amount necessary to provide a six months school term, and it shall be the duty of the county commissioners of each county to determine and provide the amount necessary to maintain the school six months in accordance with law. And either the members of the county board of education or the members of the board of county commissioners failing to perform their respective duties shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be fined or imprisoned in the discretion of the court.”
O. S., 5586, provides for the State public school fund an equalizing fund for a six months school term, as provided by the Constitution.
*329O. S., 5595, provides for the “May Budget”; C. S., 5596, contents of tbe May Budget. This section provides in detail almost every imaginable necessity for an up-to-date school system. 5603, duty of board of county commissioners to provide funds for six months term; 5604, commissioners required to raise full amount;’5608, procedure in cases of disagreement or refusal of county commissioners to levy school taxes.
O. S., Art. 19, under “Education,” gives the entire method of how the board of county commissioners shall proceed.
C. S., 5617, in part: “The county board of education shall divide the funds belonging to the county into two classes: (1) those portioned to districts for salaries for instructional service and other regular employees, and (2) those reserved to the county board of education for all other necessary expenses included in the budget under current expense fund, capital outlay fund, and debt service fund. The treasurer shall pay out funds reserved to the county board of education only on warrants signed by the chairman and secretary of said board,” etc. See Laws 1929, ch. 180, 201, 245, 274, 323.
Finding of fact (6) in the present case, says: “That on 22 July, 1929, the board of county commissioners of Buncombe County duly adopted the annual appropriation resolution for public schools required by section 8 of the County Fiscal Control Act, and said appropriation was divided into three classes, to wit: Current expense fund, $935,-553.50; capital outlay fund, $49,696.50; debt service fund, $131,676.75; total, $1,116,926.75.”
Chapter 146, Public Laws 1927, is known as “The County Fiscal Control Act.”
The defendant, BE. E. Walter, under said act, section 3, was appointed by the board of county commissioners of Buncombe County as “county accountant.”
Section 2 of this act deals with school funds and defines the meaning of the funds as used in the act. (e) Constitutional school maintenance “means the maintenance of schools for the six months term required by State Constitution.” (j-3) “County-wide school expenses over and above constitutional school maintenance.”
Section 8, subsection (b): “The powers given by the general law to the county board of education and county commissioners jointly, in respect to the determination of the amount to be raised or expended for the maintenance of the six months school term, shall be observed by the' county accountant and by the board of county commissioners.”
The county commissioners passed a resolution consolidating purchases of supplies for all departments of county government and attempted, under chapter 91, Public Laws of 1927, to usurp this duty heretofore put by law on the board of education of Buncombe County. *330That act, as seen, is entitled “An act to provide improved methods for county government.” Nowhere in the act in the school system mentioned, although the board of county commissioners and the board of education are by law made separate corporations. If intended to apply to the board of education, how easily so important a function of government as the school system could have been mentioned. Expressio umus est exclusio alterius. The law in existence placed this duty on the board of education. The county accountant, under the resolution of the board of county commissioners refused to pay certain bills for supplies which the board of education had purchased, through its duly constituted agent, and proper warrants and orders were made for same, .in accordance with the “May Budget.” The “May Budget” appropriation was agreed to by the dual bodies, the board of education and the board of county commissioners, and these funds were segregated for the purpose heretofore mentioned for the county schools. These orders and warrants by the proper officials of the board of education, were within the appropriation of the “May Budget,” and in accordance with section 8, Public Laws 1927, ch. 146. That being so, it was the duty of the defendant, the county accountant, to approve them. Defendant had no autocratic power under the a.ct to refuse to approve the orders or warrants for supplies. Public Laws 1927, ch. 146, secs. 15 and 16.
It is the duty of the courts to reconcile, if possible, the different acts of the General Assembly, dealing with these matters, and we see no difficulty in this case. Leonard v. Sink, ante, 114. Any other holding would create confusion and discord between two bodies of high official dignity, which it goes without saying have the good of their county at heart.
Under our Constitution this Court, in a unanimous opinion, speaking to the subject in Frazier v. Commissioners, 194 N. C., at p. 61-2, said: “The Constitution of North Carolina does provide — and its provisions in that respect have been held mandatory — that the General Assembly shall provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform system of public schools, wherein tuition shall be free of charge to all the children of the State between the ages of six and twenty-one, Article IX, section 2; and that to accomplish this end, the State shall be divided into a convenient number of districts, in which one or more public schools shall be maintained at least six months in every year, Article IX, section 3. It cannot be too often emphasized that the controlling purpose of the people of North Carolina, as declared in their Constitution, is that a State system of public schools shall be established and maintained — a system of schools supported by the State, and providing for the education of the children of the State — and that ample power has been conferred upon the General Assembly to make' this pur*331pose effective. In Tate v. Board of Education, 192 N. C., 516, tbis Court bas said: ‘It is, however, fully witbin tbe power of tbe General Assembly, because of tbe duty imposed upon it by tbe Constitution, ‘to provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform system of public schools,’ to authorize and direct tbe respective counties of tbe State, as administrative units of tbe public school system, or as governmental agencies employed for that purpose by tbe General Assembly, to provide tbe money for such expense by taxation and otherwise. Lovelace v. Pratt, 187 N. C., 686; Lacy v. Bank, 183 N. C., 373.’ ” Hartsfield v. Craven County, 194 N. C., 358; Hall v. Commissioners, 194 N. C., 769, 195 N. C., 367; Owens v. Wake County, 195 N. C., 132.
We think tbe court below properly ordered that a writ of mandamus issue. Tbe judgment of tbe court below is
Affirmed.