{ "id": 8629112, "name": "THE TALGE MAHOGANY COMPANY v. YEAGER MANUFACTURING COMPANY et al.", "name_abbreviation": "Talge Mahogany Co. v. Yeager Manufacturing Co.", "decision_date": "1932-06-15", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "814", "last_page": "815", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "202 N.C. 814" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "91 N. Y., 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 2188473 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny/91/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 S. E., 857", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 N. C., 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623489 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/200/0484-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 301, "char_count": 4151, "ocr_confidence": 0.456, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.20730976979738974 }, "sha256": "00902379ab86c7a4291942105debd5d5ed03991d6c19cf72c6e12284478f24fe", "simhash": "1:85b6c21acb8fa724", "word_count": 701 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:38:17.445618+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE TALGE MAHOGANY COMPANY v. YEAGER MANUFACTURING COMPANY et al." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Stagy, 0. J.\nTbe language of tbe agent\u2019s authorization, -\u201cto sit in and plug for us\u201d at creditors\u2019 meeting, reasonably lends itself to tbe interpretation placed upon it in good faitb by Carter and tbe defendant, and tbe jury was justified in taking tbe same view of it. 2 C. J., 559. Cole v. Fibre Co., 200 N. C., 484, 157 S. E., 857.\nTbe expression \u201cplug for us,\u201d to say tbe least, is ambiguous and equivocal, and tbe principle applies that a letter or telegram of instruction from a principal to an agent should be expressed in clear language, and if not expressed in \u201cplain and unequivocal terms, but tbe language is fairly susceptible of different interpretations, and tbe agent in fact is misled and adopts and follows one, while tbe principal intends another, then tbe principal will be bound, and tbe agent will be exonerated.\u201d Story on Agency, sec. 74; Winne v. Ins. Co., 91 N. Y., 185.\nTbe telegram of authorization did not ask for a report of tbe meeting. However, a report was made in keeping with tbe agent\u2019s reply, and it is to be presumed that Carter informed tbe plaintiff, of bis execution of tbe compromise agreement. We have failed to find on tbe record any specific repudiation of Carter\u2019s action in this respect. Gordon J. Talge, a witness for plaintiff, does say that be expressed great surprise on 20 June, 1930, when Yeager informed him of Carter\u2019s signature to tbe agreement and that Carter made no reference to it in bis report. It is also in evidence by John H. Talge, witness for plaintiff, that Carter bad no authority to compromise plaintiff\u2019s claim. But no repudiation seems to have been made. Tbe plaintiff cannot in-justice defeat tbe compromise agreement by putting an interpretation upon its instructions at variance with that of its agent and tbe defendant, since tbe language clearly warrants tbe latters\u2019 interpretation. 21 R. C. L., 907.\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "Stagy, 0. J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Theodore F. Cummings and F. B. Cline for plaintiff.", "Thomas P. Pruitt and W. A. Self for defendants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE TALGE MAHOGANY COMPANY v. YEAGER MANUFACTURING COMPANY et al.\n(Filed 15 June, 1932.)\nPrincipal and Agent O b \u2014 Authorization of agent held ambiguous and his action thereon in good faith bound his principal.\nWhere the principal instructs his agent by telegram to sit in on a creditors\u2019 meeting and \u201cplug for us,\u201d the words of the authorization are ambiguous, and where the agent and the debtor, in good faith interpret and act on it as authorization to the agent to execute in the principal\u2019s name a comijromise agreement with other creditors whereby claims were settled on a percentage basis: Held, in the absence of repudiation of the agreement by the principal upon notification thereof, he may not contend that the agent exceeded his authority and that he was not bound by the agreement.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Moore, J., at September Term, 1931, of Catawba.\nCivil action to recover tbe sum of $1,922.51 evidenced by two promissory notes given by tbe defendant to tbe plaintiff.\nOn 22 April, 1930, defendant wired plaintiff, a nonresident corporation, as follows: \u201cWe desire to bave consultation with some of our creditors Friday, 25 April, two p.m. Please wire us immediately whether you can attend this meeting.\u201d\nOn 24 April, plaintiff wired W. 0. Carter, its salesman for this territory, as follows: \u201cYeager calls creditors meeting for tomorrow at two can you arrange to sit in and plug for us.\u201d\nOn 25 April, Carter replied: \u201cAnswering will attend Yeager creditors meeting and report.\u201d\nPursuant to above authorization, W. 0. Carter attended creditors\u2019 meeting 25 April, 1930, and executed in tbe name of bis principal, along with tbe representatives of ten other creditors, a compromise agreement to accept % in cash or % on terms, in full of their claims. This agreement is pleaded in reduction of plaintiff\u2019s right to recover on tbe notes in suit. Tbe case turns on Carter\u2019s authority to bind tbe plaintiff.\nTbe question of Carter\u2019s authority to sign tbe compromise agreement was submitted to tbe jury, who found in favor of such authority. Judgment was thereupon entered agreeably to tbe terms of said agreement. Plaintiff appeals, assigning errors.\nTheodore F. Cummings and F. B. Cline for plaintiff.\nThomas P. Pruitt and W. A. Self for defendants." }, "file_name": "0814-01", "first_page_order": 880, "last_page_order": 881 }