{ "id": 8625172, "name": "FLOYD MASON v. LOTTIE H. MASON", "name_abbreviation": "Mason v. Mason", "decision_date": "1946-11-20", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "740", "last_page": "742", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "226 N.C. 740" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "225 N. C., 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8600171 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/225/0080-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 N. C., 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8600522 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/225/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 N. C., 685", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8631509 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/215/0685-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 N. C., 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629989 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/222/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 N. C., 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8600361 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/225/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 N. C., 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8607057 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/225/0340-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 257, "char_count": 3823, "ocr_confidence": 0.484, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.317852702137001e-08, "percentile": 0.4388584044861303 }, "sha256": "9e2dfbd588e6f90f9a4c8eaed3dad6c8be54d65cd87505d049406b17bae2cf90", "simhash": "1:a908063a7c7b6c42", "word_count": 664 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:52:42.041183+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "FLOYD MASON v. LOTTIE H. MASON." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Devin, J.\nThe plaintiff assigns error in the action of the trial court in submitting to the jury the fourth issue as to whether the separation was due to the fault of the plaintiff. However, in view of the verdict on the third issue, by which it was determined by the jury that the plaintiff and defendant had not lived separate and apart from each other for two years as alleged, tbe ruling of tbe court in tbis respect becomes immaterial.\nTbe evidence offered by tbe defendant was sufficient to support tbe verdict, and to negative tbe conclusion that conjugal relations between husband and wife bad ceased for tbe period prescribed by tbe statute. Young v. Young, 225 N. C., 340, 34 S. E. (2d), 154; Dudley v. Dudley, 225 N. C., 83, 33 S. E. (2d), 489; Byers v. Byers, 222 N. C., 298 (304) ; Woodruff v. Woodruff, 215 N. C., 685, 3 S. E. (2d), 5.\nLikewise, tbe exception to tbe judge\u2019s charge, when considered contextually and in tbe light of tbe verdict, cannot be sustained. Controverted issues of fact as to separation and cessation of cohabitation between tbe husband and wife were decided by tbe jury in favor of tbe defendant, and judgment denying tbe plaintiff\u2019s suit for divorce was properly entered. Moody v. Moody, 225 N. C., 89, 33 S. E. (2d), 491; Taylor v. Taylor, 225 N. C., 80, 33 S. E. (2d), 492.\nIn tbe trial we find\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "Devin, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Harley B. Gaston and Willis C. Smith for plaintiff.", "P. C. Froneberger for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "FLOYD MASON v. LOTTIE H. MASON.\n(Filed 20 November, 1946.)\n1. Appeal and Error \u00a7 39b\u2014\nPlaintiff\u2019s exception to the submission of one of the issues becomes immaterial when the answers to the other issues establish that plaintiff is not entitled to the relief sought.\n2. Divorce \u00a7 81)\u2014\nEvidence that less than two years before the institution of the action defendant visited plaintiff at camp and plaintiff visited defendant on furloughs, and that at such times they cohabited as man and wife, is held sufficient to negative the conclusion that conjugal relations between the parties had ceased for the period prescribed by the statute, and supports the verdict in defendant\u2019s favor and judgment denying plaintiff\u2019s suit for divorce on the grounds of two years separation. G. S., 50-6.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Clement, J., at March Term, 1946, of GastoN. No error.\nAction for divorce on ground of two years separation. G. S., 50-6. The defendant denied they had lived separate and apart for the statutory period.\nThe plaintiff and defendant were first married in 1929, divorced in an action by the present defendant in May, 1941, and remarried in December, 1941. The plaintiff was inducted into the armed forces of the United States in May, 1942, served in\u2019 Camp Shelby and Camp Pickett until March, 1944, when he went overseas for service in the Pacific Area, returning to this country in July, 1945. Summons in the present action was issued March, 1945. Plaintiff testified he separated himself from the defendant in April, 1942, shortly before he entered the Army, and that they had lived separate and apart since that time.\nThe defendant denied the separation and testified that on visits to the plaintiff while he was in camp and, on his visits home on furlough, they cohabited as man and wife, and that these marital relations continued up to the time plaintiff sailed in March, 1944.\nIssues were submitted to the jury and answered as follows :\n\u201c1. Were the plaintiff and defendant lawfully married as alleged in the complaint? Answer: Yes.\n\u201c2. Has plaintiff been a resident of North Carolina for a period of six months next preceding the filing of the complaint in this action? Answer: Yes.\n\u201c3. Have the plaintiff and defendant lived separate and apart for a period of two years as alleged in the complaint? Answer: No.\n\u201c4. Was said separation due to fault of plaintiff? Answer: Yes.\u201d\nHarley B. Gaston and Willis C. Smith for plaintiff.\nP. C. Froneberger for defendant." }, "file_name": "0740-01", "first_page_order": 788, "last_page_order": 790 }