{ "id": 8598454, "name": "CARL ROSE and T. W. ROSE v. MRS. R. G. FRANKLIN", "name_abbreviation": "Rose v. Franklin", "decision_date": "1939-10-11", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "289", "last_page": "291", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "216 N.C. 289" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "195 S. E., 43", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 N. C., 814", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8620695 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/212/0814-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 S. E., 830", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 N. C., 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8658073 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/133/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 S. E., 896", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N. C., 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8660071 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/128/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 N. C., 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2104328 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/23/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 N. C., 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11274558 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/19/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 N. C., 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 N. C., 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11276129 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/13/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 S. E., 283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 N. C., 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8652141 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/142/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 S. E., 340", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N. C., 816", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8662371 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/122/0816-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 N. C., 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8693821 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/25/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 N. C., 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8684318 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/7/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 N. C., 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 S. E., 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "170 N. C., 625", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8661351 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/170/0625-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 S. E., 786", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N. C., 870", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8654223 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/118/0870-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 438, "char_count": 7733, "ocr_confidence": 0.496, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.090893894084587e-08, "percentile": 0.4673085187592018 }, "sha256": "fc4dcd40e85a5e7d920e2bda80fe4d816c58098670d8a76a2924dd6a309faa62", "simhash": "1:fde610f3d469eb3d", "word_count": 1414 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:26:30.134660+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CARL ROSE and T. W. ROSE v. MRS. R. G. FRANKLIN." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Winborne, J.\nAppellant presents this question as determinative of this appeal: Did the court below err in holding as a matter of law that the description of the land in the deeds under which plaintiffs claim extends to the middle or thread of the Tadkin River?\nWith that ruling we are in accord.\nDefendant, having admitted that the plaintiffs have a good and valid title to all the lands embraced within the boundaries described in those deeds, and the Tadkin River at the point in question being non-navigable as admitted by all parties, the question involves the construction of what is the boundary. This is a question of law for the court. Brown v. House, 118 N. C., 870, 24 S. E., 786; Power Co. v. Savage, 170 N. C., 625, 87 S. E., 629, and numerous other decisions.\nIn accordance with well settled principle of law, a description of riparian lands by which a line runs to a monument on the bank, and thence with the river, makes the river the boundary. Sandifer v. Foster, 2 N. C., 237. The underlying principle has been enunciated in many later decisions of this Court, among which are Cherry v. Slade, 7 N. C., 82; Shultz v. Young, 25 N. C., 385; Bowen v. Gaylord, 122 N. C., 816, 29 S. E., 340; Power Co. v. Savage, supra.\nIn Sandifer v. Foster, supra, the last line of a boundary was from a white oak (which stood half a mile from the river), thence along the river to the beginning. The Court held that the river is the boundary.\nLikewise, as stated by Brown, J., in Wall v. Wall, 142 N. C., 387, 55 S. E., 283, \u201cThere is no rule of common law better settled, and more universally adopted in this country, than that which prescribes that a grant of land bounded in terms by a creek or river not navigable carries the land to the grantee usque ad filum aquae, to the middle or thread of the stream.\u201d Wilson v. Forbes, 13 N. C., 30; Ingram v. Threadgill, 14 N. C., 61; Pugh v. Wheeler, 19 N. C., 50; Williams v. Buchanan, 23 N. C., 535; Rowe v. Lumber Co., 128 N. C., 301, 38 S. E., 896; Rowe v. Lumber Co., 133 N. C., 433, 45 S. E., 830; Dunlap v. Light Co., 212 N. C., 814, 195 S. E., 43.\nApplying these principles to the facts of the present case, the calls \u201cto a large burch on the bank of the Eiver,\u201d \u201cthence down the angles of the river to the beginning\u201d make the river the boundary, and carry the next to last call to the thread or middle of the stream, and thence down the thread or middle of the stream as it meanders to the beginning.\nDefendant contends, however, that the principle cannot apply when the bed of the stream has been previously granted \u2014 citing Williams v. Buchanan, supra. This contention is apparently based upon the theory that plaintiffs have shown no grant from the State, and that she has shown a grant to her predecessor in title. But, in this contention, appellant loses sight of the fact that title of plaintiffs is admitted to be good and valid to whatever land the description in their deeds covers. This admission presupposes that plaintiffs have an older paper title originating in a grant from the State, or that they have had adverse possession with or without color of title for a sufficient length of time to ripen title, not only as against her but as against the State. Otherwise, the title would not be good and valid.\nIn the judgment below, we find\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "Winborne, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Wm. M. Allen and Hoke F. Henderson for plaintiffs, appellees.", "Earl C. James for defendant, appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CARL ROSE and T. W. ROSE v. MRS. R. G. FRANKLIN.\n(Filed 11 October, 1939.)\n1. Boundaries \u00a7 1\u2014\nThe construction of a deed as to the effect of the language describing the boundary is a question of law for the court.\n2. Boundaries \u00a7 4\u2014\nThe calls in a State grant of lands to a' tree on the bank of a non-navigable stream and thence \u201cdown the angles of the river to the beginning\u201d makes the river the boundary and extends the call to the middle or thread of the stream opposite the tree and thence down the thread or middle of the stream to the beginning.\n3. Estoppel \u00a7 4 \u2014 Admission of record precludes contention at variance therewith.\nDefendant admitted that plaintiffs\u2019 title was good as to all lands embraced in the description in plaintiffs\u2019 deeds. The calls in plaintiffs\u2019 deeds were to a point on the bank of a non-navigable river and thence down the angles of the stream to the beginning. Defendant contended that the rule that such calls took the boundary to the thread of the stream was inapplicable because of defendant\u2019s claim under a prior grant embracing the bed of the stream. Held: Defendant\u2019s contention was precluded by her admission which conceded better title in plaintiffs as to all lands embraced in their deeds.\nAppeal by defendant from Alley, J., at May Term, 1939, of Suket. Civil action in ejectment.\nPlaintiffs allege tbat they are the owners in fee simple of a certain tract of land in the town of Elkin, lying west of old river bridge, described in a deed of W. C. Lewis to plaintiffs dated 21 April, 1936, registered 15 May, 1936, in Book 125, page 320, of the deed records of Surry County, North Carolina, in which deed these calls appear: \u201cthence south 22-00 degrees east 90 feet, more or less,.to the Yadkin river; thence down the meanders of the river as it meanders 150 feet, more or less, to an iron stake on the west margin of Bridge Street; thence north with west margin of Bridge Street 136.6 feet to the beginning.\u201d\nPlaintiffs trace their title through, and offer in evidence mesne conveyances in connected chain to a deed from Eich Gwynn to Bichard E. Gwynn, dated 29 November, 1866, registered 21 June, 1869, in Book 12, page 234, of the records of deeds of Surry County, North Carolina.\nAs a part of the description in that deed which includes the land described in the said deed from ~W. O. Lewis to plaintiffs, there appear these calls : \u201cThence along the road south about 32 degrees east 15 chains to a large bureh on the bank of the river below the ferry landing and mouth of Big Elkin; thence down the angles of the river to the beginning, including 697 acres, more or less.\u201d\nThe call in the deed to plaintiffs \u201cthence down the meanders of the river as it meanders 150 feet more or less\u201d is a part of the call \u201cthence down the angles of the river to the beginning,\u201d,in the deed from Rich Gwynn to Richard R. Gwynn.\nPlaintiffs offered evidence tending to show that they and those under whom they claim title have had adverse possession of the lands so described to the middle or thread of the stream over a long period of years.\nIt is admitted that the Tadkin River at the point in question is a non-navigable stream. The defendant admits that the plaintiffs have a good and valid title to all the land embraced in the boundaries of the several deeds under which they claim. However, the defendant does not admit that plaintiffs\u2019 title extends to the thread or middle of the Tadkin River, for that she claims that the title to the bed of the river remained in the State and was granted by the State in Grant No. 12524 on 5 July, 1894, to R. G. Franklin, from whose heirs at law she received deed. Defendant introduced in evidence record of that grant and of that deed. \u201c\"Without prejudice to plaintiffs\u2019 rights, plaintiffs admit that the description in the grant introduced by the defendant described the bed of the river adjacent to the property owned by the plaintiffs.\u201d\nUpon these admissions the court below held as a matter of law that the description in the deed to plaintiffs extends to the middle or thread of Tadkin River, and entered judgment declaring the plaintiffs to be the owners in fee simple and entitled to the possession of the lands in question, up to the middle or thread of the Tadkin River.\nDefendant appeals to the Supreme Court, and assigns error.\nWm. M. Allen and Hoke F. Henderson for plaintiffs, appellees.\nEarl C. James for defendant, appellant." }, "file_name": "0289-01", "first_page_order": 355, "last_page_order": 357 }