{ "id": 8625851, "name": "STATE v. ELLA GODWIN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Godwin", "decision_date": "1947-05-21", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "449", "last_page": "452", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "227 N.C. 449" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "51 N. C., 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11277675 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/51/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 N. C., 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8616001 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/223/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 S. E., 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 N. C., 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8652908 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/186/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 S. E., 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 N. C., 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8603115 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/194/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 S. E., 891", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 N. C., 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626708 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/201/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 N. C., 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629430 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/215/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 S. E., 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N. C., 648", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8653775 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/113/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S. E., 663", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 N. C., 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624600 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/210/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 S. E., 311", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N. C., 769", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11254058 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/141/0769-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 S. E., 846", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 N. C., 738", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8658756 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/183/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 S. E., 581", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 N. C., 752", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8658021 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/185/0752-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 474, "char_count": 8637, "ocr_confidence": 0.46, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.570334708068409e-07, "percentile": 0.8161871599463907 }, "sha256": "2bcde5b4dc0d75d24dfcb4e1ef10cf7f288588f2e839bfac2eb4c922f3b377e5", "simhash": "1:6562475b33389d77", "word_count": 1577 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:20:04.384970+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE v. ELLA GODWIN." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Stacy, C. J.\nThe validity of the trial, and not the guilt or innocence of the accused, is the question presently to be considered.\nThe peremptory character of the court\u2019s instructions, certainly those in the first two cases, would seem to be in excess of approved practice, where, as here, there is no admission or presumption calling for explanation or reply on the part of the defendant. S. v. Estes, 185 N. C., 752, 117 S. E., 581; S. v. Singleton, 183 N. C., 738, 110 S. E., 846; S. v. Hill, 141 N. C., 769, 53 S. E., 311. It is only in rare instances that a verdict may be directed for the State in a criminal prosecution. S. v. Ellis, 210 N. C., 166, 185 S. E., 663. \u201cThe plea of not guilty disputes the credibility of the evidence, even when uncontradicted, since there is the presumption of innocence, which can only be overcome by the verdict of a jury.\u201d S. v. Riley, 113 N. C., 648, 18 S. E., 168. See S. v. Dickens, 215 N. C., 303, 1 S. E. (2d), 837, and cases there cited.\nWhere a defendant pleads not guilty to the charge contained in the warrant or bill of indictment to which he is required to answer, there comes to his aid the common-law \u201cpresumption of innocence\u201d which goes with him throughout' the trial and stands until overcome by proof or an adverse verdict. S. v. Herring, 201 N. C., 543, 160 S. E., 891; S. v. Boswell, 194 N. C., 260, 139 S. E., 374. His plea of traverse cases upon the State the burden of establishing his guilt, not merely to the satisfaction of the jury, but to a moral certainty or beyond a reasonable doubt. S. v. Singleton, supra.\nMoreover, it appears from the cross-examination of the witness that the State\u2019s c\u00e1se must lean more or less upon a \u201cbroken reed,\u201d as it were, since it was brought about by persistent entreaty and duplicity. In this respect, it is quite unlike S. v. Murphrey, 186 N. C., 113, 118 S. E., 894. The witness admits that, in the first case, he misled the defendant and was able to leave with a pint of liquor only after swapping drinks with her \u2014 his own act he imputes to righteousness, hers to unrighteousness; and in the second case he told her a story. Indeed, his testimony in the second case would seem to burden credulity somewhat. At any rate, the jury should have been allowed to give the defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt. S. v. Harris, 223 N. C., 697, 28 S. E. (2d), 232. \u201cReasonable doubt, in the humanity of our law, is exercised for the prisoner\u2019s sake, that he may be acquitted if his case will allow it, but it is never applied for his condemnation.\u201d S. v. Starling, 51 N. C., 366. No mention is made of any sale in the cross-examination.\nLittle need be said about the instruction in the third case. Even if standing alone, it could be upheld, which is unconceded, we think the verdict here was necessarily influenced by the results in the first two cases, since it appears to have followed as a matter of course. The judgment in this case was suspended on condition.\nFull liberty of consideration on the part of the jury would seem to be the defendant\u2019s due in all three cases. Suum cuique tribuere.\nNew trial.", "type": "majority", "author": "Stacy, C. J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney-General McMullan and Assistant Atlomeys-Genera.l Bruton, Rhodes, and Moody for the State.", "Henry L. Anderson and James R. Nance for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE v. ELLA GODWIN.\n(Filed 21 May, 1947.)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 52b\u2014\nIt is rarely proper to direct a verdict for the State in a criminal prosecution, and where there is no admission or presumption calling for explanation or reply on the part of defendant, an instruction that if the jury should find beyond a reasonable doubt the facts to be as shown by all the evidence, to return a verdict of guilty, must he held for reversible error, certainly where the court fails to charge that if the jury has a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt to acqiiit her.\n2. Intoxicating Liquor \u00a7 9e\u2014\nIn this prosecution for the sale of nontax-paid whiskey the sole witness was an employee of the A. B. C. Board whose testimony disclosed that he procured the sales by defendant by persistent entreaty and duplicity. Held; Under defendant\u2019s plea of not guilty, defendant was entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt as to the credibility of the State\u2019s witness, and therefore an instruction that if the jury should find beyond a reasonable doubt the facts to be as shown by all the evidence to return a verdict of guilty, is erroneous.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 28\u2014\nUpon defendant\u2019s plea of not guilty the presumption of innocence attaches and goes with him throughout the trial and stands until overcome by proof or an adverse verdict, and casts the burden on the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 81c (4) \u2014\nDefendant was convicted on three counts, sentence on the first two to run concurrently and sentence on the third to begin at the expiration of the first two, suspended on good behavior. Held: There being error in the conviction on the first two counts and it being apparent that the conviction on the third count was necessarily influenced by and followed as a matter of course from the convictions on the first two counts, a new trial must be awarded on the third count also.\nAppeal by defendant from Parlter, Jat November Term, 1946, of CUMBERLAND.\nCriminal prosecutions on three separate warrants charging the defendant in each with the sale of nontax-paid whiskey, consolidated and tried together.\nRalph Lamb, an employee of the State A. B. C. Board, testified that on Sunday morning, 31 March, 1946, he went to the home of the defendant to buy some whiskey. The defendant at first declined to sell him any, she was afraid of him, didn\u2019t know him, but said she would give him a drink. The witness replied that he had a drink (he had about an inch of A. B. C. whiskey in a bottle), but wanted some to take along with him. The defendant agreed to swap drinks with him, which she did. The witness took a swallow of the whiskey, and after much importuning, the defendant said: \u201cGive me $2 and go ahead. I think you are all right.\u201d The witness gave her $2 and took the whiskey.\nThereafter, on 19 April, the witness and another Mr. Lamb, who was working with him, went to the home of the defendant to buy some whiskey. The defendant first said she was afraid, and the witness replied: \u201cThat is exactly what we are going to do, arrest you as soon as you sell us whiskey.\u201d She then sold the witness a pint and his comrade paid her $3 for it.\nStill, again, on Sunday morning, 5 May, the witness and Mr. Pete Lamb went to the home of the defendant and got a pint of \u201cstump hole nontax-paid liquor,\u201d paid for it and left.\nOn cross-examination, the witness said that on the first occasion there was a swapping of drinks, \u201cI don\u2019t consider that selling it. There was no money in exchange. ... I went there and sat around and argued with that woman a long time and finally left there with a pint of liquor.\u201d\nSpeaking of the second occasion, he says: \u201cWe represented ourselves as being A. B. C. officers. ... I said as soon as you sell us this whiskey we are going to arrest you. ... I wasn\u2019t going to arrest her.\u201d '\nOn the second occasion another girl was there and they were mopping the floor. \u201cThe third time we only saAv Mrs. Godwin.\u201d\nThe defendant offered no evidence.\nThe following instructions were given to the jury:\n1. In respect to the first charge, \u201cThe court instructs you that if you find the facts to be true as testified to by the State\u2019s witness and beyond a reasonable doubt, it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty in that case.\u201d Exception.\n2. In respect to the second charge, \u201cThe court instructs you that if you find the facts to be true as shown by. all the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty in that case.\u201d Exception.\n3. In respect to the third charge, \u201cThe court instructs you that if you find the facts to be true as shown by all the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty in that case. If you have a reasonable doubt of her guilt you will acquit her.\u201d Exception.\nVerdict: Guilty as charged in all three cases.\nJudgments: In the first case, 12 months in the Woman\u2019s Division of the State\u2019s Prison; in the second case, 12 months in the Woman\u2019s Division of the State\u2019s Prison to run concurrently with the sentence in the first case; in the third case, 12 months in the Woman\u2019s Division of the State\u2019s Prison to begin at the expiration of the sentences in the first and second cases. The sentence in \u2019the third case to be suspended for two years on conditions, good behavior, etc.\nThe defendant appeals, assigning errors.\nAttorney-General McMullan and Assistant Atlomeys-Genera.l Bruton, Rhodes, and Moody for the State.\nHenry L. Anderson and James R. Nance for defendant." }, "file_name": "0449-01", "first_page_order": 497, "last_page_order": 500 }