GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION v. J. E. FLETCHER.
(Filed 27 January, 1932.)
Principal and Agent A a — Evidence in this case held sufficient to raise prima facie case of agency for collection.
Where there is evidence that an alleged agent has repeatedly collected money owed to the alleged principal, and that the alleged principal has received the money and applied it to the debts, it is sufficient to make out a prima facie case of agency, and where, in an action by a credit company on a note transferred to it, the defendant offers evidence of payment to the automobile dealer who had transferred the note to the plaintiff, together with such evidence of agency, and the jury finds the fact of agency in favor of the defendant: Held,, a judgment entered thereon that the plaintiff recover nothing on the note is correct.
Appeal by plaintiff from Oglesby, J., at September Term, 1931, of Eoesyth.
Affirmed.
Tbis is an action to recover on a negotiable instrument executed by the defendant, payable to the order of the Lindsay Eishel Buick Company, and negotiated for value and before maturity by the said Buick Company to the plaintiff.
The action was begun and tried in the Forsyth County-Court. The issues submitted to the jury were answered as follows:
“1. Did the defendant execute and deliver to the Lindsay Eishel Buick Company his written obligation as alleged in the complaint? Answer: Yes, by the court upon the pleadings.
*1712. Did tbe Lindsay Eisbel Buick Company transfer said written obligation to tbe General Motors Acceptance Corporation before maturity, and for value, as alleged in tbe complaint? Answer: Yes, by tbe court upon tbe pleadings.
3. Was tbe Lindsay Eisbel Buick Company tbe agent of tbe plaintiff, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, witb authority express or implied, to receive for it tbe payments as alleged in tbe answer? Answer: Yes.
4. Did tbe defendant, J. L. Eletcber, pay to tbe Lindsay Eisbel Buick Company, as agent for tbe plaintiff, tbe amount of said written obligation, as alleged in tbe answer? Answer: Yes.
5. In wbat amount, if any, is tbe defendant indebted to tbe plaintiff ? Answer: Nothing.”
From judgment that plaintiff recover nothing of tbe defendant, plaintiff appealed to tbe judge of tbe Superior Court of Forsyth County. Its assignments of error on this appeal were not sustained.
From judgment affirming tbe judgment of tbe Forsyth County Court, plaintiff appealed to tbe Supreme Court.
Shuping & Hampton for plaintiff.
Parrish & Beal for defendant.
CONNOR, ,T.
On its appeal to this Court, plaintiff relies on its assignments of error Dased on its exceptions to tbe rulings- of tbe judge of tbe Superior Court on its appeal from tbe judgment of tbe county court witb respect to its exceptions at tbe trial pertinent to tbe third issue. In view of tbe admissions in tbe pleadings, this is tbe determinative issue in this action. Tbe execution by tbe defendant of tbe negotiable instrument sued on in this action, its transfer by tbe endorsement of tbe Lindsay Fisbel Buick Company for value and before maturity to tbe plaintiff, and tbe payment of tbe amount of said instrument by tbe defendant to tbe Lindsay Fisbel Buick Company, after its transfer and before its maturity, are admitted. Tbe defense interposed by tbe defendant is that tbe Lindsay Fisbel Buick Company was tbe agent of tbe plaintiff, for tbe collection of said instrument, and that therefore tbe payment of tbe same by tbe defendant to tbe said Buick Company discharged tbe defendant from liability on tbe instrument.
There was evidence at tbe trial tending to show that tbe Lindsay Fisbel Buick Company was tbe agent of tbe plaintiff, as alleged in tbe answer; this evidence witb evidence offered by tbe plaintiff to tbe contrary was submitted to tbe jury under instructions which are free from error.
*172’ The judgment is affirmed under the authority of Credit Co. v. Greenhill, 201 N. C., 609, 161 S. E., 72; Bank v. Howell, 200. N. C., 637, 158 S. E., 203, and Buckner v. C. I. T. Corporation, 198 N. C., 698, 153 S. E., 254. In these cases it is held that where there is evidence tending to show that an alleged agent has repeatedly collected money upon debts owed to the alleged principal, and the alleged principal has received the money collected by the alleged agent, and applied the same as payments on his debts, the inference is permissible that an agreement to that effect had been made by and between them, and that the evidence is sufficient to make out a prima facie case of agency. This principle is applicable in the instant case. There was no error in the judgment affirming the judgment of the county court.' It is Affirmed.