{
  "id": 8623074,
  "name": "STATE v. H. M. BOWEN",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Bowen",
  "decision_date": "1946-10-16",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "601",
  "last_page": "603",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "226 N.C. 601"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "221 N. C., 334",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8627703
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/221/0334-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "221 N. C., 255",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8627405
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/221/0255-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "117 S. E., 793",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "185 N. C., 768",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8658169
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/185/0768-01"
      ]
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  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 350,
    "char_count": 5520,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.474,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:52:42.041183+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STATE v. H. M. BOWEN."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Winborne, J.\nAppellant stresses for error in the main two assignments :\nThe first arising in this manner: A witness for the State was asked the question: \u201cDo you know the general reputation of Bowen around in the Farmville community?\u201d to which he replied, \u201cYes, sir.\u201d Whereupon, to question interposed by counsel for defendant, the witness replied that defendant does not live in Farmville. But upon further questioning by the solicitor and by the court, the witness testified that defendant goes to Farmville quite often; that he lives about six or seven miles from there; and that be comes there about two or three times a week, \u201cI guess.\u201d Upon this the court ruled that that is a part of the community. And to the further question by the solicitor as to what is defendant\u2019s character and reputation, the witness replied: \u201cWell, with the exception of Mr. Bowen drinking some, his character is good, but he does have the reputation of drinking.\u201d Defendant excepts to denial of his motion to strike the answer.\nIn this State the testimony of \u201ca character witness is confined to the general reputation of the person whose character is attacked, or supported, in the community in which he lives \u2014 depending upon what the witness has heard or learned as to the general opinion of his standing in the community.\u201d S. v. Steen, 185 N. C., 768, 117 S. E., 793, and cases cited. In the light of this rule of evidence, defendant contends that the proper foundation was not laid to qualify the witness to testify as to his character, since he, the defendant, did not live in Farmville, and the professed knowledge of the witness related to the character of .defendant \u201caround in the Farmville community.\u201d However, no exception is taken to the ruling of the court that the Farmville community included the place where defendant lives. But, if there had been, we think the word \u201caround in the community\u201d is comprehensive enough to include the neighboring rural region in which defendant lives. The Court will take judicial notice of size and location of the town of Farmville. See Clark v. City of Greenville, 221 N. C., 255, 20 S. E. (2d), 56; Mallard v. Housing Authority, 221 N. C., 334, 20 S. E. (2d), 281.\nHence, there is no error in refusing to strike the answer of the witness.\nThe second relates to this portion of the charge of the court:\n\u201cIt is not necessary for the State to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was drunk, but it is necessary that the jury be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, the burden being upon the State to so satisfy them, that while the defendant was driving a motor vehicle on the public highway he had in his system a sufficient quantity of some kind of intoxicant to make him lose the normal control of his mental and physical faculties and cause those faculties to be materially impaired,\u201d\nWhile the language of this portion of the charge is not identical with that in the opinion by Denny, J., in S. v. Carroll, ante, 237, 37 S. E. (2d), 688, it is substantially the same. The chief difference is that here the court used the clause \u201cto be materially impaired,\u201d whereas in the Carroll case, supra, the words were \u201cappreciable impairment.\u201d Webster says \u201cappreciable\u201d means \u201clarge or material enough to be recognized or estimated; perceptible; as an appreciable quantity\u201d; and that \u201cmaterially\u201d means \u201cin an important regard or degree; substantially.\u201d While the language of the rule in the Carroll case, supra, is preferred, we fail to see in that used in the. present case sufficient difference in meaning for the rule given in the Carroll case, supra, to have been misunderstood by the jury. Hence, the assignment may not be sustained.\nOther assignments have been given due consideration, and are found to be without merit.\nIn the judgment below, we find\nNo error.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Winborne, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney-General McMullan and Assistant Attorneys-General Bruton, Rhodes, and Moody for the State.",
      "Sam O. Worthington for defendant, appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE v. H. M. BOWEN.\n(Filed 16 October, 1946.)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 40a\u2014\nWhere a defendant lives within sis or seven miles of a town and frequently visits the municipality, a witness may properly testify as to his general reputation \u201caround in\u201d the town community, the phrase being sufficient to include the surrounding rural region.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 27\u2014\nThe court will take judicial notice of the size and location of a munici-' pality of the State.\n3. Automobiles \u00a7 30d\u2014\nIn a prosecution for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants a charge that the burden is on the State to prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant while operating the vehicle was under the influence of a sufficient quantity of intoxicants to make him lose the normal control of his mental and physical faculties and cause those faeul- \u25a0 ties to be \u201cmaterially\u201d impaired, is held,, not to constitute reversible error, although the use of \u201cappreciably\u201d impaired is preferable.\nAppeal by defendant from Carr, J., at April Term, 1946, of Pitt.\nCriminal prosecution instituted in recorder\u2019s court of Pitt County upon a warrant charging that defendant \u201cdid unlawfully ^.nd willfully operate a motor vehicle on the public highway of North Carolina while under the influence of alcoholic beverages or narcotic drugs, etc.,\u201d heard in Superior Court of Pitt County upon appeal thereto from judgment of recorder\u2019s court on verdict of guilty.\nYerdict in Superior Court: Guilty.\nJudgment: Pronounced.\nDefendant appeals therefrom to Supreme Court, and assigns error.\nAttorney-General McMullan and Assistant Attorneys-General Bruton, Rhodes, and Moody for the State.\nSam O. Worthington for defendant, appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0601-01",
  "first_page_order": 649,
  "last_page_order": 651
}