{ "id": 8627198, "name": "ALBERT WILSON v. E. H. CLEMENT COMPANY and UNITED STATES CASUALTY COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Wilson v. E. H. Clement Co.", "decision_date": "1935-01-01", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "541", "last_page": "544", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "207 N.C. 541" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "60 S. E., 985", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N. C., 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11269341 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/147/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N. C., 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8698142 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/90/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N. C., 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11277526 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/85/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 N. C., 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8683110 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/74/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 N. C., 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8681483 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/43/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 N. C., 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626892 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/205/0096-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 462, "char_count": 8637, "ocr_confidence": 0.467, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.865412489753563e-07, "percentile": 0.7254328341150391 }, "sha256": "232ebfeba28a2773af1187e3de45d1969ed81d2773bc844bd4df7ec3c9239840", "simhash": "1:3af2af969b063204", "word_count": 1524 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:17:31.653514+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ALBERT WILSON v. E. H. CLEMENT COMPANY and UNITED STATES CASUALTY COMPANY." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Beogden, J.\nIs the claimant entitled to receive compensation for the injury sustained on or about 15 August, 1929?\nC. S., 8081 (dd), 8081 (ee), and 8081 (ff), prescribe the method of giving notice and of filing a claim with the Industrial Commission. C. S., 8081 (ff), declares in plain and unequivocal language that \u201cthe right to compensation . . . shall be forever barred unless the claim be filed with the Industrial Commission within one year after the accident,\u201d etc. It was found as a fact by the Industrial Commission that no claim was filed by anyone witbin a year from tbe date of tbe accident, and, consequently, nothing else appearing, plaintiff would not be entitled to recover.\nHowever, tbe plaintiff asserts tbat C. S., 8081 (ff), is a statute of limitations, and tbat tbe same bas been waived by tbe defendants, or tbat by tbeir conduct tbey lulled tbe plaintiff to sleep, and while be slept deprived him of bis right of compensation, and therefore tbe principle of equitable estoppel prevents them from asserting tbe bar of tbe statute.\nTbe defendants assert with equal conviction tbat tbe statute is not a statute of limitations, but a condition precedent annexed to tbe cause of action, and cannot be waived by tbe parties. Tbe defendants further assert tbat, even if it be conceded tbat tbe principle of equitable estoppel would be applicable, there is no evidence in tbe record sufficient to invoke such doctrine.\nIt is unnecessary to decide whether C. S., 8081 (ff), is a condition precedent or a statute of limitations.\nOf course, if it is a condition annexed to tbe cause of action of similar character to C. S., 160, obviously tbe claimant was entitled to no compensation. Conceding, but not deciding, tbat tbe statute is one of limitations, is there any evidence upon which to base tbe doctrine of equitable estoppel? Tbe nature of such estoppel and tbe elements thereof, as heretofore declared and applied, were stated in Franklin v. Franks, 205 N. C., 96. Tbe Court said:. \u201cTbe general rule is tbat a party may either by agreement or conduct estop himself from pleading tbe statute of limitations as a defense to an obligation. ... To constitute such estoppel, there must be more than a mere delay or indulgence at tbe request of tbe debtor. There must be an express agreement not to plead tbe statute, or such conduct on tbe part of tbe debtor as would make it inequitable for him to do so. . . . See Lyon v. Lyon, 43 N. C., 201; Daniel v. Comrs., 74 N. C., 494; Haymore v. Comrs., 85 N. C., 268; Whitehurst v. Dey, 90 N. C., 542; Brown v. R. R., 147 N. C., 217, 60 S. E., 985.\n\u201cIn tbe Dey case, supra, it was intimated by tbe Court tbat it would constitute a species of fraud for a person to actively request or cause a delay in asserting a cause of action and then plead tbe statute of limitations as a defense when tbe suit was brought. Tbe Court said: No such fraudulent element is found in tbe facts of this transaction. Tbe failure to sue was not in consequence of any request from tbe defendant, nor under any agreement making payment contingent or any undetermined future event, as an underlying condition requiring delay.\u2019 \u201d\nTbe facts in tbe case at bar do not bring it witbin tbe principle of equitable estoppel. Tbe defendants did not request tbe claimant to delay tbe pursuit of bis rights. There was neither express nor implied agreement upon their part not to plead the statute. While it is true that the defendants told the claimant that his wages were going on, nevertheless he did not receive a penny in wages for more than twelve months, and, consequently, was bound to know that no wages were being paid.\nThe Court is of the opinion that the admitted facts are not sufficient to warrant the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel and thus to preclude the defendants from pleading the bar of C. S., 8081 (ff).\nReversed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Beogden, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Graham & Sawyer and Thomas 0. Garter for plaintiff.", "Thos. Qreelcmore and Murray Allen for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ALBERT WILSON v. E. H. CLEMENT COMPANY and UNITED STATES CASUALTY COMPANY.\n(Filed 1 January, 1935.)\nMaster and Servant F c \u2014 Evidence held insufficient to invoke principle of equitable estoppel relied on by claimant to defeat N. C. Code, 8081 (if).\nClaimant sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of bis employment, but no claim for compensation was filed with the Industrial Commission for more than twelve months after the injury, N. C. Code, 8081 (ff). Claimant testified that within the twelve months period he inquired of his superintendent several times as to compensation, and was told on one occasion that his \u201cwages were going on,\u201d and that he relied upon the foreman\u2019s statement. The evidence disclosed that he received no wages or compensation for over twelve months after the injury: Held, the facts do not bring the case within the principle of equitable estoppel, there being no request by defendant that claimant delay the pursuit of his rights, nor was there an express or implied agreement not to plead the statute, and claimant\u2019s right to compensation was barred by N. C. Code, 8081 (ff). Whether N. C. Code, 8081 (ff), is a statute of limitations or condition precedent to the right to recover compensation which cannot be waived by the parties, quwre?\nCivil action, before Sinclair, J., at March Term, 1934, of Oeange.\nPlaintiff suffered an injury by accident in the course of his employment on 15 August, 1929. He employed counsel and filed a claim with the Industrial Commission on 8 September, 1930. Thereupon, a hearing was had before Commissioner Allen, who found that the injury to plaintiff arose out of and in the course of his employment, and that as a result thereof he had sustained a twenty per cent permanent loss of use of his right leg. He also found \u201cthat no written report of the accident by the employee, employer, or insurance carrier was filed with the Industrial Commission within one year from the date of the accident,\u201d and denied an award. There was an appeal to the full Commission, and it found that no claim for compensation had been filed by anyone within one year after the accident, and also that \u201cthe claimant was led to believe by officials of the defendant employer that he would be taken care of, and in relying upon their statements that he would be taken care of, prevented him from employing counsel and filing his claim within twelve months,\u201d and concluded that \u201cthe defendant ought not to be permitted to plead the statute and defeat the rights of the employee in this case, and we believe that the principle of equitable estoppel ought to be invoked and that the claimant ought to be awarded compensation.\u201d\n' Consequently, an award was made and the defendant appealed to the Superior Court.\nThe testimony of plaintiff appearing in the record upon which the doctrine of equitable estoppel was based is substantially as follows: Plaintiff was hurt on or about the middle of August, and on Saturday following his injury he went down to the quarry and saw Mr. Dickinson, the superintendent. Plaintiff said: \u201cI said to Mr. Dickinson, 'I got to quit work, I can\u2019t walk.\u2019 He said: \u2018Can you carry water?\u2019 I said: \u2018I can\u2019t walk and couldn\u2019t carry water when I can\u2019t walk.\u2019 \u201d Some time subsequent to the foregoing conversation the plaintiff went to see Mr. Dickinson again and narrates the conversation as follows: \u201cI said : \u2018Mr. Dickinson, I\u2019m not able to- work yet because I can\u2019t walk yet.\u2019 . . . \u2018You have not paid me anything for getting hurt around here.\u2019 He said: \u2018Well, I would pay you as much as $10.00 if you come back and go to work.\u2019 I told him I couldn\u2019t walk. That is the second time I told him. The-third time I told him I couldn\u2019t walk and couldn\u2019t work, he said: \u2018You can have a job as long as you want it.\u2019 I told him I couldn\u2019t work. He said, \u2018You got on good clothes, you better go ahead, and go to preaching.\u2019 I said: \u2018I was not called to preach.\u2019 I said: \u2018I have got to get an operation and it looks like you could give me a little compensation. I\u2019m a man with six children.\u2019 . . . He told me my wages was going on, and I told him I had never received anything. . . . He said, \u2018Your wages is going on, they come here,\u2019 and I told him I didn\u2019t get it. I never have received anything. ... I saw Mr. Dickinson and depended on him as I did once before when I got hurt down there. He said, \u2018I will pay you when you come back and go to work.\u2019 \u201d\nThe claimant was treated by Drs. Thompson, Coleman, and Markham prior to the time the notice of claim was filed.\nThe trial judge affirmed the award of the full Commission, and the defendant appealed to- the Supreme Court.\nGraham & Sawyer and Thomas 0. Garter for plaintiff.\nThos. Qreelcmore and Murray Allen for defendant." }, "file_name": "0541-01", "first_page_order": 609, "last_page_order": 612 }