On 10 July, 1929, the plaintiff submitted to the defendant a proposed budget of the necessary expenses of operating the public schools of Johnston County for a term of six months. The defendant rejected the budget in part and suggested certain reductions. The parties held a joint session on 6 August, 1929, the plaintiff voting to adopt the budget and the defendant to amend it. The clerk of the Superior *431Court was called upon to act as arbitrator of tbe issues raised by tbe disagreement. C. S., 5608. Tbe clerk beld tbat tbe amount proposed in tbe budget was essential to tbe maintenance of tbe schools and ordered tbe defendant to levy a tax sufficient for tbis purpose. Tbe defendant appealed to tbe Superior Court and tbe jury under a directed instruction found in response to tbe issue tbat $10,115, tbe amount in controversy, was needed to maintain tbe schools for a term of six months. Judge Sinclair rendered judgment tbat tbe defendant levy a tax sufficient, with sums received from other sources, to produce tbe following amounts: for current expenses $399,348.89; for capital outlay, $3,650.50; for debt service, $156,116.46, the three items aggregating $559,176.46. C. S., 5596. Tbe defendant excepted and appealed to tbis Court. To prevent delay beyond a reasonable time for levying tbe tax, tbe judge directed tbe defendant to levy a tax for tbe ensuing year at a rate sufficient to raise $156,176.97 for tbe debt service fund and an amount, which with funds derived from other sources, would total $405,541.15, which was tbe current expense fund for tbe previous year. Tbe defendant excepted and appealed.
Tbe presiding judge made tbis order pursuant to tbe authority conferred by section 5609. In consequence tbe defendant levied a tax sufficient to produce a debt service fund and current expense fund in excess of tbe amount which would have been collected for these purposes under tbe budget. Tbe tax, or a large part of it, has been collected and applied to tbe support of tbe schools and tbe term of six months has almost expired. A new trial or a reversal of tbe judgment would not alter these conditions. Tbe appeal therefore raises a question which is abstract or academic. It would be useless to consider tbe bare question whether there was error in ordering tbe levy of a school tax which has been collected and paid out. It is tbe custom of appellate courts to disregard matters which have no relation to concrete form. Wikel v. Commissioners, 120 N. C., 451; Harrison v. Bryan, 148 N. C., 315; Pickler v. Board of Education, 149 N. C., 221; Wallace v. Wilkesboro, 151 N. C., 614; Moore v. Monument Co., 166 N. C., 211; Kilpatrick v. Harvey, 170 N. C., 668; Glenn v. Culbreth, 197 N. C., 675.
We do not mean to say that there was error in tbe judgment. In objecting to tbe budget tbe defendant proposed reductions amounting to $25,275.62. Tbe plaintiff agreed tbat tbis amount should be réduced by deducting $14,000 as tbe charge for fire insurance; and tbe defendant agreed tbat from its proposed reductions tbe items of $500 and $600.62 should be eliminated. Tbe remaining question was whether tbe difference ($10,175) was needed to maintain tbe schools for six months and it was determined under an issue which was submitted to tbe jury. Under tbe last clause of section 5608 tbe jury was permitted to consider “all *432papers and records relating to the case,” including the verified budget. It is contended by the plaintiff that there is no exception to the admission of the papers and records, no competent evidence to impeach the items embraced in the issue, and that the directed instruction was correct. In any view of the record we find
No error.