{
  "id": 8627687,
  "name": "JAKE WATSON v. CITY OF DURHAM",
  "name_abbreviation": "Watson v. City of Durham",
  "decision_date": "1935-01-28",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "624",
  "last_page": "625",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "207 N.C. 624"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.",
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    },
    {
      "cite": "206 N. C., 657",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
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    {
      "cite": "153 S. E., 406",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.",
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      "cite": "198 N. C., 742",
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    {
      "cite": "171 N. C., 328",
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      "reporter": "N.C.",
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    {
      "cite": "106 S. E., 818",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
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      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "181 N. C., 292",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
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      "case_paths": [
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:17:31.653514+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "JAKE WATSON v. CITY OF DURHAM."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "BeogdeN, J.\nTbe trial judge properly submitted the cause to the jury. He stated and arrayed the contentions of the parties with clearness and impartiality and correctly stated the principles of law applicable to the various phases of the evidence.\nThe defendant offered one of the guards as a witness, who was present at the time of the injury, and was asked what was the condition of the hammer plaintiff was using. He replied: \u201cI would say it was in good condition.\u201d\nThe plaintiff insists that the evidence was incompetent and should have been excluded by application of the rule heretofore announced in Marshall v. Telephone Co., 181 N. C., 292, 106 S. E., 818. However, the ruling of the trial judge is sustained. The identical point was considered in Bane v. R. R., 171 N. C., 328, 88 S. E., 477. The Court said: \u201cThe instantaneous conclusions of the mind as to the appearance, condition, or mental or physical state of persons, animals, and things, derived from observation of a variety of facts presented to the senses at one and the same time, are, legally speaking, matters of fact, and are admissible in evidence,\u201d etc. See, also, McCord v. Harrison-Wright Co., 198 N. C., 742, 153 S. E., 406.\nThe plaintiff also attempted to offer evidence that other persons had suffered injuries \u201cwhile working in the rock quarry belonging to the city of Durham, while breaking rock,\u201d in the same manner as the plaintiff. The trial judge properly excluded the evidence for the reason that the evidence did not disclose \u201cthe substantial identity of circumstances or proximity of time which the law contemplates.\u201d Etheridge v. R. R., 206 N. C., 657, 175 S. E., 124.\nPlaintiff further insisted that it was error for the trial judge to decline to state his contentions to the effect that he was being worked in violation of the Constitution and laws upon the theory that C. S., 7758, authorizes convicts to be worked on the roads or streets, and, therefore, excludes work in quarries. Even if it be conceded that such contention is sound, there were no allegations in the pleadings raising the question, and hence the trial judge ruled correctly in declining to submit such contention.\nA careful examination of all the exceptions does not disclose to the Court any error of law.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "BeogdeN, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "P. B. Hines, Julius Brown, and. B. 0. Everett for plaintiff.",
      "S. G. Chambers for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "JAKE WATSON v. CITY OF DURHAM.\n(Filed 28 January, 1935.)\n1. Evidence K lb\u2014\nIn reply to a question as to the condition of a hammer furnished plaintiff for the performance of his work, defendant\u2019s witness, who had observed the hammer, was permitted to testify, \u201cI would say it was in good condition\u201d: Held, the testimony was competent as opinion testimony.\n2. Evidence I) h\u2014\nThe exclusion of testimony that others had been injured in the rock quarry in which plaintiff received the injury in suit is held without error in this case, the evidence failing to disclose the required substantial identity of circumstances or proximity of time.\n3. Trial E c\u2014\nWhere the contention of plaintiff is not supported by allegations in the complaint, the refusal of the court to submit such contention will not be held for error.\nCivil actioN, before Crammer, J., at September Term, 1934, of DURHAM.\nPlaintiff was sentenced to tbe State\u2019s prison for a term of years, and soon thereafter, by virtue of a contract between the city of Durham and the .State\u2019s prison authorities, he was sent to work at a quarry owned and operated by the city of Durham. He had worked in the quarry for approximately four years and was hurt on 22 September, 1930. Plaintiff testified: \u201cOn 22 September I was breaking rock with a hammer, . . . and a piece from that hammer hit me in my right eye and put it out.\u201d There was evidence that this hammer was a rock hammer, weighing about eighteen pounds, and that it was \u201call crumpled and battered and would shoot spraws . . . and fine pieces of rock.\u201d Plaintiff further testified that he had asked for goggles to protect his eyes and his request had been denied. He also testified that he had asked for a new hammer and that the same had not been furnished. He offered evidence that goggles were appliances approved and in general use for workmen engaged in breaking rock.\nThe defendant offered evidence tending to show that goggles were not appliances approved and in general use for the particular work that plaintiff was required to do, and that the hammer furnished had been inspected as required by reasonable prudence, and that said instrument was free from defects, and was a proper appliance for breaking rock.\nThere was sufficient evidence of negligence to be submitted to the jury, and the trial judge submitted issues of negligence, contributory negligence, and damages. The jury answered the issue of negligence \u201cNo,\u201d and from judgment upon the verdict the plaintiff appealed.\nP. B. Hines, Julius Brown, and. B. 0. Everett for plaintiff.\nS. G. Chambers for defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0624-01",
  "first_page_order": 692,
  "last_page_order": 693
}