{
  "id": 8617675,
  "name": "FOREST CITY COTTON COMPANY et al. v. HENRIETTA MILLS",
  "name_abbreviation": "Forest City Cotton Co. v. Mills",
  "decision_date": "1940-10-09",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "294",
  "last_page": "295",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "218 N.C. 294"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "63 N. C., 285",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        11277127
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/63/0285-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "47 S. E., 226",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "135 N. C., 95",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8658464
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/135/0095-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "24 S. E., 516",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "118 N. C., 180",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 220,
    "char_count": 3360,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.488,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 6.627581411147289e-08,
      "percentile": 0.4044923082388201
    },
    "sha256": "10a5b0fc6c6b2c36c6dd5dd901d2bf6b2dd12feb353051c01e15cd73642c50e9",
    "simhash": "1:3b60f0bc405a056d",
    "word_count": 560
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:22:12.547739+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "FOREST CITY COTTON COMPANY et al. v. HENRIETTA MILLS."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Stacy,'C. J.\nThe trial court seems to have fallen into error in instructing the jury to answer the issue of liability \u201cNo\u201d if they should find that tbe defendant \u201cbas not made any unreasonable use of its riparian rights, ... or, if reasonable, bas not taken in whole or in part any of plaintiff\u2019s land.\u201d Tbe plaintiff bad abandoned its allegations of negligence and was proceeding only in trespass. It was, therefore, entitled to have tbe cause submitted to tbe jury on tbe theory of trespass without reference to tbe allegations of negligence or wrongful taking. Cline v. Baker, 118 N. C., 180, 24 S. E., 516: Chaffin v. Mfg. Co., 135 N. C., 95, 47 S. E., 226.\nTbe challenged instruction placed too heavy a burden on tbe plaintiff. In trespass, tbe plaintiff is entitled to recover nominal damages if be only show that tbe defendant broke bis close. Lee v. Stewart, ante, 287; Chaffin v. Mfg. Co., supra; Little v. Stanback, 63 N. C., 285.\nNew trial.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Stacy,'C. J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Hamrick \u2022& Hamrick and Paul Boucher for plaintiff, appellant.",
      "Oscar J. Mooneyham and Clarence 0. Ridings for defendant, appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "FOREST CITY COTTON COMPANY et al. v. HENRIETTA MILLS.\n(Filed 9 October, 1940.)\nTrespass \u00a7 la: Waters and Water Courses \u00a7 7 \u2014 Plaintiff in action for trespass is entitled to recover nominal damages upon showing that defendant broke his close.\nThis action was instituted to recover damages to plaintiff\u2019s land resulting from the construction and operation of defendant\u2019s milldam. Plaintiff abandoned its cause of action for negligent construction and operation of the dam, and elected to stand solely on its cause of action for trespass. Meld: Since plaintiff is entitled to recover nominal damages if he only show that the defendant broke his close, without reference to negligence or wrongful taking, an instruction to answer the issue of liability in the negative if the jury should find that defendant made no unreasonable uses of its riparian rights or, if reasonable, has not taken in whole or in part any of plaintiff\u2019s land, is error, as placing too heavy a burden on plaintiff.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Armstrong, J., at April Term, 1940, of Rutheeeobd.\nCivil action (1) for trespass, and (2) for negligent construction and operation of river dam.\nIt is alleged that thirty acres of plaintiff\u2019s land situate on Puzzle Creek have been sobbed and soured and the shrubbery thereon destroyed by the construction and negligent operation of the defendant\u2019s milldam on Second Broad River, which is several miles below plaintiff\u2019s property.\nOn the hearing, the plaintiff abandoned its allegations of negligence, and elected to stand solely upon its action for trespass.\nOn the issue of liability, the court instructed the jury as follows:\n\u201cThe court instructs you that if you should find from the evidence in this case that the defendant in the construction, operation and maintenance of its dam at Caroleen, North Carolina, has not made any unreasonable use of its riparian rights, as the court has defined the law to you and explained what unreasonable use means, or if reasonable, has not taken in whole or in part any of the plaintiff\u2019s land as the court has heretofore instructed you, then you would answer the second issue No.\u2019 \u201d Exception.\nThe jury answered the issue of liability in favor of the defendant. From judgment thereon, the plaintiff appeals, assigning errors.\nHamrick \u2022& Hamrick and Paul Boucher for plaintiff, appellant.\nOscar J. Mooneyham and Clarence 0. Ridings for defendant, appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0294-01",
  "first_page_order": 362,
  "last_page_order": 363
}