{ "id": 8627998, "name": "STATE v. RAYMOND EDWARDS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Edwards", "decision_date": "1937-04-28", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "555", "last_page": "557", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "211 N.C. 555" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "123 Ind., 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ind.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N. C., 816", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8661409 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/124/0816-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N. C., 1148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N. C., 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N. C., 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8650978 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/100/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 N. C., 868", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8652558 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/104/0868-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 N. C., 614", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8659415 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/157/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 S. E., 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 N. C., 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8653507 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/186/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 S. E., 72", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 N. C., 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8658898 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/164/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 S. E., 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 N. C., 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2217673 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/193/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 S. E., 121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 N. C., 694", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8632443 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/206/0694-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 S. E., 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N. C., 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8653878 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/117/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 S. E., 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N. C., 1203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8654801 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/118/1203-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 S. E., 552", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N. C., 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8653536 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/121/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 S. E., 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 N. C., 645", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8659084 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/133/0645-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 S. E., 143", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 N. C., 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8631023 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/195/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 L. R. A., 304", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L.R.A.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 Ill., 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3276529 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/204/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N. C., 630", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8698129 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/79/0630-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 S. E., 91", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 N. C., 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630548 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/206/0388-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 476, "char_count": 8291, "ocr_confidence": 0.49, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.218658514259916e-07, "percentile": 0.8669634793379846 }, "sha256": "66e08f6dea9101578ec44db7545adcbcda05e633c58aaeaff438e93bc1eed231", "simhash": "1:bac8cc0fd63ec5c9", "word_count": 1447 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:38:14.990140+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE v. RAYMOND EDWARDS." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Stacy, C. J.\nIn telling the jury that they should take the exculpatory part of defendant\u2019s confession \u201cwith a grain of salt,\u201d the learned judge was evidently under the impression that the defendant had testified in his own behalf. In this he was mistaken. The defendant did not go upon the witness stand. The confession was offered in evidence by the State, and upon the confession the prosecution grounded its case. S. v. Cohoon, 206 N. C., 388, 174 S. E., 91. The defendant was entitled to have the confession considered as given, in its entirety, with whatever views or theories it afforded. S. v. Jones, 79 N. C., 630; 1 R. C. L., 585.\nIn Burnett v. People, 204 Ill., 208, 68 A. S. R., 206, 66 L. R. A., 304, the following instruction was held to be a correct statement of the law: \u201cThe court instructs the jury that where a confession of the prisoner charged with a crime is offered in evidence, the whole of the confession so offered and testified to must be taken together, as well (as) that part which makes in favor of the accused as that part which makes against him; and if the part of the statement which is in favor of the defendant is not disproved by other testimony in the ease, and is not improbable or untrue, considered in connection with all the other testimony of the case, then that part of the statement is entitled to as much consideration from the jury as the parts which make against the defendant.\u201d\nAgain, this original misapprehension seems to have led the court into another error. The jury was instructed to consider the \u201cevidence of the defendant,\u201d meaning the exculpatory statements in the confession, \u201cwith care and caution because he is liable to testify to his own interest . . . if a man\u2019s life is at stake.\u201d It is conceded in the State\u2019s brief that, had the defendant testified in his own behalf, this instruction could hardly be said to meet the test laid down in S. v. Ray, 195 N. C., 619, 143 S. E., 143: \u201c. . . where a defendant, in the trial of a criminal prosecution, testifies in his own behalf, it is error for the trial court to instruct the jury to scrutinize his testimony and to receive it with grains of allowance, because of his interest in the verdict, without adding that if they find the witness worthy of belief, they should give as full credit to his testimony as any other witness, notwithstanding his interest,\u201d citing in support of the position, S. v. Graham,, 133 N. C., 645, 45 S. E., 514; S. v. Lee, 121 N. C., 544, 28 S. E., 552; S. v. Collins, 118 N. C., 1203, 24 S. E., 118; S. v. Holloway, 117 N. C., 730, 23 S. E., 168, later quoted with approval in S. v. Wilcox, 206 N. C., 694, 175 S. E., 121.\nEvidence of the defendant\u2019s drunken condition at the time of the homicide was competent to he considered by the jury on the question of premeditation and deliberation. S. v. Ross, 193 N. C., 25, 136 S. E., 193; S. v. English, 164 N. C., 497, 80 S. E., 72; S. v. Allen, 186 N. C., 302, 119 S. E., 504.\nSpeaking to the question in S. v. Murphy, 157 N. C., 614, Holce, J delivering the opinion of the Court, said: \u201cIt is very generally understood that voluntary drunkenness is no legal excuse for crime, and the position has been held controlling in many causes in this State and on indictments for homicide, as in S. v. Wilson, 104 N. C., 868; S. v. Potts, 100 N. C., 457. The principle, however, is not allowed to prevail where, in addition to the overt act, it is required that a definite specific intent be established as an essential feature of the crime. In Clark\u2019s Criminal Law, p. 72, this limitation on the more general principle is thus succinctly stated: \u2018Where a specific intent is essential to constitute crime, the fact of intoxication may negative its existence.\u2019 Accordingly, since the statute dividing the crime of murder into two degrees and in cases where it becomes necessary, in order to convict an offender of murder in the first degree, to establish that the \u2018killing was deliberate and premeditated,\u2019 these terms contain, as an essential element of the crime of murder, \u2018a purpose to kill previously formed after weighing the matter\u2019 (S. v. Banks, 143 N. C., 658; S. v. Dowden, 118 N. C., 1148), a mental process, embodying a specific, definite intent, and if it is shown that an offender, charged with such crime, is so drunk that he is utterly unable to form or entertain this essential purpose he should not be convicted of the higher offense. It is said in some of the cases, and the statement has our unqualified approval, that the doctrine in question should be applied with great caution. \u25a0 It does not exist in reference to murder in the second degree nor as to manslaughter. Wharton on Homicide (3 Ed.), 810. It has been excluded in well considered decisions where the facts show that the purpose to kill was deliberately formed when sober, though it was executed when drunk, a position presented in S. v. Kale, 124 N. C., 816, and approved and recognized in Arzman v. Indiana, 123 Ind., 346, and it does not avail from the fact that an offender is, at the time, under the influence of intoxicants, unless, as heretofore stated, his mind is so affected that he is unable to form or entertain the specified purpose referred to.\u201d\nEor errors, as indicated, a new trial will be awarded.\nNew trial.", "type": "majority", "author": "Stacy, C. J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney-General Seawell and Assistant Attorney-General McMullan for the State.", "Ernest R. Warren and Charles E. Hamilton, Jr., for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE v. RAYMOND EDWARDS.\n(Filed 28 April, 1937.)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 33, 41f \u2014 Defendant is entitled to have exculpatory as well as incriminating portions of confession considered by jury.\nExculpatory matter contained in a confession of guilt introduced in evidence by the State should be given the same weight by the jury as incriminating portions of the confession, unless disproved or weakened by other evidence, since a confession must be considered as given, in its entirety, and the exculpatory statements do not constitute evidence by defendant in his own behalf, and an instruction that such statements should be scrutinized because of defendant\u2019s interest in the verdict, is error.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 41f \u2014 Credibility of testimony by defendant in his own behalf.\nIt is error for the court to charge that defendant\u2019s testimony should be scrutinized and received with caution in view of defendant\u2019s interest in the verdict, without adding that if they find defendant worthy of belief, they should give as full credit to his testimony as any other witness, notwithstanding his interest.\n3. Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 4c, 21 \u2014 Evidence of drunkenness is competent on question of premeditation and deliberation.\nEvidence of defendant\u2019s drunken condition at the time of the homicide is competent on the question of premeditation and deliberation, since if defendant is too intoxicated to be capable of premeditation and deliberation he cannot be convicted of first degree murder, unless the deliberate purpose to kill was formed when sober, though executed when drunk.\nAppeal by defendant from Finley, Emergency Judge, at November Term, 1936, of GastoN.\nCriminal prosecution, tried upon indictment charging the defendant with the murder of his wife, Fannie Edwards.\nThe deceased was killed on the night of 5 November, 1936. The evidence tending to connect the defendant with the homicide comes from a written confession in which the defendant says he killed his wife with an axe, but in the same confession he states and reiterates that he was drunk and did not know what he was doing. The defendant offered no evidence.\nWith respect to the statements in the confession tending to show that the defendant was drunk, the court in its charge said to the jury: \u201cThis is evidence offered by the defendant in his own behalf and the law says that you shall Take it with a grain of salt.\u2019 \u201d Exception.\nAnd immediately following: \u201cThe State contends that there was no evidence to show that he was drunk that evening outside of the evidence of the defendant \u2014 evidence made in his own behalf. The law says that you must take these statements with care and caution, because be is Hable to testify to bis own interest, ... if a man\u2019s life is at stake.\u201d Exception.\nVerdict: Guilty of murder in tbe first degree.\nJudgment: Death by asphyxiation.\nThe defendant appeals, assigning errors.\nAttorney-General Seawell and Assistant Attorney-General McMullan for the State.\nErnest R. Warren and Charles E. Hamilton, Jr., for defendant." }, "file_name": "0555-01", "first_page_order": 621, "last_page_order": 623 }