#### SARAH HURLEY v. J. N. LOVETT.

(Filed 3 December, 1930.)

Libel and Slander D c — Where complaint does not allege that words of defendant imported immorality testimony to. this effect is not admissible.

In an action to recover damages for slandering a female when the words sued on are ambiguous, the complaint must allege that the words spoken of and concerning the plaintiff implied immorality in order to admit testimony of witnesses as to their understanding ■ of the intent of the words actually spoken, the wrongful intent being denied both in the answer and in testimony of defendant as a witness.

Appeal by plaintiff from Hcurding, J., at January Special Term, 1930, of Wilkes.

Affirmed.

This is an action to recover damages, botb actual and punitive, for slanderous words alleged in tbe complaint to bave been spoken by tbe defendant of and concerning tbe plaintiff.

From judgment dismissing tbe action, at tbe close of all tbe evidence, plaintiff appealed to tbe Supreme Court.

F. J. McDuffie cmd Trivetie é ¡I ohhouser for plaintiff.

T. 0. Bowie for defendant.

Peis Cueiam.

Tbe words alleged in tbe complaint to bave been spoken by tbe defendant of and concerning tbe plaintiff are slanderous per se. However, tbe words wbicb all tbe evidence shows were spoken by defendant are not slanderous per se. Tbey do not in themselves impute to plaintiff immoral conduct.

Conceding that tbe words which tbe evidence shows tbe defendant did speak of and concerning tbe plaintiff, are ambiguous and fairly admit of a slanderous interpretation, in tbe absence of an allegation in tbe complaint to that effect, there was no error in excluding testimony of witnesses offered by plaintiff as to their understanding of tbe meaning of tbe words spoken by tbe defendant. Defendant in bis answer and also as a witness at tbe trial, denied that be intended to charge or did charge plaintiff with immoral conduct. Tbe evidence as to tbe circumstances under wbicb tbe words were spoken, supports tbe denial of tbe defendant. Tbe instant case is distinguishable from Vincent v. Pace, 178 N. C., 421, 100 S. E., 581, relied on by plaintiff on her appeal to this Court. In that case, it is alleged in tbe complaint not only that defendant spoke tbe words set out therein, but also that be intended thereby to charge and did charge plaintiff with a felony, to wit, larceny.

There was no error in tbe trial of this action. Tbe judgment is

Affirmed.