{ "id": 8620691, "name": "W. W. ROSE v. TALITHA ROSE", "name_abbreviation": "Rose v. Rose", "decision_date": "1941-01-08", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "20", "last_page": "23", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "219 N.C. 20" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "218 N. C., 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8615704 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/218/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 S. E., 657", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N. C., 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8650042 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/101/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 S. E., 166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 N. C., 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8655988 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/183/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 S. E., 904", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N. C., 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11272405 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/134/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 S. E., 568", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N. C., 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8659477 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/131/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 S. E., 454", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 N. C., 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8656217 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/159/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 S. E., 721", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 N. C., 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11269189 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/173/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 Pa. St., 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 964948 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/13/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 S. E., 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 N. C., 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627543 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/211/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Am. Dec., 447", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "Am. Dec.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Pa. St., 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 979412 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/27/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 S. E., 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N. C., 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11268552 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/138/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 N. H., 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.H.", "case_ids": [ 4466340 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nh/46/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 S. E., 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 N. C., 630", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625647 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/192/0630-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 S. E., 60", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 N. C., 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8654027 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/186/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 S. E., 25", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 N. C., 684", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2217752 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/193/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 S. E., 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 N. C., 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629890 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/195/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 S. E., 581", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N. C., 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8658941 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/136/0130-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 481, "char_count": 7808, "ocr_confidence": 0.5, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.491125551307556e-08, "percentile": 0.39933930511006627 }, "sha256": "2d3a16b9a54198c198cdbb0fef22f53106f629cf627bef6da5f4358d1d518482", "simhash": "1:3f8e0019c8564ae7", "word_count": 1446 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:38:18.105136+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "W. W. ROSE v. TALITHA ROSE." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Stacy, C. J.\nThe question in difference arises out of the construction of the following item in the will of J. 0. Rose :\n\u201c5. I give and bequeath to my son, ~W. W. Rose, the Pierce place where he now lives . . . his lifetime, then to his wife, Sarah, her life time or widowhood but in case said ~W. W. Rose have any heirs said land go to said heirs.\u201d\nIt is conceded that if W. W. Rose take a fee simple in the land devised to him under the above clause in his father\u2019s will, the deed tendered is sufficient, and the judgment in favor of the plaintiff is correct, but the defendant questions the devise as vesting in W. W. Rose a fee-simple estate.\nThe record states that plaintiff\u2019s wife, mentioned as Sarah in the will, died in 1937, leaving her surviving the plaintiff, her husband, and no children, as none was born to their marriage. The plaintiff has not remarried, and he has no children. The intervening life estate of plaintiff\u2019s wife, Sarah, is therefore at an end, she having predeceased her husband.\nIt would seem that according to what was said in Cooper, Ex parte, 136 N. C., 130, 48 S. E., 581, the limitations in the present devise are so framed as to attract the rula in Shelley\u2019s case, which says, in substance, \u201cthat if an estate in freehold be limited to A., with remainder to his heirs, general or special, the remainder, although importing an independent gift to the heirs, as original takers, shall confer the inheritance on A., the ancestor.\u201d Martin v. Knowles, 195 N. C., 427, 142 S. E., 313. It operates to vest in the first taker a fee simple or a fee tail, as the case may be, divided or split by intervening limitations, where there are any. Welch v. Gibson, 193 N. C., 684, 138 S. E., 25; Bank v. Dortch, 186 N. C., 510, 120 S. E., 60. There were intermediate estates in Shelley\u2019s case itself. Benton v. Baucom, 192 N. C., 630, 135 S. E., 629.\nA very satisfactory statement of the rule by Lord Macnagbten will be found in Van Grutten v. Foxwell, Appeal Cases, Law Reports (1897), at p. 658: \u201cIt is a rule in law when the ancestor by any gift or conveyance takes an estate of freehold, and in the same gift or conveyance an estate is limited either mediately or immediately to his heirs in fee or in tail, that always in such cases \u2018the heirs\u2019 are words of limitation of the estate and not words of purchase.\u201d\nIt is hardly necessary to observe that every part of this statement is deserving of attention, from the opening words, which declare it to be \u201ca rule in law,\u201d to the last clause, which says that \u201cthe heirs\u201d can never take by purchase when the rule applies. \u201cIn determining whether the rule in Shelley\u2019s case shall apply, it is not material to inquire what the intention of the testator was as to the quantity of estate that should vest in the first taker. The material inquiry is, What is taken under the second devise? If those who take under the second devise take the same estate, they would take as heirs or heirs of his body, the rule applies\u201d \u2014 Perley, G. J., in Crockett v. Robinson, 46 N. H., 454. \u201cIt (The Rule) applies when the same persons will take the same estate, whether they take by descent or purchase; in which case they are made to take by descent\u201d \u2014 Brown, J., in Tyson v. Sinclair, 138 N. C., 23, 50 S. E., 450.\nIt will be noted that the limitation to the heirs of W. W. Rose does not change the course of descent. \u201cThe law will not treat that as an estate for life which is essentially an estate of inheritance, nor permit anyone to take in the character of heir unless he takes also in the quality of heir.\u201d Steacy v. Rice, 27 Pa. St., 95, 65 Am. Dec., 447.\nReduced to its simplest terms, the devise in question is one to W. W. Rose for life, remainder to his wife Sarah for life, remainder to his heirs. Rowland v. Building & Loan Assn., 211 N. C., 456, 190 S. E., 719. This under the rule in Shelley\u2019s case gives to W. W. Rose an estate for life in possession, with a fee simple in expectancy. Hileman v. Bouslaugh, 13 Pa. St., 344. He may deal with the property as full owner and convey it, subject only to the intervening life estate and its incidents. Welch v. Gibson, supra; Smith v. Smith, 173 N. C., 124, 91 S. E., 721; Cotten v. Moseley, 159 N. C., 1, 74 S. E., 454. As the intervening life estate is at an end, he may convey it absolutely and in fee simple.\nThe suggestion that the limitation to the heirs of W. W. Rose was intended as a shifting devise, or as a substitute for the limitation to his wife Sarah, even though arguable, when reduced to its final analysis, seems to lead to the same conclusion, or at least to no different result. Whitfield v. Garris, 131 N. C., 148, 42 S. E., 568; on rehearing, 134 N. C., 24, 45 S. E., 904. The disjunctive clause, \u201cbut in case said ~W. W. Eose have any heirs,\u201d appears to be only an awkward expression, and should perhaps be disregarded as surplusage, Cooper, Ex parte, supra, but if not, its ultimate effect is to prevent a reverter, and in either event, the limitation falls within the rule in Shelley\u2019s case.\nHere, there is no reverter and no limitation over in case the first taker should \u201cdie without heirs,\u201d Willis v. Trust Co., 183 N. C., 267, 111 S. E., 166, and nothing to indicate the use of the word \u201cheirs\u201d in any restricted sense. Leathers v. Gray, 101 N. C., 162, 7 S. E., 657; Whitley v. Arenson, post, 121. See cases assembled in Williamson v. Cox, 218 N. C., 177, 10 S. E. (2d), 662.\nThe conclusion is reached that the judgment should be upheld.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Stacy, C. J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Wellons \u25a0& Wellons for plaintiff, appellee.", "W. 0. Rosser, Jr., for defendant, appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "W. W. ROSE v. TALITHA ROSE.\n(Filed 8 January, 1941.)\n1. Wills \u00a7 42\u2014\nWhere the devisee of an intervening life estate dies prior to the first taker, her life estate is at an end.\n2. Wills \u00a7 33b\u2014\nThe rule in Shelley\u2019s ease applies equally whether the remainder to the heirs is limited mediately or immediately after the estate to the ancestor.\n3. Same\u2014\nThe rule in Shelley\u2019s case is a rule of law, and its application depends not upon the estate intended to be devised to the ancestor but upon the estate devised to the heirs, the rule being applicable if the limitation over is to the same persons who would take the same estate as heirs, since the law will not permit a person to take in the character of heir unless he takes also in the quality of heir.\n4. Same \u2014 Rule in Shelley\u2019s case held applicable to devise in question.\nTestator devised the land in question to his son \u201chis lifetime\u201d then to his son\u2019s wife for her life or widowhood \u201cbut in case\u201d the son \u201chave any heirs said land to go to said heirs.\u201d Held: There is no reverter and no limitation over in case the first taker should \u201cdie without heirs\u201d and nothing to indicate the use of the word \u201cheirs\u201d in any restricted sense, and the rale in Shelley\u2019s ease applies to give an estate for life to the son, an intervening life estate to his wife, and a fee simple in expectancy to the son, and upon the termination of the intervening life estate by the death of his wife, the son may convey in fee simple.\nAppeal by defendant from Carr, J., at November Term, 1940, of JOHNSTON.\nControversy without action submitted on an agreed statement of facts. Plaintiff, being under contract to convey a 79-acre tract of land to defendant, duly executed and tendered deed sufficient in form to invest the defendant with a fee-simple title to the property, and demanded payment of the purchase price as agreed, but the defendant declined to accept the deed and refuses to make payment of the purchase price on the ground that the title offered is defective.\nThe court, being of opinion that upon the facts agreed, the deed tendered was sufficient to convey a fee-simple title to the locus in quo, gave judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appeals, assigning error.\nWellons \u25a0& Wellons for plaintiff, appellee.\nW. 0. Rosser, Jr., for defendant, appellant." }, "file_name": "0020-01", "first_page_order": 62, "last_page_order": 65 }