{ "id": 8600802, "name": "ANNIE GLENN RATTLEY, Administratrix of SYLVESTER RATTLEY, Deceased, v. L. R. POWELL, JR., and HENRY W. ANDERSON, Receivers of SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY COMPANY, and T. LACY WILLIAMS, Administrator of JOHN VAUGHAN, Deceased", "name_abbreviation": "Rattley v. Powell", "decision_date": "1943-05-05", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "134", "last_page": "137", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "223 N.C. 134" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "219 N. C., 679", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626024 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/219/0679-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 S. E., 364", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 N. C., 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627064 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/213/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 N. C., 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8598957 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/217/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 S. E., 85", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 N. C., 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626434 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/213/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 S. E., 555", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 N. C., 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627248 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/202/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 S. E., 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N. C., 718", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8631328 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/197/0718-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 S. E., 459", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 N. C., 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11255339 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/174/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 S. E., 564", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 N. C., 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8656667 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/182/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 S. E., 327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 N. C., 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622783 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/201/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 N. C., 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627298 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/221/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 S. E., 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "211 N. C., 725", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629004 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/211/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 S. E., 88", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "213 N. C., 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626372 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/213/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 N. C., 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625129 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/219/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 N. C., 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630960 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/222/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 S. E., 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "167 N. C., 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11273626 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/167/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 S. E., 180", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "192 N. C., 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8615883 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/192/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 S. E., 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "196 N. C., 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629208 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/196/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 S. E., 367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "214 N. C., 608", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8632314 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/214/0608-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 N. C., 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11306741 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/220/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 N. C., 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11301802 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/220/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 N. C., 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627138 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/221/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 S. E., 342", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "205 N. C., 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628505 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/205/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 S. E., 85", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "213 N. C., 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626434 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/213/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 S. E., 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "197 N. C., 718", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8631328 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/197/0718-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 S. E., 327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "201 N. C., 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622783 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/201/0102-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 507, "char_count": 9051, "ocr_confidence": 0.507, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1138770313050151e-07, "percentile": 0.7635730886240858 }, "sha256": "34b83a656cba9485cd220dd418e86e708adf0e8106a9e0a7e0c25e8368de28bd", "simhash": "1:729c15c69cf5a44f", "word_count": 1612 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:13:50.990749+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WiNBORNE, J., joins in this opinion." ], "parties": [ "ANNIE GLENN RATTLEY, Administratrix of SYLVESTER RATTLEY, Deceased, v. L. R. POWELL, JR., and HENRY W. ANDERSON, Receivers of SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY COMPANY, and T. LACY WILLIAMS, Administrator of JOHN VAUGHAN, Deceased." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Seawell, J.\nTbis case was bere before upon tbe appeal of plaintiff from a judgment of nonsuit, and will be found reported as Henderson v. Powell and Rattley v. Powell, 221 N. C., 239. (For summary of facts, see tbat case.) Tbe defendants bad prevailed in tbeir motion for non-suit upon tbe evidence upon tbe theory either tbat tbe trial disclosed no evidence to go to tbe jury upon tbe issue of defendants\u2019 negligence, or tbat such negligence was insulated by tbe intervening negligent conduct of McCrimmon, tbe driver of tbe car in which Rattley, tbe intestate, was a guest when killed. Tbe decision of tbis Court was adverse to tbe defendants upon both points, and tbe case was sent back for a new trial, without restriction of tbe issues to any phase of tbe case. Tbe factual situation disclosed by tbe evidence on tbe second trial does not differ materially from tbe case as it then stood; and tbe views expressed by tbe Court in tbat decision with respect to tbe negligence of tbe defendants and tbe suggested insulation thereof by tbe conduct of McCrimmon become tbe law of tbe case.\nAdverting to the instructions to tbe jury challenged upon tbis appeal, we have to say tbat mere intervention, alone, of an independent negligent act will not relieve tbe author of an original negligence from tbe consequences of bis negligent conduct as an efficient cause in producing tbe injury.\n\u201cBy proximate cause is not meant necessarily tbe last act of cause, or nearest act to tbe injury, but such act, wanting in ordinary care, as actively aided in producing tbe injury as a direct and existing cause.\u201d 38 Am. Jur., p. 703, sec. 55.\nTbe court below was not in error in instructing tbe jury tbat intervening negligence to have tbe effect of \u201cinsulating\u201d tbe original negligence, where it is found to exist, must totally supersede tbat negligence in causal effect. Tbe principle as laid down in Sherman and Redfxeld on Negligence (1941, Vol. 1, p. 101, sec. 38) and Restatement of tbe Law, Torts, sec. 439, is not different from that expressed in numerous well considered opinions of our own Court and in controlling opinion throughout the country. Campbell v. R. R., 201 N. C., 102, 109, 159 S. E., 327. In White v. Bealty Co., 182 N. C., 536, 538, 109 S. E., 564, the principle is clearly expressed :\n\u201cBut if any degree, however small, of the causal negligence, or that without which the injury would not have occurred, be attributable to the defendant, then the plaintiff, in the absence of any contributory negligence on his part, would be entitled to recover; because the defendant cannot be excused from liability unless the total causal negligence, or proximate cause, be attributable to another or others. \u2018When two efficient proximate causes contribute to an injury, if defendant\u2019s negligent act brought about one of such causes, he is liable.\u2019 \u201d Wood v. Public-Service Corp., 174 N. C., 697, 94 S. E., 459.\nBut the trial judge did fall into a causal error in instructing the jury that in order to break the sequence of proximate causation or, in other words, to supersede the original negligence as proximate cause, the intervening negligence must be palpable or gross.\nThis expression was derived from Herman v. R. R., 197 N. C., 718, 150 S. E., 361, and was applied in Hinnant v. R. R., 202 N. C., 489, 493, 163 S. E., 555, but met with definite disapproval in Quinn v. R. R., 213 N. C., 48, 50, 195 S. E., 85.\nThe test is not to be found merely in the degree of negligence of the intervening agency, but in its character \u2014 whether it is of such an extraordinary nature as to be unforeseeable. Restatement of the Law, Torts, sec. 447; Butner v. Spease, 217 N. C., 82, 86, 6 S. E. (2d), 808. A . person is bound to foresee only those consequences that naturally and probably flow from his negligence; but caution must be observed in the application of this principle also, since the failure'to foresee the exact nature of the occurrence caused by his negligence will not excuse him if it could be reasonably foreseen that injury to some person might occur through an event of that character. Dunn v. Bomberger, 213 N. C., 172, 177, 195 S. E., 364; Lancaster v. Greyhound Corporation, 219 N. C., 679, 688, 14 S. E. (2d), 820.\nThe real test then is that of foreseeability of the intervening act as a reasonable consequence of the original negligence. If upon the application of these principles, the intervening act or conduct is found to be reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the original negligence, it will not serve the purpose of insulation. See quotation from White v. Realty Co., supra; Wood v. Public-Service Corp., supra.\nThe test applied in the instruction is not wholly consistent with these rules, and may have diverted the jury from their application. For the error contained therein, the defendants are entitled to a new trial, and it is so ordered.\nWe deem it unnecessary to consider other exceptions.\nNew trial.", "type": "majority", "author": "Seawell, J." }, { "text": "Stacy, 0. J.,\nconcurring: When an automobile is hit by or collides\nwith a train at a grade crossing, the law makes a distinction between the causal negligence of the driver of the automobile which will bar a recovery in an action brought against the railroad by the driver and the negligence on his part which will bar a recovery in an action brought against the railroad by a guest in the automobile who exercises no control over the driver. Baker v. R. R., 205 N. C., 329, 171 S. E., 342.\nIn the first case, contributory negligence on the part of the driver of the automobile will suffice to bar a recovery in an action brought by him. McCrimmon v. Powell, 221 N. C., 216, 19 S. E. (2d), 880; Godwin v. R. R., 220 N. C., 281, 17 S. E. (2d), 137; Miller v. R. R., 220 N. C., 562, 18 S. E. (2d), 232.\nIn the second, the negligence on the part of the driver which will defeat a recovery in an action brought against the railroad by a guest in the automobile who exercises no control over the driver, must do more than contribute to the injury; it must be the real efficient cause, or the sole proximate cause of the guest\u2019s injury. Quinn v. R. R., 213 N. C., 48, 195 S. E., 85; Marvell v. Wilmington, 214 N. C., 608, 200 S. E., 367; Campbell v. R. R., 201 N. C., 102, 159 S. E., 327; Dickey v. R. R., 196 N. C., 726, 147 S. E., 15; Earwood v. R. R., 192 N. C., 27, 133 S. E., 180; Bagwell v. R. R., 167 N. C., 611, 83 S. E., 814.\nIt is true, in Herman v. R. R., 197 N. C., 718, 150 S. E., 361, it was said \u201cthe negligence of the driver of the automobile is so palpable and, gross, as shown by plaintiff\u2019s own witnesses, as to render his negligence the sole proximate cause of the injury.\u201d The Court was there speaking to a nonsuit and of the palpable and gross negligence of the driver appearing on the record which rendered his negligence \u201cthe sole proximate cause of the injury.\u201d This was not to say, however, that the negligence of the driver must be \u201cpalpable and gross.\u201d It is enough in such case to defeat a recovery, if the negligence of the driver be the sole proximate cause of the guest\u2019s injury. Montgomery v. Blades, 222 N. C., 463; Chinnis v. R. R., 219 N. C., 528, 14 S. E. (2d), 500; Powers v. Sternberg, 213 N. C., 41, 195 S. E., 88; Smith v. Sink, 211 N. C., 725, 192 S. E., 108.\nAn instruction similar to the one here complained of was held for error in Quinn v. R. R., supra. A like holding wordd seem to be in order here.\nWiNBORNE, J., joins in this opinion.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Stacy, 0. J.," } ], "attorneys": [ "Yarborough & Yarborough for plaintiff, appellee.", "Malone & Malone and Murray Allen for defendants, appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ANNIE GLENN RATTLEY, Administratrix of SYLVESTER RATTLEY, Deceased, v. L. R. POWELL, JR., and HENRY W. ANDERSON, Receivers of SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY COMPANY, and T. LACY WILLIAMS, Administrator of JOHN VAUGHAN, Deceased.\n(Filed 5 May, 1943.)\n1. Negligence \u00a7 5\u2014\nBy proximate cause is not meant necessarily the last act of cause; or nearest act to the injury, but such act, wanting in ordinary care, as actively aided in producing the injury as a direct and existing cause.\n2. Negligence \u00a7 7\u2014\nIntervening negligence to have the effect of \u201cinsulating\u201d the original negligence, where it is found to exist, must totally supersede that negligence in causal effect.\n3. Negligence \u00a7 6\u2014\nWhen two efficient proximate causes contribute to an injury, if defendant\u2019s negligent act brought about one of such causes, he is liable.\n4. Negligence \u00a7 7\u2014\nIt is error for the court to instruct the jury that, in order to break the sequence of proximate causation or, in other words, to supersede the original negligence as proximate cause, the intervening negligence must be palpable or gross.\n5. Same\u2014\nThe real test is that of foreseeability of the intervening act as a reasonable consequence of the original negligence. If the intervening act or conduct is found to be reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the original negligence, it will not serve the purpose of insulation.\nStacy, O. J., concurring.\nIVinbokNE, J., joins in concurring opinion.\nAppeal by defendants from Nimocks, J., at November Term, 1942, of Franklin.\nNew trial.\nYarborough & Yarborough for plaintiff, appellee.\nMalone & Malone and Murray Allen for defendants, appellants." }, "file_name": "0134-01", "first_page_order": 186, "last_page_order": 189 }