{ "id": 8632081, "name": "ANDERSON CHAMBERLAIN v. HOME SECURITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Chamberlain v. Home Security Life Insurance", "decision_date": "1934-06-20", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "622", "last_page": "627", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "206 N.C. 622" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "16 S. E., 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N. C., 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8651154 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/111/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 S. E., 616", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 N. C., 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8655028 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/179/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 N. C., 8", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8683684 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/75/0008-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 S. E., 50", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N. C., 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8652653 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/139/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 S. E., 18", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 N. C., 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8660234 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/144/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 S. E., 287", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N. C., 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11253119 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/141/0361-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 478, "char_count": 14521, "ocr_confidence": 0.465, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.20735552536074497 }, "sha256": "083aa2c560183a8121649e395e7c8d1a5cc6982613341715b4910e5c13cd6ff1", "simhash": "1:2ab1503192464773", "word_count": 2518 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:27:02.537957+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Schekck, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "ANDERSON CHAMBERLAIN v. HOME SECURITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Connor, J.\nTwo causes of action are alleged in tbe complaint in this action. On tbe first cause of action, tbe plaintiff seeks to recover damages, both actual and punitive, for tbe wrongful, wilful, wanton and malicious cancellation of tbe policies of insurance on bis life issued to him by tbe defendant. On tbe second cause of action, be seeks to recover tbe amount of bis claim for a disability resulting from an injury to bis band, which was covered by one of said policies. Tbe second cause of action was apparently abandoned by the plaintiff at the trial. No issue was tendered by the plaintiff or submitted by the court, involving the amount, if any, which the plaintiff was entitled to recover of the defendant on his second cause of action. For that reason, the affirmative answer to the first issue need not be considered in deciding the questions involved in this appeal. In effect, the plaintiff suffered a nonsuit on his second cause of action.\nThe first cause of action alleged in the complaint is founded on contract. It is alleged in the complaint that the defendant breached its contracts with the plaintiff, as evidenced by the three policies of insurance which were issued to the plaintiff by the defendant, by its wrongful, wilful, wanton and malicious cancellation of said policies. The facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to constitute a single cause of action. The three policies of insurance were canceled by the defendant simultaneously. But one cause of action is alleged in the complaint as arising out of the cancellation of the policies. For purposes of jurisdiction, the fact that three policies of insurance, all issued by defendant to plaintiff, but at different dates, and for different amounts, were canceled, is immaterial. McGowan v. Ins. Co., 141 N. C., 361, 54 S. E., 287.\nAs his damages accruing on his first cause of action, the plaintiff demands judgment that he recover of the defendant (1) the sum of $168.20, this being the amount which he had paid to the defendant as premiums on his policies prior to their cancellation; and (2) the sum of $500.00, this being the amount which he alleges he is entitled to recover as punitive damages. These sums constitute different elements of the damages which accrued from a single cause of action. See Thompson v. Express Co., 144 N. C., 389, 57 S. E., 18, and Hall v. Telegraph Co., 139 N. C., 369, 52 S. E., 50.\nIn Braswell v. Ins. Co., 75 N. C., 8, which was an action to recover damages for the wrongful cancellation of a policy of insurance on the life of the plaintiff, it was held that where plaintiff elected to demand as his damages the amount paid by him as premiums on his policy, prior to its wrongful cancellation, he could recover such amount as money had and received by the defendant for his use. The judgment for such amount was affirmed.\nThis principle, when invoked by the plaintiff in an action to recover damages for the wrongful cancellation of a policy of insurance, was approved in Garland v. Ins. Co., 179 N. C., 67, 101 S. E., 616. In that ease it was held, however, that in a proper case the plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of the policy at the time it was wrongfully canceled, or the amount which would enable him to procure another policy affording him the same protection as that which he had under the policy which was wrongfully canceled.\nIt cannot be held as a matter of law that on the facts alleged in the complaint in the instant case, the plaintiff was limited in his recovery for the cancellation of his policies to the amount paid by him as premiums on said policies, prior to their cancellation, and that his allegation that he was entitled to recover punitive damages was not in good faith.\nIt has been uniformly held by this Court that in actions on contract, the amount demanded in good faith in the complaint is determinative of the jurisdiction of the action. Where such amount exceeds $200.00, the Superior Court has original jurisdiction. Martin v. Goode, 111 N. C., 288, 16 S. E., 232. There was no error in the refusal of the court to sustain the demurrer ore tenue to the complaint, on the ground that the Superior Court was without jurisdiction of this action.\nThere was no error in the instruction of the court to the jury, both in the charge and after the conclusion of the charge, that if the jury should answer either of the first four issues in the affirmative, they should answer the 5th issue \u201c$168.20\u201d; but that if they should answer either of said issues in the negative, they should answer the 5th issue, \u201cNothing.\u201d It does not appear that the defendant was prejudiced by this instruction.\nWe find no error in the trial of the action. The judgment is affirmed.\nNo error.\nSchekck, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "Connor, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "W. H. Sanders for plaintiff.", "Bulwinhle & Doiley for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ANDERSON CHAMBERLAIN v. HOME SECURITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.\n(Filed 20 June, 1934.)\n1. Appeal and Error J g \u2014 Consideration of issue based on cause of action abandoned during trial held not necessary to decision of appeal.\nWhere plaintiff alleges two causes of action, but apparently abandons the second and fails to tender an issue as to damages thereon and the court fails to submit such issue to the jury, the answer of the jury to a prior issue based exclusively on matters pertaining to the cause of action abandoned need not be considered in deciding the questions involved in the appeal.\n2. Courts A a \u2014 Sum demanded in good faith held to exceed two hundred dollars and Superior Court has jurisdiction.\nPlaintiff brought this action in the Superior Court, alleging that he had three policies of insurance issued by defendant insurer on different dates, that he tendered insurer\u2019s agent, while the policies were in force, the amount due on premiums in arrears, and that insurer refused to accept the sum tendered and canceled each of the policies because plaintiff refused to pay premiums in arrears due on a policy issued by the insurer to plaintiff\u2019s wife, and that such cancellation was wrongful, wilful, wanton and malicious. Plaintiff demanded damages in the sum of $168.20, the amount paid by him as premiums on the policies, together with $500.00 punitive damages. Plaintiff did not tender an issue as to punitive damages nor did the court submit such issue. Defendant insurer demurred to the complaint on the ground that the cause of action was within the exclusive jurisdiction of a justice of the peace. Held, the demurrer was properly overruled, the simultaneous cancellation of the three policies constituting a single cause of action, and the sums demanded as actual and punitive damages being different elements of damage accruing from the single cause of action, and it being impossible to determine as a matter of law that the demand for punitive damages was not made in good faith.\n3. Insurance H d \u2014 Measure of damages for wrongful cancellation of policy.\nIn an action to recover against insurer for its wrongful cancellation of a policy of insurance plaintiff may recover the sums paid by him as premiums on tlie policy if lie so elects, or in proper cases lie may recover tlie value of tlie policy at tlie date of cancellation, or tlie sum presently required to obtain like protection for plaintiff.\n4. Appeal and Error J e\u2014\nExceptions to tlie court\u2019s charge in this case are not sustained, it appearing that appellant ivas not prejudiced by the instructions given.\nSchenck, X, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.\nAppeal by defendant from Stack, Jat February Term, 1934, of G-astoN.\nNo error.\nThis is an action to recover damages for the wrongful, wilful, wanton and malicious cancellation by the defendant of three policies of insurance on the life of the plaintiff issued to him by the defendant, and also to recover on one of said policies for a disability resulting from an injury to plaintiff\u2019s hand.\nIn his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that from the issuance of said policies to their cancellation, he paid to the defendant the sum of $168.20, as premiums on said policies; and that he is entitled to recover the said sum as his actual damages resulting from the cancellation of said policies by the defendant. He also alleges that in addition to his actual damages, he is entitled to recover of the defendant the sum of $500.00, as punitive damages, for the reason that the cancellation of said policies by the defendant was not only wrongful and unlawful, but also wilful, wanton and malicious.\nHe further alleges that while said policies were in force, he suffered a disability, resulting from an injury to his hand, and that by the terms of one of said policies, he is entitled to recover of the defendant on account of said disability the sum of $6.00.\nIn its answer, the defendant admits the issuance and cancellation of said policies of insurance, and the payment by the plaintiff as premiums on said policies, prior to their cancellation, of the sum of $168.20; it denies, however, that the cancellation of said policies was wrongful and unlawful, or wilful, wanton and malicious; it also denies that it is liable to plaintiff for the disability resulting from an injury to his hand, as alleged in the complaint. It prays judgment that the plaintiff recover nothing by his action, and that it recover its costs.\nAt the trial, the evidence for the plaintiff tended to show that the defendant issued to the plaintiff three policies of insurance on his life, one dated 14 April, 1924; one dated 18 February, 1924; and one dated 30 November, 1931; that the premiums on said policies were payable weekly, the total amount of said premiums being seventy cents per week; and that some time in March, 1933, the defendant, over the protest of the plaintiff and without his consent, canceled all of said policies. At tbe date of such cancellation, tbe plaintiff paid to tbe agent of the'defendant tbe sum of $1.75, wbicb sum was sufficient to pay tbe premiums tben in arrears, and to keep tbe said policies in force.\nThere was evidence tending to sbow tbat tbe defendant bad issued to tbe wife of tbe plaintiff policies of insurance on her life, and tbat tbe premiums on said policies were in arrears in March, 1933; and tbat tbe agent of tbe defendant refused to accept from tbe plaintiff tbe sum required to pay tbe premiums tben in arrears on tbe policies issued to him, unless plaintiff also paid tbe premiums tben in arrears on tbe policies issued to bis wife. Tbe plaintiff testified tbat tbe agent of tbe defendant refused to apply tbe sum of $1.75, wbicb be bad paid to said agent, in payment of tbe premiums on bis policies, but returned said sum to plaintiff, and canceled bis policies, as well as tbe policies on tbe life of bis wife. Because of bis advanced age and physical infirmities, plaintiff has been unable to procure other policies on bis life.\nThere was also' evidence tending to show tbat while tbe policies issued to tbe plaintiff by tbe defendant were in force, plaintiff suffered an injury, wbicb caused a disability wbicb was covered by one of said policies; and tbat defendant wrongfully refused to furnish to tbe plaintiff blanks on wbicb be was required by tbe terms of said policy to make proof of bis loss. Tbe amount wbicb plaintiff was entitled to recover on -account of sucb disability was $6.00.\nThere was also evidence tending to show tbat tbe total amount of tbe premiums paid by tbe plaintiff to tbe defendant on said policies, prior to their cancellation was $168.20.\nAt tbe close of tbe evidence for tbe plaintiff, tbe defendant demurred ore terms to tbe complaint, on tbe ground tbat tbe Superior Court was without jurisdiction of tbe action, for tbat tbe amount involved was less than $200.00. Tbe demurrer was overruled, and defendant excepted.\nTbe evidence offered by tbe defendant tended to show tbat tbe cancellation of tbe policies on tbe life of tbe plaintiff was not wrongful or unlawful, but was in accord with tbe terms and provisions of said policies, and was at tbe request of tbe plaintiff, who bad advised defendant tbat be was unable to pay tbe premiums in arrears at tbe date of said cancellation.\nNo issue involving punitive damages was tendered by tbe plaintiff or submitted by tbe court. Tbe issues submitted to tbe jury were as follows:\n\u201c1. Did tbe defendant wrongfully refuse to give tbe plaintiff tbe form for proof of claim for injury to bis band, as alleged in tbe complaint? Answer: .\n2. Did tbe plaintiff on.March, 1933, pay or tender to defendant\u2019s agent tbe sum of $1.75, wbicb would bring plaintiff\u2019s policies within tbe grace period of said policies ? Answer: .\n3. Did tbe defendant wrongfully cancel or suspend tbe policies of tbe plaintiff as alleged in tbe complaint ? Answer:.\n4. Did tbe plaintiff pay tbe premiums on bis policies as provided in said policies, for bis benefit and protection, in tbe approximate sum of $168.00? Answer: .\n5. What amount, if any, is plaintiff entitled to recover of tbe defendant ? Answer : .\u201d\nIn its charge to tbe jury, tbe court stated tbe contentions of both tbe plaintiff and defendant witb respect to eacb of tbe first four issues and fully instructed tbe jury witb respect to tbe law applicable to eacb of said issues. Tbe court then instructed tbe jury witb respect to tbe 5tb issue, as follows:\n\u201cIf you answer eacb of tbe first four issues, \u2018Tes,\u2019 in favor of tbe plaintiff, tben tbe court instructs tbe jury to answer tbe 5tb issue, \u2018$168.20\u2019; but if you answer tbe said issues \u2018No,\u2019 or any one of them \u2018No,\u2019 you will answer tbe 5tb issue, \u2018Nothing.\u2019 Tbe defendant excepted to this instruction.\nAfter tbe court bad concluded its charge, but before tbe jury bad retired, counsel for defendant stated to tbe court, in tbe presence of tbe jury, that defendant contended that its agent did not refuse to allow plaintiff to pay premiums on one or any number of tbe policies, but that it refused to accept tbe sum of $1.15, as tbe full amount due as premiums on all tbe policies. Tbe court tben said to tbe jury:\n\u201cYes, gentlemen, tbe defendant contends that, and offered evidence to support that contention. If you find witb them, you will answer at least some of these issues in tbe negative.\u201d Tbe defendant excepted to this instruction.\nTbe jury answered eacb of tbe first issues, \u2018Yes,\u201d and tbe 5th issue, \u201c$168.20.\u201d\nFrom judgment that plaintiff recover of tbe defendant tbe sum of $168.20, together witb tbe costs of tbe action, tbe defendant appealed to tbe Supreme Court.\nW. H. Sanders for plaintiff.\nBulwinhle & Doiley for defendant." }, "file_name": "0622-01", "first_page_order": 684, "last_page_order": 689 }