{ "id": 8631361, "name": "ROOSEVELT DICKERSON et al. v. MAMIE REYNOLDS", "name_abbreviation": "Dickerson v. Reynolds", "decision_date": "1934-01-24", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "770", "last_page": "772", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "205 N.C. 770" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "130 S. E., 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "190 N. C., 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8606640 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/190/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 S. E., 491", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 N. C., 759", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626083 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/200/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 S. E., 75", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 N. C., 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624472 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/200/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 S. E., 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 N. C., 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8616999 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/200/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 S. E., 356", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 N. C., 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8654346 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/189/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 S. E., 949", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 N. C., 4", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11271010 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/167/0004-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 S. E., 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 N. C., 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625377 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/200/0654-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 402, "char_count": 6308, "ocr_confidence": 0.452, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.733818432913881e-08, "percentile": 0.4944187865779047 }, "sha256": "03532c0479e6e1e1f11305019c787c9ab08e884b0b53fb2bc122fc6311c36a35", "simhash": "1:ab45f4a72e7ed219", "word_count": 1147 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:12:31.066060+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ROOSEVELT DICKERSON et al. v. MAMIE REYNOLDS." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Stacy, O. J.\nWhose servant or agent was Walter Aiken at the time of the collision, the defendant\u2019s or her son\u2019s? The case turns on the answer to this question. It may be resolved either way by the record. This makes it a case for the jury. Parrish v. Armour Co., 200 N. C., 654, 158 S. E., 188.\nThe rule is, that, on a motion to nonsuit, the evidence which makes for the plaintiff\u2019s claim, or tends to support his cause of action, is to be taken in its most favorable light for the plaintiff, and he is \u201centitled to the benefit of every reasonable intendment upon the evidence and every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom.\u201d Christman v. Hilliard, 167 N. C., 4, 82 S. E., 949; Nash v. Royster, 189 N. C., 408, 127 S. E., 356; Hill v. Ins. Co., 200 N. C., 115, 156 S. E., 518; Hamilton v. R. R., 200 N. C., 543, 158 S. E., 75.\nWe are not unmindful of the strength of the argument which points in the opposite direction, but the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are matters properly to be considered by the jury. McGee v. Crawford, ante, 318; Grier v. Woodside, 200 N. C., 759, 158 S. E., 491. It is ours only to determine whether the evidence is fit to be submitted to the twelve. Its credibility is for them. The cases cited and relied upon by the defendant are not controlling on the present record.\nThe learned judge who tried the cases thought the evidence sufficient to support the verdicts. His refusal to nonsuit the cases is supported by the apposite decisions on the subject.\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "Stacy, O. J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Phillips & Bower and Spruill & Olive for plaintiffs.", "Don A. Walser and Marcus Erwin for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROOSEVELT DICKERSON et al. v. MAMIE REYNOLDS.\n(Filed 24 January, 1934.)\n1. Automobiles D b \u2014 Evidence held sufficient .to sustain inference that driver was defendant\u2019s agent at time of collision.\nEvidence that defendant\u2019s son called defendant on long distance, requested her to send her car to a certain town so that he might return to his home more quickly, which he desired to do because of his wife\u2019s sudden illness, that the son was of age and that at the time was not living with defendant, that the son occasionally used the car as a member of the family, and that in response to the call defendant sent her chauffeur with the car to the place designated and that on the journey the chauffeur had an accident resulting in injury to plaintiffs, is held sufficient to be submitted to the jury on the issue of whether the chauffeur was defendant\u2019s agent at the time, the evidence being sufficient to support an inference to that effect, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence being for the determination of the jury.\n2. Trial D a \u2014 On motion of nonsuit all evidence is to Ibe considered in light most favorable to plaintiff.\nOn motion as of nonsuit all the evidence which tends to support plaintiff\u2019s cause of action is to be considered in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and he is entitled to every reasonable intendment thereon and every reasonable inference therefrom. 0. S., 567.\nAppeal by defendant from Shaiu, Emergency Judge, at May Term, 1933, of DavidsoN.\nCivil actions to recover damages for personal injuries to plaintiffs, and to tbe car in which they were riding, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, and as the several causes of action arose out of the same collision, or the same state of facts, for convenience, they were consolidated and tried together. Fleming v. Ilolleman, 190 N. C., 449, 130 S. E., 171; Baker v. B. B., ante, 329.\nThe essential facts are these: On 22 October, 1932, plaintiffs were injured, and the car in which they were riding was damaged, in a collision with defendant\u2019s automobile, operated at the time by Walter Aiken, defendant\u2019s chauffeur. For present purposes, it is conceded the evidence was sufficient to carry the case to' the jury on the alleged negligence of Walter Aiken, but it is contended he was not the defendant\u2019s agent, or driving for the defendant, at the time of the collision.\nThe question of agency or liability is to be determined solely from the testimony of the defendant, who was called as a witness by the plaintiffs.\nHer evidence is to the effect that she is the mother of Eobert E. Eeynolds; that she lives just outside the city of Asheville; that Walter Aiken was in her employ as butler, chauffeur and general utility man during the fall of 1932; that on the day in question, having received word her son\u2019s wife was critically ill, she immediately telephoned her son, who was away from home on a speaking tour, and acquainted him with the fact of his wife\u2019s illness. \u201cIn consequence of this message I sent the car with Walter Aiken to meet him after he got through speaking at some place near Lexington so he could get home earlier than he would if he had to go to Greensboro to take the train.\u201d\nThe defendant further testified: \u201cAt that time, my son was making his home in Asheville. He maintained an apartment there. He did not live with me just at that time. He was of legal age, 47 years old, and occasionally came and spent some time with me, but on this occasion he was not living with me. His regular home was my home. Prior to October, 1932, he had made his home for a long time with me, but just at that time he was living in the city. I had permitted or allowed my son, for his convenience, to use my automobile as a member of the family. He had made use of it occasionally for pleasure but not regularly. He was not using my car at the time to travel from one place to another in the State. With reference to whose mission the car was on\u2014 well, the nurse had phoned my son his wife was critically ill. Naturally, he was nervous and excited and wanted to get home as quickly as possible. He phoned and asked me to send Walter down to some point near Lexington \u2014 I have forgotten the town \u2014 with the car. My son was the one who phoned me. In consequence of this phone message, I called Walter and told him to take the car to my son at this point.\u201d\nAt the close of plaintiff's evidence, and again at the close of all the evidence, the defendant demurred and moved for judgment of nonsuit. Overruled; exception.\nFrom verdicts and judgments for the plaintiffs, the defendant appeals, assigning as errors the refusal of the court to dismiss the actions as in cases of nonsuit.\nPhillips & Bower and Spruill & Olive for plaintiffs.\nDon A. Walser and Marcus Erwin for defendant." }, "file_name": "0770-01", "first_page_order": 834, "last_page_order": 836 }