{ "id": 8624260, "name": "JULIA LaSALLE STEVENSON v. DR. JAMES M. NORTHINGTON et al.", "name_abbreviation": "Stevenson v. Northington", "decision_date": "1933-06-14", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "690", "last_page": "695", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "204 N.C. 690" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "83 S. E., 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 N. C., 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11271852 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/167/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 S. E., 616", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 N. C., 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8599785 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/194/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 S. E., 449", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 N. C., 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11271694 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/156/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 S. E., 710", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 N. C., 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8654928 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/189/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 S. E., 360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 N. C., 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8653316 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/180/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 N. C., 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8692693 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/30/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 S. E., 97", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 N. C., 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11273316 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/178/0578-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 S. E., 209", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N. C., 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8652627 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/113/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 S. E., 434", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 N. C., 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11254986 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/174/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 S. E., 871", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 N. C., 614", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2217896 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/193/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 S. E., 446", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 N. C., 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622747 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/201/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 N. C., 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11274952 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/33/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 S. E., 571", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N. C., 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8659560 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/131/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 S. E., 931", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N. C., 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8660720 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/128/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 S. E., 16", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 N. C., 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621658 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/200/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 S. E., 10", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 N. C., 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628888 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/195/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 S. E., 961", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 N. C., 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11271034 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/167/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 S. E., 775", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N. C., 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8650166 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/109/0270-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 694, "char_count": 12473, "ocr_confidence": 0.475, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.973077755223483e-07, "percentile": 0.7395514178625858 }, "sha256": "40699871198ff8848a520ce02a224a2b8523d930278a20ab83841a8c585e08a9", "simhash": "1:bea3e12e3919b4e4", "word_count": 2154 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:38:28.108315+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JULIA LaSALLE STEVENSON v. DR. JAMES M. NORTHINGTON et al." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Stacy, C. J.,\nafter stating the case: The trial court held that the \u25a0original publication of the alleged defamatory articles was privileged, and limited the plaintiff to the subsequent publication of said articles in 1931, when the defendant mailed them to Dr. Calfee, president of the Asheville Normal and Teachers College, and caused plaintiff\u2019s work in Asheville to be stopped.\nIt is the contention of the defendant that this letter was, at least, \u2022qualifiedly privileged, and, therefore, both falsity and actual or express malice must be shown to establish liability. Ramsey v. Cheek, 109 N. C., 270, 13 S. E., 775; Brown v. Lumber Co., 167 N. C., 9, 82 S. E., 961; Newberry v. Willis, 195 N. C., 302, 142 S. E., 10; Hartsfield v. Hines, 200 N. C., 356, 157 S. E., 16.\nThe question is presented by exception to the following instruction on the third issue: \u201cThe court instructs you unless it was done with some malice, not necessarily ill-will; but without just cause or excuse, why then that would end the case \u2014 that is to say, if it was in good faith, why then that would end the case.\u201d\nThe contention is, that, in a case of this hind, express or actual malice must be proved, and not merely legal or implied malice; and Ramsey v. Cheek, supra, is cited as a controlling authority on the subject. There, it was said: \u201cIn this class of cases (qualified privilege), an action will lie only where the party is guilty of falsehood and express malice. 13 A. & E., 406. Express malice is malice in fact, as distinguished from implied malice, which is raised as a matter of law by the use of words libelous per se, when the occasion is not privileged. \"Whether the occasion is privileged is a question of law for the court,-subject to review, and not for the jury, unless the circumstances of the publication are in dispute, when it is a mixed question of law and fact.\u201d\nRut taking the instruction in connection with other portions of the charge, we do not regard it as necessarily offending against the distinction between actual and implied malice, though it might have been clearer. Speaking to a similar instruction in Gattis v. Kilgo, 128 N. C., 402, 38 S. E., 931, it was said: \u201cIn his charge on the question of malice, his Honor was also correct in stating in substance that although the malice, which is a necessary ingredient in the constitution of a libel where the publication is privileged, is actual or express malice \u2014 that which is popularly called malice \u2014 and not malice in law, yet that it was not necessary that the ill-will or malice of the defendant should have been against the plaintiff personally, and that if the publication was not in good faith for the reason claimed, but from a wrongful, indirect and ulterior motive and was false, the same would be malicious. The request, therefore, of the defendants\u2019 counsel to the court for instruction that malice in fact means personal ill-will and a desire to injure the plaintiff was properly refused. Ramsey v. Cheek, 109 N. C., 270; Odgers Libel and Slander, 266, 267.\u201d\nIn actions for libel, it is not necessary that particular ill-will or malice should exist toward the plaintiff. Savage v. Davis, 131 N. C., 159, 42 S. E., 571. It may be otherwise in an action for malicious prosecution. Brooks v. Jones, 33 N. C., 260; Dickerson v. Refining Co., 201 N. C., 90, 159 S. E., 446. Or where punitive damages are sought to be recovered. Tripp v. Tobacco Co., 193 N. C., 614, 137 S. E., 871.\nIt will be observed that in the instruction bere complained of tbe jury was told if the letter in question was written in good faith, \u201cwhy then that would end the case.\u201d So, the jury must have found that the articles were false, and that the letter was mailed to Dr. Oalfee maliciously or for no good purpose. The plaintiff was required to show that the defendant was governed by a bad motive, and that he did not act in good faith. Riley v. Stone, 174 N. C., 588, 94 S. E., 434. Malice in this connection is defined as \u201cany indirect and wicked motive which induces the defendant to defame the plaintiff. If malice be proved, the privilege attaching to the occasion is lost at once.\u201d Odgers Libel and Slander, 267. The privilege attaching to the occasion in the instant case, therefore (if indeed any attached, which may be doubted), was at once lost upon the showing of malice. Ramsey v. Cheek, supra; Bryd v. Hudson, 113 N. C., 203, 18 S. E., 209.\nThe plaintiff contends that in mailing the letter to Dr. Oalfee, the defendant was not actuated by any desire to protect the public, but was possessed of a spirit of unkindness, and sent the letter \u201cwith intent to injure her.\u201d The defendant, on the other hand, says that he was merely interested in the medical profession; that he acted in good faith, with no ulterior motive, and that he mailed the letter only in the interest of the public good. These contentions were fully given to the jury by the trial court in its instructions. Hence, viewed in the light of the whole charge, it would seem that the excerpt is free from reversible error. Lewis v. Carr, 178 N. C., 578, 101 S. E., 97; Adcock v. Marsh, 30 N. C., 360.\nHaving reached the above conclusion with respect to the exception to the charge, it is unnecessary to decide whether the occasion was in fact \u201cunprivileged\u201d as the plaintiff contends (Alexander v. Vann, 180 N. C., 187, 104 S. E., 360), or \u201cqualifiedly privileged\u201d as the defendant asserts. Elmore v. R. R., 189 N. C., 658, 127 S. E., 710; Fields v. Bynum, 156 N. C., 413, 72 S. E., 449. The case was tried upon the defendant\u2019s theory, which was more favorable to him than the plaintiff\u2019s, thus leaving him without cause for complaint so far as the question of qualified privilege is concerned. Undoubtedly, the publication was actionable, if untrue and not privileged, for it tended to expose the plaintiff to ridicule or scorn, and was calculated to injure her in her calling or profession. Penluff v. Park, 194 N. C., 146, 138 S. E., 616; Riley v. Stone, supra.\nFinally, it is contended the action should be dismissed because no damage has been shown. The point is without merit. Plaintiff not only proved losses of a financial nature, but she also established injury to her reputation and standing in the community as a result of the publication in question.' Her answer to this contention is one of philosophic paraphrase: \u201cHe who steals my purse steals trash, but he who robs me of my good name takes all that I have; takes that which enrieheth him not, but imp over isbeth me.\u201d Yerily, a good name is rather to be chosen than great riches. Prov. 22 :1.\nThe evidence is quite sufficient to carry the case to the jury, and in no view of it, could the motion to nonsuit have been allowed. Pentuff v. Park, supra; Ivie v. King, 167 N. C., 174, 83 S. E., 339; 17 R. C. L., 294.\nA careful perusal of the record leaves us with the impression that the case is free from reversible error. The judgment of affirmance entered by the Superior Court will be upheld.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Stacy, C. J.," } ], "attorneys": [ "Kitchin & Kitchin and. Weaver & Miller for plaintiff.", "B. S. Whiting and Broclc Baricley for defendants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JULIA LaSALLE STEVENSON v. DR. JAMES M. NORTHINGTON et al.\n(Filed 14 June, 1933.)\n1. Libel and Slander B b \u2014 Actual malice terminates qualified privilege and such malice need not be directed against xjlaintiff personally.\nAlthough falsity and actual or expressed malice must be shown to establish liability for an alleged libel where the defendant is under a qualified privilege, such malice need not be directed against the plaintiff personally, it being sufficient if the defendant was governed by a bad motive and did not act in good faith, and the instruction in this case that defendant would not be liable \u201cunless it was done with some malice, not necessarily ill-will; but without just cause or excuse, why then that would end the case \u2014 that is to say, if it was done in good faith, why then that would end the case\u201d when taken in connection with other portions of the charge is held not erroneous as failing to draw the distinction between actual and implied malice.\n2. Appeal and Error J e: J g \u2014 Defendant may not complain where recovery is correctly had on theory of trial favorable to defendant.\nWhere an action for libel is tried upon the defendant\u2019s theory that the publication was qualifiedly privileged and not upon plaintiff\u2019s contention that no privilege attached thereto, and the jury has found that the publication was false and made with actual malice, it is unnecessary to decide upon defendant\u2019s appeal whether the publication was qualifiedly privileged, and defendant has no just cause to complain, the case having been tried upon the theory most favorable to him.\n3. Libel and Slander A b \u2014 In this action for libel plaintiff is held to have sufficiently proven damage.\nWhere in an action for libel the plaintiff not only proves losses of a financial nature, but also proves injury to her reputation and standing in the community tending to injure her in her calling or profession, defendant\u2019s contention that the action should be dismissed for failure to prove damages cannot be sustained.\n4. Libel and Slander D b\u2014\nEvidence in this action for libel is held sufficient to be submitted to jury and overrule defendant\u2019s motion as of nonsuit.\nAppeal by defendants from Alley, J., at March Term, 1933, of BuNcombe.\nCivil action for libel. The Tri-State Medical Association was not served with summons.\nThe plaintiff, who testifies that she is a professional teacher of educational psychology, a lecturer on personality, beauty and charm, was pursuing her profession in Charlotte, N. 0., during the summer of 1926, when the defendant, who is the editor of the official organ of the TriState Medical Association, \u201cSouthern Medicine and Surgery,\u201d published in said magazine, in the June and July issues, articles of and concerning the plaintiff, one under the heading: \u201cFor War on Medical Fakers: With Field Notes of a Skirmish: The Fantastic Cults and Isms Will be Energetically Opposed and Exposed at Every Opportunity,\u201d meaning thereby to charge the plaintiff with being a faker, a teacher of fantastic isms, and a member of fantastic cults. It was asserted in said article that the plaintiff had been arrested in Florida for practicing medicine without a license, which was true, but omitted to state that the case against her was dismissed. Defendant\u2019s publication also contained the statement that plaintiff advertised in McEerrin\u2019s Health Bulletin, \u201cwhose columns were patronized by either quacks or faddists, and doubtless \u2018Dr. Stevenson feels at home among this class.\u201d\nPlaintiff testified that the defendant came to her hotel while she was in Charlotte and threatened to do her harm. He is alleged to have said, \u201cI will find something, if I want to, against you, and I am going to\u201d; whereupon the defendant was shown the door. Plaintiff lectured upon such subjects as \u201cThe Cause of Old Age,\u201d \u201cHow to Stay Young,\u201d \u201cRejuvenation Through Auto-Suggestion,\u201d \u201cEating Your Way Back to Health,\u201d \u201cForces Within You and How to Use Them,\u201d and other subjects of like nature.\nAgain, in the summer of 1931, while the plaintiff was lecturing in Asheville, N. C., or preparing to lecture before the Asheville Normal and Teachers College, the defendant wrote to Dr. John E. Calfee, president of said institution, and enclosed copies of his articles as \u201cbits \u2022of information for whatever disposal you care to make,\u201d which said articles were read before the school, and the plaintiff\u2019s work brought to a close.\nThe defendants, other than the Tri-State Medical Association, pleaded the truth of the articles as a defense, also their qualified privilege and .alleged that they were written in good faith, without any malice or ill-will towards the plaintiff.\nThe jury returned the following verdict:\n\u201c1. Did the defendant publish of and concerning the plaintiff the \u2022matters alleged in the complaint by writing letter and mailing clippings from his publication to Dr. John E. Calfee? Answer: Yes.\n\u201c2. Were such statements false and defamatory? Answer: Yes.'\n\u201c3. Was such publication done in malice? Answer: Yes.\n\u201c4. What damage, if any, is plaintiff entitled to recover? Answer: :$3,000.\u201d\nJudgment on the verdict in the General County Court, from which the defendants appealed on questions of law to the Superior Court of .Buncombe County where the judgment of the trial court was upheld.\nFrom this latter judgment, the defendants appeal, assigning errors.\nKitchin & Kitchin and. Weaver & Miller for plaintiff.\nB. S. Whiting and Broclc Baricley for defendants." }, "file_name": "0690-01", "first_page_order": 756, "last_page_order": 761 }