{
  "id": 8628657,
  "name": "CHARLES F. JENKINS v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY",
  "name_abbreviation": "Jenkins v. Metropolitan Life Insurance",
  "decision_date": "1942-09-30",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "83",
  "last_page": "85",
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      "cite": "222 N.C. 83"
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
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    "name": "N.C."
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      "cite": "211 N. C., 182",
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    {
      "cite": "207 N. C., 166",
      "category": "reporters:state",
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:48:14.759571+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "CHARLES F. JENKINS v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Winborne, J.\nThis is the question decisive of this appeal: Is there evidence, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, that plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled within the express language of the certificate or policy of insurance? A negative answer comes from recent decisions of this Court in Thigpen v. Ins. Co., 204 N. C., 551, 168 S. E., 845; Boozer v. Assurance Society, 206 N. C., 848, 175 S. E., 175; Hill v. Ins. Co., 207 N. C., 166, 176 S.. E., 269; Carter v. Ins. Co., 208 N. C., 665, 182 S. E., 106; Lee v. Assurance Society, 211 N. C., 182, 189 S. E., 626; and Medlin v. Ins. Co., 220 N. C., 334, 17 S. E. (2d), 463.\nUnder the authority of these cases, defendant\u2019s motion for judgment as in case of nonsuit should have been sustained. Further treatment of the subject, at this time, would be unnecessarily repetitious.\nIn keeping with these decisions, it is sufficient to say that as plaintiff has agreed, so shall he b.e bound. And even though he and another say that he is not able to work, the fact remains, as revealed in his testimony, that he worked for compensation almost continuously more than eight months, from 5 November, 1941, to July, 1942, the date of the trial of this action. Adverting to similar factual situation in the Thigpen case, supra, Brogden, J., aptly said: \u201cThe law is designed to be a practical science, and it would seem manifest that a plain, everyday fact, uncon-troverted and established, ought not to be overthrown by the vagaries of opinion or by scientific speculation.\u201d\nThe judgment below is\nReversed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Winborne, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "J. Scroop Styles for plaintiff, appellee.",
      "Harkins, Van Winkle \u25a0& Walton for defendant, appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "CHARLES F. JENKINS v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.\n(Filed 30 September, 1942.)\nInsurance \u00a7 34a\u2014\nIn plaintiff\u2019s action to recover, on a policy of insurance, benefits for total and permanent disability, preventing him \u201cpermanently from engaging in any occupation or from performing any work for compensation or profit,\u201d where it appears from his own testimony that he actually did work almost continuously for more than eight months immediately preceding the trial of this action, defendant\u2019s motion of nonsuit should have been allowed.\nAppeal by defendant from Sink, J., at Begular July Civil Term, 1942, of BtjNcombe.\nCivil action to recover on policy of insurance benefits for total and permanent disability.\nUpon trial de novo in Superior Court on appeal thereto from a judgment of a court of a justice of the peace, in which the action was instituted on 2 January, 1942, this case was submitted to the jury on these issues, which were answered as shown:\n\u201c1. Is the plaintiff permanently and totally disabled as the result of bodily injury and disease so as to be prevented thereby from engaging-in any occupation for wage or profit? Answer: \u2018Yes.\u2019\n\u201c2. What amount, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to recover of the defendant? Answer: \u2018$180.00.\u2019\u201d\nOn such trial evidence for plaintiff tended to show that as an employee of the Carolina Power & Light Company, the defendant issued to him a certain certificate of insurance under certain group policy which contained this provision :\n\u201cTotal AND PERMANENT Disability BeNeeits : Under the terms of the Group Policy mentioned on page one of this Certificate, any employee shall be considered totally and permanently disabled who furnishes due proof to the Insurance Company that, while insured thereunder and prior to his sixtieth birthday, he has become so disabled, as a result of bodily injury or disease, as to be prevented permanently from engaging in any occupation or from performing any work for compensation or profit\u201d; that plaintiff, who is now 58 years of age, was employed by the Carolina Power & Light Company for nineteen years, during four years of which he testifies that he \u201cwas totally and permanently disabled\u201d; that the company discharged him on that account, and he left its employment on 31 May, 1941, and rested for twelve or thirteen weeks, during which time defendant paid him for temporary disability; that his \u201cchest is completely broken down\u201d from pleurisy; that he has \u201cto wear straps to try to work to feed an invalid wife\u201d and \u201cnever sees a minute\u2019s ease\u201d; that, though he testified that he is \u201cnot able as a result of bodily injury or disease, to engage in any occupation or perform any work for wage or profit,\u201d and though another witness testified that \u201cbeyond the shadow of a doubt\u201d plaintiff \u201chas been an invalid and not able to work,\u201d plaintiff went to Lincolnton about 8 September, 1941, and worked there two or three weeks, and made $46.00; that after working at Lincolnton, he came to Asheville and began to work at Martel Cotton Mills about 5 November, 1941, and continued to work there until the time of trial of this action in Superior Court in July, 1942; that he worked the number of hours each week \u201cas shown on the time books of the company, and as reflected in questions propounded the witness,\u201d which, eliminating one week ending 25 April, when he did not work, and two weeks in December when he worked only five hours each week, show that during that period he worked from sixteen to sixty-one hours per week, or on an average of approximately thirty-two hours per week, and was paid thirty-seven and one-half to forty cents per hour. And the doctor, offered by plaintiff as a witness, testified that as a result of his examination of him on 26 November, 1941, he did not think that - plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled so as to be unable to perform labor for wage or profit.\nUpon judgment on verdict for plaintiff, defendant appealed to Supreme Court and assigns error.\nJ. Scroop Styles for plaintiff, appellee.\nHarkins, Van Winkle \u25a0& Walton for defendant, appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0083-01",
  "first_page_order": 127,
  "last_page_order": 129
}