{
  "id": 8631014,
  "name": "MRS. LILLIE MORRIS, Administratrix of C. OSCAR MORRIS, Deceased, v. C. M. JOHNSON",
  "name_abbreviation": "Morris v. Johnson",
  "decision_date": "1938-11-09",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "402",
  "last_page": "403",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "214 N.C. 402"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
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    {
      "cite": "213 N. C., 603",
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    {
      "cite": "72 S. E., 213",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "156 N. C., 112",
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      "reporter": "N.C.",
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      "cite": "62 S. E., 884",
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      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "149 N. C., 117",
      "category": "reporters:state",
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      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/149/0117-01"
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    {
      "cite": "213 N. C., 314",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8627855
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      "weight": 2,
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      "case_paths": [
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  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 293,
    "char_count": 4356,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.492,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.1861496195346131e-07,
      "percentile": 0.5902633705671644
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    "sha256": "97c2ea11d83cb33b6b9e503dfafa5a302090a802e90becf04fb5a08f4974cbfa",
    "simhash": "1:577922802f14b9cb",
    "word_count": 739
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:38:13.292364+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "MRS. LILLIE MORRIS, Administratrix of C. OSCAR MORRIS, Deceased, v. C. M. JOHNSON."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Pee CtjRiam.\nEvidence of speed in excess of tbe statutory limits is prima facie evidence \u201cthat tbe speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful.\u201d Public Laws 1935, cb. 311, sec. 2. It is, therefore, prima facie evidence of negligence. Woods v. Freeman, 213 N. C., 314. A prima facie showing carries tbe case to tbe jury for it to say whether or not tbe crucial and necessary facts have been established; Woods v. Freeman, supra; Cox v. R. R., 149 N. C., 117, 62 S. E., 884; Brock v. Ins. Co., 156 N. C., 112, 72 S. E., 213; unless plaintiff\u2019s evidence is such that tbe conclusion that plaintiff\u2019s intestate was guilty of contributory negligence is tbe only reasonable conclusion to be deduced from tbe testimony. Mulford v. Hotel Co., 213 N. C., 603. If tbe record discloses any evidence of contributory negligence it is not of sufficient probative force to require tbe conclusion as a matter of law that tbe deceased by bis conduct proximately contributed to bis injury and death.\nThere is likewise sufficient evidence that tbe car driven by defendant\u2019s daughter was in use as a family car to require tbe submission of an appropriate issue thereon.\nThe judgment below is\nReversed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Pee CtjRiam."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "W. I. Godwin and L. L. Levinson for plaintiff, appellant.",
      "Abell & Shepard for defendant, appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "MRS. LILLIE MORRIS, Administratrix of C. OSCAR MORRIS, Deceased, v. C. M. JOHNSON.\n(Filed 9 November, 1938.)\n1. Automobiles \u00a7 12a\u2014\nEvidence of speed in excess of the statutory limits is prima facie evidence that the speed is unlawful, and therefore constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence. Public Laws of 1935, ch. 311, sec. 2.\n2. Automobiles \u00a7 18g\u2014\nA prima facie showing of negligence in operating an automobile at a speed in excess of the statutory limits carries the case to the jury in the absence of evidence establishing contributory negligence as a matter of ' law.\n8. Trial \u00a7 24\u2014\nOrdinarily, a prima facie showing carries the case to the jury for it to say whether or not the necessary facts have been established.\n4. Automobiles \u00a7 25 \u2014 Evidence held sufficient for jury under family car doctrine.\nEvidence that title to a car was taken in the trade name of defendant\u2019s business, but that his wife and daughter habitually used the car, and did not customarily use any other car, and that at the time of the accident in suit defendant\u2019s daughter was driving the car with his consent, is held, sufficient to be submitted to the jury on the issue of defendant\u2019s liability for the daughter\u2019s negligent driving under the family car doctrine.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Harris, J., at February Term, 1938, of JohNstoN.\nReversed.\nCivil action to recover damages for the wrongful death of plaintiff\u2019s intestate alleged to have been caused by the negligent operation of an automobile by defendant\u2019s daughter.\nAbout 5 p.m., 30 December, 1936, plaintiff\u2019s intestate alighted from a truck which stopped on the east shoulder of State Highway No. 22 at Bill\u2019s Service Station between Smithfield and Selma. He then walked diagonally in a southwesterly direction across the hard surface road toward bis truck, wbieb was parked west of said bigbway. Just as be reached tbe western edge of tbe paved surface of tbe road be was struck by an automobile being driven in a southerly direction by defendant\u2019s daughter and was carried some distance down tbe road. He died from the injuries received. One witness testified: \u201cIt was going fast, probably sixty or seventy miles per hour, just like tbe wind.\u201d The deceased was carried about 75 feet down tbe road and tbe automobile traveled some distance after be was thrown or fell from tbe front of tbe car. There is other evidence to like effect.\n\u2022 Tbe evidence likewise discloses that tbe defendant conducts a laundry under a trade name; that tbe title to tbe automobile is in tbe trade name of tbe defendant\u2019s business; that defendant\u2019s wife uses tbe car for business, shopping, collecting, etc.; that defendant\u2019s daughter drives tbe car with tbe consent of her mother and that she was operating tbe car at tbe time of tbe accident with tbe consent of tbe defendant. Defendant\u2019s wife and daughter are not accustomed to driving any other car owned by tbe defendant.\nAt tbe conclusion of plaintiff\u2019s evidence, on motion of tbe defendant, tbe action was dismissed as of involuntary nonsuit. Plaintiff excepted and appealed.\nW. I. Godwin and L. L. Levinson for plaintiff, appellant.\nAbell & Shepard for defendant, appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0402-01",
  "first_page_order": 470,
  "last_page_order": 471
}