{
  "id": 11307657,
  "name": "STATE v. PAUL A. MILLER",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Miller",
  "decision_date": "1942-01-07",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "660",
  "last_page": "666",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "220 N.C. 660"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "192 S. E., 859",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "212 N. C., 56",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8599244
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/212/0056-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "189 S. E., 868",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "211 N. C., 278",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8626174
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/211/0278-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "167 S. E., 456",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "204 N. C., 28",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8610419
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/204/0028-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 825,
    "char_count": 19210,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.484,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 2.492106037537233e-07,
      "percentile": 0.8086552536460619
    },
    "sha256": "bb12eb901c6d377591948fcf1219588d330c33ea41af03897e19fbfbd5a75666",
    "simhash": "1:932a901ef3e421fd",
    "word_count": 3384
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:44:04.432821+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STATE v. PAUL A. MILLER."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "'WiNBORNE, J.\nDefendant challenges the judgment rendered in court below mainly upon the ground that the evidence, when taken in the light most favorable to the State, is insufficient to support either of the verdicts upon which it rests. While, after due consideration of exceptions pertaining thereto, we are of opinion that the evidence supports the verdict on the charge of operating a motor vehicle upon public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, we are equally convinced that, accordant with applicable principles of law, well established in this State, the evidence, even when considered favorably alone to the State, leaves the proximate cause of the fatal injuries to deceased in a state of conjecture and speculation. S. v. Cope, 204 N. C., 28, 167 S. E., 456, and eases cited. In that case it is said that culpable negligence in the law of crimes is something more than actionable negligence in the law of torts. It is such recklessness or carelessness proximately resulting in injury or death, as imports a thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless indifference to the safety and rights of others. It may be in an intentional, willful or wanton violation of a statute or ordinance for the protection of human life or limb which proximately. results in injury or death. Or it may be in an inadvertent violation of a prohibitory statute or ordinance accompanied by recklessness of probable consequences of a dangerous nature, when tested by the rule of reasonable prevision, amounting altogether to a thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless indifference to the safety of others, if injury or death proximately ensue;\nWhile it is true as contended by the State that there is evidence that defendant at the time his wife was injured was violating the statute by which any person who shall, while intoxicated or under the influence of intoxicating liquors, operate a motor vehicle upon any public highway or street of any town in this State, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. C. S., 4506, as amended by Public Laws 1925, chapter 283; Public Laws 1927, chapter 230, sec. 1. Yet, the State is forced to rely upon circumstances as to whether the violation of that statute proximately caused the fractured skull from which wife of defendant died. In this connection: \u201cIt is true that circumstantial evidence is not only a recognized and accepted instrumentality in the ascertainment of truth, but also in many cases, quite essential to its establishment. . . . However, the rule is, that when the State relies upon circumstantial evidence for a conviction, the circumstances and evidence must be such as to produce in the mind of the jurors a moral certainty of the defendant\u2019s guilt, and exclude any other reasonable hypothesis.\u201d S. v. Stiwinter, 211 N. C., 278, 189 S. E., 868, and cases cited. See, also, S. v. Madden, 212 N. C., 56, 192 S. E., 859, where Barnhill, J., fully discusses the subject. See, also, 23 C. J. S., 149, 150, 153.\nApplying this principle to the evidence in hand, many theories consistent with logic and equally reasonable may be advanced as to what caused the wife of defendant to leave the car, which leaving, irrespective of how it may have occurred, manifestly inflicted the injuries which resulted in her death.\nConceding that the injuries were inflicted in leaving the car in some manner, it could be argued that if she were \u201cdrunk,\u201d \u201chelpless\u201d or \u201clifeless,\u201d she may have fallen \u201cover on the door,\u201d which, if in a sprung condition, may not have been securely fastened, and might have opened, causing her to fall out of the car;' or that, if drunk or if sober, she were leaning against the door, it might, because of its sprung condition, or for other unaccountable reason, have opened, and caused her to fall out; or that, there being no glass in the door, she may have put her hand through the door, taken hold of the handle to steady herself, and unintentionally turned it and caused the door to open; or that, under this last situation, she might have intentionally turned the handle and caused the door to open; or that, with her arm hanging on outside of door against the handle, the handle turned and the door opened; or that she deliberately opened the door and attempted to jump out and fell, or jumped and was thrown to the ground; or that, if the automobile tracks on outside of road were made by defendant\u2019s car, the ear for lack of control, or for other cause, suddenly swerved in making the circular course, and threw her against the door, causing it to open; or that on such course, the car struck a bump and threw her through the glassless door. These theories, and many others which are conceivable, unless that of intentional jumping from the car be accepted, are based upon assumed facts, and are purely speculative and conjectural. A conviction, under such circumstances, runs counter to rights of defendant, and must not stand.\nThe judgment on verdict of guilty as to manslaughter is\nReversed.\nThe judgment on verdict of guilty as to operating motor vehicle on public highway, while under influence of intoxicating liquor, is\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "'WiNBORNE, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney-General McMullan and Assistant Attorneys-General Bruton and Patton for the State.",
      "J. F. Motsinger and E. M. Whitman for defendant, appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE v. PAUL A. MILLER.\n(Filed 7 January, 1942.)\n1. Automobiles \u00a7 29\u2014\nEvidence held, sufficient to support conviction of defendant on charge of drunken driving. O. S., 4506, as amended by Public Laws 1925, ch. 283; Public Laws 1927, ch. 230, sec. 1.\n2. Negligence \u00a7 23\u2014\nCulpable negligence means something more than actionable negligence in the law of torts, and is such recklessness or carelessness, proximately resulting in injury or death, as imports a thoughtless disregard of consequence or heedless indifference to the safety and rights of others.\n3. Same\u2014\nThe violation of a safety statute which results in injury or death will constitute culpable negligence if the violation is willful, wanton, or intentional, or if the violation is inadvertent but is accompanied by a heedless disregard of probable consequences of a dangerous nature which could have been reasonably anticipated under the circumstances.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 32a, 52b\u2014\nWhile circumstantial evidence is a recognized instrumentality in the ascertainment of truth, in order to sustain a conviction it must be such as to produce in the minds of the jurors a moral certainty of defendant\u2019s guilt and exclude any other reasonable hypothesis.\n5. Automobiles \u00a7 32e \u2014 Evidence held to leave in conjecture question of whether violation of safety statute was proximate cause of death.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that defendant was operating his automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, that his wife, who was riding in the front seat of the car with him, was also drunk, and that she was later found in the street near the curb with a fractured skull, which injury caused her death. The State\u2019s evidence further tended to show that although defendant\u2019s car was dilapidated, the right front door opened and closed all right, but a witness for defendant testified that the door was sprung and was hard to close so that it would catch tightly. There was further evidence for the State tending to show that at the scene where the wife was found there were tracks indicating that a car liad run over the curb, across a space reserved for sidewalk, and back into the street. Defendant testified that his wife attempted to jump out of the car, that he took both hands off the steering wheel in a futile effort to catch her, and at this time temporarily lost control of the car. There was evidence for defendant that when seen shortly before the accident he was not driving recklessly, and that prior thereto, while the car was stationary, his wife fell out of the car, or got out and fell on the sidewalk, without serious injury, and that defendant picked her up from where she lay and put her back in the car. Held: Whether the fatal injury to the wife was the proximate result of defendant\u2019s driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of statute rests in mere speculation and conjecture upon the evidence considered in the light most favorable to the State, and defendant\u2019s motion to nonsuit upon the charge of manslaughter should have been allowed.\nAppeal by defendant from Rousseau, J., at 5 May, 1941, Term, of FORSYTH.\nThree criminal prosecutions upon (1) indictment charging defendant with crime of manslaughter of one Euby Odessa Miller with deadly weapon, to wit, an automobile; (2) warrant charging defendant with crime of reckless driving of motor vehicle upon public highway; and (3) warrant charging defendant with operating motor vehicle on public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, consolidated for the purpose of trial, to each of which defendant pleaded \u201cNot guilty.\u201d\nUpon the trial below the State offered evidence tending to show a narrative of facts leading up to and surrounding the death of Euby Odessa Miller, wife of defendant, as same pertain to the offenses with which defendant is charged, substantially as follows: On the night of 5 April, 1941, about seven o\u2019clock, Euby Miller, wife of defendant, was found by Sergeant Mitchell of the State Highway Patrol, lying \u201cface-foremost\u201d unconscious on pavement on Broad Street, south of Salem Creek, in Winston-Salem, her feet \u201cabout twelve inches from the west \"curb and her head . . . something like three and a half feet\u201d therefrom. She was lying in a pool of blood. She was admitted to hospital at seven o\u2019clock and died in less than two hours thereafter, as result of \u201cfractured skull with internal injuries to her brain.\u201d\nAn autopsy disclosed a fracture of the skull that extended from behind one ear across the top of the skull to behind the other ear. The temporal muscles on the left side of her head were full of hemorrhage. The brain showed severe damage. Externally there were various bruises and abrasions, some on the back of her hand, some on her knees, and some on her left hip.\nOn the afternoon of said date, Saturday, defendant, accompanied by his wife, his father and mother, a little boy, and one Luther Oxendine, having driven to WinstonrSalem in his 1933 model Y-8 Ford, parked at Sorrell\u2019s Warehouse around three o\u2019clock, and all agreed to meet there at six o\u2019clock to \u201cgo back home.\u201d defendant and bis wife came to tbe meeting place ten or fifteen minutes after tbe others bad arrived. It appeared that \u201cbe was drinking,\u201d tbougb not drunk. \u201cSbe seemed to be pretty bigb.\u201d As tbey came up sbe \u201cwas kind of staggering,\u201d and be \u201ckind of bolding ber band.\u201d While tbe others did not get in tbe car, defendant, bis wife and Oxendine did do so \u2014 he driving, sbe sitting \u201cin tbe middle\u201d and Oxendine \u201con tbe outside.\u201d Oxendine testified: That tbey \u201ccome on out and bit First Street\u201d; that defendant \u201cwas driving all right then,\u201d \u201cbut going down tbe bill from First to Brookstown\u201d be \u201cwas going a little fast, and sbe was drunk and singing and laughing\u201d; that as be, Oxendine, \u201ctold\u201d defendant, \u201cPaul, you bad better not drive so fast coming down here,\u201d tbe wife of defendant said, \u201cDon\u2019t drive so fast then \u2014 you might hurt somebody\u201d; that while defendant \u201cwas driving fast\u201d and \u201cit wasn\u2019t reckless,\u201d be, Oxendine, was frightened, and decided to get out, because, in bis language, \u201cI knew if tbe law stopped us tbey would get us\u201d; that upon Oxendine\u2019s request to stop and to let him out, defendant \u201cput on tbe brakes\u201d and Oxendine \u201cpulled up tbe emergency brakes,\u201d and then \u201ctbe car kind of ran over or against tbe side of tbe curb,\u201d attracting attention of W. R. Middleton, who was near-by; that Oxendine got out at tbe corner of First and Brookstown Streets around quarter to seven o\u2019clock, and as be started to close tbe door, or slam it, defendant\u2019s wife \u201cwent over on tbe door.\u201d What followed immediately is detailed in testimony of W. R. Middleton, tending to show that be saw a man get out of a car, which tbe evidence tends to show was tbe car of defendant, slam tbe door and walk west on First Street, and next be saw a woman there \u201cright across tbe sidewalk\u201d; that sbe \u201cseemed to be helpless\u201d and \u201clooked to be lifeless\u201d; that a man got out of tbe car, \u201cattempted to lift ber back in\u201d it; that when be got \u201cber up a few inches, be stumbled and dropped ber,\u201d but \u201csucceeded in getting ber back in tbe car\u201d; and \u201cgot tbe door closed\u201d; that then \u201csbe told him to leave ber alone\u201d; that then he started up First Street, which is steep there; that Middleton \u201cdid not see anything about that car while it was there, or as it left, to indicate any reckless driving,\u201d and, in bis opinion, \u201cwhen defendant turned south on Broad Street, be was making' around thirty or thirty-five miles an hour.\u201d\nOther testimony, offered by tbe State, tends to show that tbe scene of tbe above incident is approximately a mile and a half from tbe point where tbe wife of defendant was found on tbe street; and that about a block south of this point on Broad Street tbe ear of defendant was seen traveling south with tbe door banging open. Tbe witness, Mrs. Gunter, testified: \u201cIt looked as if be might be trying to shut tbe door and going to turn around. He wasn\u2019t driving very fast. It looked like be might be going to make a complete turn or semi-circle. . . . He was driving slowly. ... I think we were the only car going north and that was the only car I saw going south.\u201d\nThe State\u2019s evidence further tends to show that at the time patrolman drove up to where wife of defendant lay in the street, there was no other car or person there, but that in about five minutes afterward defendant came up driving a 1933 Ford coach, headed north, and parked on opposite side of street, and came over and identified the woman, but what he said was excluded; that he told the officers, who had gathered on the scene, \u201cwhat had happened there\u201d and \u201cthat he was driving the car sitting there\u201d; (The officer, on cross-examination, would have testified that defendant said, \u201cMy wife jumped out of my car. I did all I could to prevent her jumping.\u201d Upon objection this was excluded. Exception.) and that defendant appeared to be under influence of some intoxicant, and the officer placed him under arrest.\nThe State\u2019s evidence further tended to show that it had rained some that afternoon and the street was wet or damp; that there were car tracks, indicating that, at a point just beyond the bridge on Broad Street, where there is no sidewalk, a car apparently traveling south had run a circular route across the space reserved for a sidewalk, on to \u201cgrassy bank\u201d some ten feet from the curb, and then back into the street to the left of the pool of blood, in which wife of defendant was found.\nThe State\u2019s evidence further tended to show that the car in which defendant was riding was \u201cold and shabby\u201d' \u2014 \u201ca ram-shackle Ford\u201d without brakes; that the door which, when opened, swings back two-thirds of the way, according to testimony of officers, opened and closed all right\u2014 nothing out of ordinary. But, on the contrary, according to witness Oxendine, the door where he got out \u201cwas hard to close,\u201d \u201clooked like it had been bent up,\u201d \u201cno glass\u201d in it, and, further quoting him, \u201con that day I know that the ear door was sprung . . . after it is once closed, it is hard to open, and if it is opened, it will fly open with a big noise.\u201d\nOn the other hand, defendant testified: That his wife \u201cstarted to get out,\u201d after Oxendine had \u201cstarted up the street,\u201d and fell down on the sidewalk; that he opened the door, went around, picked her up and put her in the car and shut the door; and then went around and \u201cgot under the wheel.\u201d Using his language, \u201cI started on home . . . down Broad Street . . . toward the bottom of Broad, driving along about twenty-five miles an hour. Just before I got to the bridge, Ruby said she was going to jump out. I say, \u2018Honey, I wouldn\u2019t do that if I was you.\u2019 On the other side of the bridge, I looked over toward the Duke Power Company\u2019s plant. I heard the door crack and I looked around and Ruby was starting to jump out. I turned loose of the steering wheel and tried to catch her, but I couldn\u2019t reach her. She said she was going to jump out . . . After she jumped out of the car . . . no faster than I was driving, I didn\u2019t think she was hurt very much. I went up to the next street to turn around and come back to get her. I come back and Mr. Mitchell was there. I got out and went over there and Mr. Mitchell said, 'I wouldn\u2019t touch her if I was you.\u2019 I says, \u2018I can\u2019t help it, it is my wife. She jumped out of the car.\u2019 I asked if he had called an ambulance and he said he had had it done.\u201d\nOn cross-examination defendant further testified: \u201cI was trying to grab at my wife when we went over the bridge at Salem Creek and did not have my hands on the steering wheel, and don\u2019t know where it went. I was trying to catch her. I was so excited at that time I didn\u2019t know whether my car went up over the curb and come back in the road. She did not say to me ... to stop and let her out ... I did not tell the officers that my car went over the curb ... I went up to the next street, turned and came back ... to get her. There were cars coming down the street and I had to wait until they passed before I made my turn. I did not pass any cars but Mrs. Gunter\u2019s coming down that street before I came back ... I wasn\u2019t running over twenty-five miles an hour when my wife jumped out of the car . . . My wife did not catch on the door when she jumped. She just leaped right out. I didn\u2019t stop right then because I was so excited and no faster than I was driving, I didn\u2019t think she was hurt much and I would go up and turn around and come back and get her.\u201d\nDefendant further offered testimony tending to show that his wife was in highly nervous state and that on previous occasions she had threatened to jump out of cars in which she was riding.\nDefendant further offered testimony tending to show that the right front door of defendant\u2019s car, which opened backward, would not open from the inside; no latch on inside; that \u201cyou would have to go around . . . or reach through the window and open it from the outside\u201d; and that the door was closed \u201cfrom the place Oxendine got out until she opened it and jumped out.\u201d\nAt the close of evidence for the State motion for judgment as in case of nonsuit as to the charge of reckless driving was allowed.\nYerdict as to manslaughter: Guilty. Judgment: Confinement in State\u2019s Prison for a term of not less than four nor more than seven years, and assigned to such labor as is provided by law.\nVerdict as to operating motor vehicle upon the highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor: Guilty. Judgment: (a) Confinement in the common jail of Forsyth County for a period of two years, and assigned to work on the public highways under the control and supervision of the State Highway and Public Works Commission; (b) surrender of his driver\u2019s license to the clerk of Superior Court; and (c) deprival of privilege of operating a motor vehicle upon the public highways for a period of two years.\nDefendant appeals therefrom and assigns error.\nAttorney-General McMullan and Assistant Attorneys-General Bruton and Patton for the State.\nJ. F. Motsinger and E. M. Whitman for defendant, appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0660-01",
  "first_page_order": 704,
  "last_page_order": 710
}