{
  "id": 8607951,
  "name": "J. T. HUNTER v. KENNETH BRUTON",
  "name_abbreviation": "Hunter v. Bruton",
  "decision_date": "1939-11-29",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "540",
  "last_page": "542",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "216 N.C. 540"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "205 N. C., 17",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8626418
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/205/0017-01"
      ]
    }
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:26:30.134660+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "J. T. HUNTER v. KENNETH BRUTON."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Schenck, J.\nThis is an action to recover damages for personal injuries arising out of an automobile collision alleged to have been proximately caused by tbe negligence of tbe defendant. Tbe plaintiff was driving one car and tbe defendant was driving tbe other. Tbe plaintiff\u2019s ear was being driven in a southerly direction and tbe defendant\u2019s car in a northerly direction. The plaintiff\u2019s car struck a slick place in tbe highway which caused it to run to its left across tbe highway, to strike a telephone pole on its left side of the highway, and to turn around and come to a stop in the cornfield on its left side of the highway. The defendant turned his car to his right off of the highway and struck the plaintiff\u2019s car. The evidence is conflicting as to how long the plaintiff\u2019s ear had been at a standstill before it was stricken by the defendant\u2019s car. The plaintiff\u2019s evidence tends to show between a minute and a minute and a half, and the defendant\u2019s evidence at most \u201ca fraction of a second.\u201d\nThe plaintiff\u2019s contention is that the defendant was negligent in running off of the highway on his (defendant\u2019s) right side thereof and striking the plaintiff\u2019s car, which had cleared the road and come to rest in time for the defendant to have remained on the highway and driven by him without colliding.\nThe defendant\u2019s contention is that he saw the plaintiff\u2019s car approaching him from the opposite direction, saw it leave its right side of the highway, cross over on its left side, and approach close enough to defendant\u2019s ear to cause him to think his car would collide with plaintiff\u2019s car if he remained on the highway and that he ran his car off of the highway to his (defendant\u2019s) right in an endeavor to avoid a collision, and that plaintiff\u2019s ear left the highway on plaintiff\u2019s -left side thereof in front of the defendant\u2019s car and thereby caused the collision, with its consequent damage.\nThe question presented by these conflicting contentions, both of which are supported by evidence, is whether the defendant was negligent in leaving the highway on his right and thereby causing the collision.\nThe following excerpt from his Honor\u2019s charge upon the first issue is made the basis for an exceptive assignment of error:\n\u201cNow if you find, of course there being no burden upon the defendant, that the plaintiff\u2019s car got in his road of travel when the defendant was doing all he could do about it, and he couldn\u2019t help but hit it, of course the plaintiff can\u2019t recover, but if the plaintiff has satisfied you by the greater weight of the evidence, the burden being upon the plaintiff, that his car had left the road at a time when the road was clear, had switched around after hitting the telephone pole and had come to a standstill and was standing still, and the defendant ran off the road and struck him when he was standing still there in the cornfield, then you will answer that issue \u2018Yes.\u2019 If you fail to so find, or if your minds are equally balanced about it and you don\u2019t know how it was, you will answer it No.\u2019 \u201d\nWe think, and so hold, that this exception is well taken, since it fails to make any reference to the time the plaintiff\u2019s car may have been \u201cstanding still\u201d at the time of the collision. If the car had been \u201cstanding still\u201d for only \u201ca fraction of a second\u201d when stricken it might not follow, certainly would not follow as a matter of law, that the defendant was negligent in running off of the highway in an endeavor to avoid the collision; and even if the plaintiff\u2019s car had been \u201cstanding still\u201d for a minute and a half, as contended by the plaintiff, it would still be a question for the jury to determine whether the leaving of the highway by the defendant was negligence under the emergency that confronted him. \u201cPeril and the discovery of such peril in time to avoid injury constitutes the back log of the doctrine of last clear chance.\u201d Brogden, J., in Miller v. R. R., 205 N. C., 17.\nWe hold that the trial judge ruled correctly when he refused the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the action properly made and renewed under C. S., 567.\nPor the error assigned there must be a\nNew trial.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Schenck, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "G. T. Carswell and Joe W. Ervin for plaintiff, appellee.",
      "Gover & Covington for defendant, appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "J. T. HUNTER v. KENNETH BRUTON.\n(Filed 29 November, 1939.)\nAutomobiles \u00a7\u00a7 8, 18a \u2014 Whether acts of defendant when confronted with sudden emergency constituted negligence held for jury.\nThe evidence tended to show that plaintiff and defendant were driving their respective cars in opposite directions, that plaintiff struck a slick place in the highway, causing his car to skid to its left, strike a telephone pole on its left side of the highway, turn around and stop in a cornfield beyond the hard surface on its left side, and that defendant turned his car to the right and ran off his right side of the highway and struck plaintiff\u2019s car. There was conflict in the evidence whether plaintiff\u2019s car had been standing still only a fraction of a second or a minute and a half before it was struck by defendant\u2019s car. Held: Whether defendant was negligent in running off the highway to the right and striking plaintiff\u2019s car under the emergency that confronted him is a question for the jury, and an instruction to the effect that if defendant ran off the highway to his right and struck plaintiff\u2019s car, which was standing still, defendant would be guilty of negligence, is error.\nAppeal by tbe defendant from Johnston, Special Judge, at May Special Term, 1939, of MeckleNbtteg.\nNew trial.\nG. T. Carswell and Joe W. Ervin for plaintiff, appellee.\nGover & Covington for defendant, appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0540-01",
  "first_page_order": 606,
  "last_page_order": 608
}