#### J. M. NICHOLS, Administrator of the Estate of ALLEN NICHOLS, Deceased, v. J. M. GOLDSTON, Trading and Doing Business as GOLDSTON MOTOR EXPRESS, and OLA P. HIX, Administratrix of the Estate of DAVIS JEFFERSON HIX, Deceased, v. J. M. GOLDSTON, Trading and Doing Business as GOLDSTON MOTOR EXPRESS.

(Filed 25 February, 1948.)

1. Automobiles § 181i (2)—

Plaintiffs’ evidence tending- to show that defendant’s tractor with trailer was being driven at a speed of 35 miles per hour and entered an intersection with another highway without slackening speed or giving signal or warning, and collided with the truck in which plaintiffs’ intestates were riding, which had already entered the intersection, is held sufficient to overrule defendant’s motions as of nonsuit on the issue of negligence notwithstanding that defendant’s vehicle was being operated upon the dominant highway. G. S., 20-141 (b) (3) ; G. S., 20-14Í (c).

2. Automobiles § 8i—

The failure of the driver traveling along a servient highway to stop before entering an intersection with a dominant highway in obedience to signs of the State Highway Commission, is not negligence per se but is evidence of negligence to be considered with other facts in the case in determining the question of proximate cause. G. S., 20-158.

S. Trial § 22a—

■ Upon motion to nonsuit, the evidence tending to support plaintiffs’ claim must be construed most favorably to them and they are entitled to every reasonable intendment upon the evidence and every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom.

4. Negligence § 19e—

Proximate cause is an inference of fact, to be drawn from other facts and circumstances of the case, and it is only when but one inference can be drawn from the facts in evidence that the court may determine the question as a matter of law.

5. Automobiles § 18h (3) —

Plaintiffs’ evidence tended to show that their intestates, operating a truck along a servient highway, reduced speed from 30 to 20 miles per hour but failed to stop in obedience to highway signs before entering an intersection with a dominant highway, and that defendant’s truck, traveling along the dominant highway at a speed of 35 miles per hour, entered the intersection without slackening speed or giving warning, and that the vehicle in which intestates were riding had already entered the intersection when it was struck by defendant’s vehicle. Held: The granting of defendant’s motion to nonsuit cannot be sustained on the theory of contributory negligence, since the question of proximate cause is one, for the jury upon the evidence.

*515Appeal by plaintiffs from Bobbüt, J., at September Term, 1947, of RockiNgham.

Reversed.

Separate actions by tbe administrator of tbe estate of Allen Nicbols, deceased, and by tbe administratrix of tbe estate of Davis J. Hix, deceased, against tbe defendant J. M. Goldston for damages for wrongful death of their intestates, resulting from collision of motor trucks, were by consent Consolidated for trial.

From tbe evidence offered it appeared that on tbe morning of 28 July, 1945, plaintiffs’ intestates, Nicbols and Hix, jointly operating a motor truck owned by J. B. Greer, were traveling west along highway #158 leading from Reidsville to Winston-Salem, and at tbe intersection of this highway with highway #220, leading from Greensboro to Madison, collided with tbe tractor and trailer unit of defendant Goldston which was at the time being driven north by defendant’s driver Harry W. Odell. As result of the collision both plaintiffs’ intestates Nichols and Hix were killed, and defendant’s driver so seriously injured that he has lost all recollection of the collision and of happenings immediately before and after. Highway #158 had been designated by the State Highway and Public Works Commission as subordinate to #220, and there were appropriate signs along the side and marks on the surface of #158 notifying drivers of vehicles on that highway to stop before crossing the intersection.

According to plaintiffs’ evidence the Goldston truck was being driven at a speed of 35 miles per hour and the driver, without slackening speed, sounding horn, or applying brakes, drove into the intersection at a time when the Greer truck had already entered the intersection, and then turned to the left just as the trucks came together. The Greer truck, in which plaintiffs’ intestates were riding, as it approached the intersection slowed down from 30 to 20 miles per hour and had entered the intersection before the defendant’s truck reached it. The defendant’s evidence on the other hand tended to show the speed of the Greer truck as 35 miles per hour, and that it entered the intersection without slowing down, and that both trucks reached the intersection at approximately the same time.

At the close of all the evidence defendant’s renewed motion for judgment of nonsuit was allowed, apd from judgment dismissing the action, plaintiffs appealed.

Trivette, Holshouser & Mitchell, Ha-yes & Hayes, and, J. Hampton Price for plaintiffs, appellants.

Smith, Wharton & Jordan and H. L. Pagge for defendant, appellee.

DeviN, J.

The plaintiffs’ appeal presents the question of the propriety of the judgment of involuntary nonsuit. Considering .the evidence *516in the light most favorable for the plaintiffs, it appears that defendant’s truck, a tractor and trailer unit, was being driven toward and into an intersection of two busy highways at a speed of 35 miles per hour, and that the driver without slackening speed or giving signal or warning, or applying brakes, drove into the intersection at a time when the truck in which plaintiffs’ intestates were riding, coming from defendant’s right, had already entered the intersection. The statute then in force placed speed restriction on motor vehicles with trailer attached at 30 miles per hour. G. S., 20-141 (b) 3; G. S., 20-141 (c). We think there was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant. Swinson v. Nance, 219 N. C., 772, 15 S. E. (2d), 284.

However, it is urged that the ruling of the court below should be upheld on the ground that contributory negligence on the part of plaintiffs’ intestates conclusively appears from the evidence, for the reason, chiefly, that they failed to heed the highway signs warning drivers of motor vehicles approaching the intersection from the east to stop before attempting to cross, as required by G. S., 20-158. This statute, while imposing the duty on motorists to heed highway traffic signs, adds this pertinent proviso : “No failure to stop, however, shall be considered contributory negligence per se in any action at law for injury to person or property, but the facts relating to such failure to stop may be considered with the other facts in the case in determining whether the plaintiff in such action was guilty of contributory negligence.”

This provision has been considered in several recent decisions, notably, Hill v. Lopez, ante, 433, 45 S. E. (2d), 539; Swinson v. Nance, 219 N. C., 772, 15 S. E. (2d), 284; Pearson v. Stores Corp., 219 N. C., 717, 14 S. E. (2d), 811; Groome v. Davis, 215 N. C., 510, 2 S. E. (2d), 771; Sebastian v. Motor Lines, 213 N. C., 770, 197 S. E., 539; Kennedy v. Smith, 226 N. C., 514, 39 S. E. (2d), 380.

In view of the language of the statute and the decisions of this Court in cases involving collisions between motor vehicles at highway intersections, it seems well settled that a party may not be precluded solely by reason of his failure to stop as enjoined by a traffic sign. His failure to do so is evidence of negligence, but the question of proximate cause remains to be answered before the rights of the parties can be determined.

Was the evidence in this case such as to warrant the trial judge in holding as a matter of law that the negligence of plaintiffs’ intestates was the proximate cause of their injury and death, and, upon this view, sustaining the motions to nonsuit ?

In considering the question of nonsuit, under the rule, the evidence tending to support plaintiffs’ claims must be construed most favorably for them, and they are “entitled to the benefit of every reasonable intendment upon the evidence, and every reasonable inference to be drawn *517therefrom.” Nash v. Royster, 189 N. C., 408, 127 S. E., 356. Tbe question of proximate cause is ordinarily one for tbe jury. It is only when but one inference can be drawn from tbe facts in evidence that tbe court may declare that an act or omission is tbe proximate cause of an injury. Lineberry v. R. R., 187 N. C., 786 (793), 123 S. E., 1. In tbe language of Justice Barnhill in Conley v. Pearce-Young-Angel Co., 224 N. C., 211, 29 S. E. (2d), 740, “Proximate cause is an inference of fact, to be drawn from other facts and circumstances. ... It is only when tbe facts are all admitted and only one inference may be drawn from them that tbe court will declare whether an act was tbe proximate cause of an injury or not. But this is rarely tbe case. Hence, what is tbe proximate cause of an injury is ordinarily a question for tbe jury. . . . It is to be determined as a fact in view of tbe circumstances of fact attending it.” Numerous decisions are cited by Justice Barnhill in substantiation of this rule. That tbe act in question is in violation of a statute does not take it out of tbe rule. Conley v. Pearce-Young-Angel Co., supra.

In Reeves v. Staley, 220 N. C., 573, 18 S. E. (2d), 239, cited by ap-pellee, tbe collision occurred at a junction of highways. Tbe automobile in which tbe plaintiff’s intestate in that case was riding was driven from a subordinate road into tbe dominant highway at an undiminished speed of 35 to 40 miles per hour and- in front of an oncoming truck. There it was said in tbe opinion of tbe Court written by Justice Winborne that tbe failure of tbe driver to stop was “evidence of negligence to be considered with other facts in tbe case in determining whether be was guilty of negligence. "When so considered tbe evidence of bis conduct makes him guilty of negligence as a matter of law.” Tbe circumstances of that case indicated such a failure on tbe part of tbe driver to exercise due care as to be regarded by tbe Court as conclusive on tbe question of proximate cause.

Here tbe plaintiffs’ evidence tended to show that their intestates reduced tbe speed of their vehicle from 30 to 20 miles per hour, and bad already entered tbe intersection before tbe defendant’s truck reached it. "While tbe defendant’s evidence tended in some respects to contradict that of tbe plaintiffs, this, under tbe rule, does not help tbe defendant on bis motion for nonsuit.

For tbe reasons stated we are of opinion, and so bold, that on tbe evidence presented tbe plaintiffs were entitled to have their case submitted to tbe jury under appropriate instructions, and that tbe judgment of nonsuit must be

Reversed.