{
  "id": 8622481,
  "name": "STATE v. H. E. REAVIS",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Reavis",
  "decision_date": "1947-10-08",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "18",
  "last_page": "22",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "228 N.C. 18"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:52:37.324265+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STATE v. H. E. REAVIS."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "'WiNBORNE, J.\nThis is the pivotal question on this appeal: \u201cDid the Superior Court of Davie County have jurisdiction over the automobile of defendant seized by the sheriff of that county in connection with a violation of the nrohibition law of which the Recorder\u2019s Court for the District of Cooleemee had theretofore assumed jurisdiction.\u201d The answer is \u201cNo.\u201d\nThe General Assembly of North Carolina in the Act, Public-Local Laws 1911, Chapter 713, Section 5, creating the \u201cRecorder\u2019s Court for the District of Cooleemee,\u201d granted to that court \u201cconcurrent jurisdiction with courts of justices of the peace in all criminal offenses committed within Jerusalem Township,\u201d and \u201cexclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all other criminal offenses committed within said township below the grade of felony, as is now defined by law,\u201d \u2014 declaring \u201call such offenses committed within said township ... to be petty misdemeanors.\u201d It was provided, however, in said act, \u201cthat in all criminal offenses where said court has been given jurisdiction by the act, and no prosecution has been commenced within six months from the commission thereof, the Superior Court of Davie County may proceed to try the same, as though this court did not exist.\u201d\nHowever, the General Assembly, by Chapter 299 of Public Laws 1919, and subsequent amendments, and now G. S., 7-64, has provided that in all cases in which by statute original jurisdiction of criminal actions has been taken from the Superior Court and vested exclusively in courts of inferior jurisdiction, such exclusive jurisdiction is divested, and jurisdiction of such actions shall be concurrent and exercised by the court first taking cognizance thereof, and that appeals from all judgments of such inferior courts to the Superior Courts shall be as heretofore.\nApplying the provisions of these statutes to the factual situation in hand: The record shows that the offense charged against defendant Reavis was committed \u201con or about the 15th day of February, 1947,\u201d and defendant was arrested, and on 1 March, 1947, tried in the Recorder\u2019s Court for the District of Cooleemee, and from the judgment rendered on that date no appeal to Superior Court has been taken. Moreover, the record fails to show that at any time has any indictment been had in Superior Court of Davie County against defendant for the offense charged. Hence, the Recorder\u2019s Court, under the express provisions of G-. S., 7-64, having first taken cognizance of the offense, had jurisdiction of it to the exclusion of the Superior Court.\nFurthermore, the statute, G. S., 18-6, pertaining to the seizure of vehicles engaged in illegal transportation of intoxicating liquors, provides that \u201cwhenever intoxicating liquor transported or possessed illegally shall be seized by an officer, he shall take possession of the vehicle and team or automobile . . . and shall arrest any person in charge thereof\u201d; and that \u201csuch officer shall at once proceed against the person arrested under the provisions of this article in any court of competent jurisdiction; but the said vehicle or conveyance shall be returned to the owner upon execution by him of a good and valid bond . . . which .\u25a0 . . shall be approved by the officer and shall be conditioned to return said property to the custody of said officer on the day of trial to abide the judgment of the court.\u201d It is clear from these provisions that the vehicle is under the jurisdiction of the court which has jurisdiction of the offense charged against the person.\n\u2022 Hence, irrespective of any'irregularity there may be in the proceedings in the Recorder\u2019s Court for the District of Cooleemee, and notwithstanding the oral testimony in attack upon the written record of that court, the Superior Court was without jurisdiction to render the judgment from which this appeal is taken, \u2014 and the judgment is\nReversed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "'WiNBORNE, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney-General\u2019McMullan and Assistant Attorneys-General Bruton, Rhodes, and Moody for the State.",
      "Allen \u2022& Henderson and F. D. B. Harding for defendant, appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE v. H. E. REAVIS.\n(Filed 8 October, 1947.)\n1. Courts \u00a7\u00a7 Sc, 11\u2014\nWhere a Recorder\u2019s Court and the Superior Court have concurrent jurisdiction, the court first taking cognizance of the offense has jurisdiction thereof to the exclusion of the other. G. S., 7-64.\n2. Intoxicating liquor \u00a7 8\u2014\nThe jurisdiction to declare forfeiture of a vehicle used in the transportation of intoxicating liquor is in the court which has jurisdiction of the offense charged against the person operating the vehicle. G. S., 18-6.\n3. Same\u2014\nDefendant was tried in the Recorder\u2019s Court upon a warrant charging the illegal transportation of intoxicating liquor. The State accepted a plea of guilty of unlawful possession, and the judgment, after imposing a suspended sentence, ordered that the vehicle used by defendant be returned to him. No appeal was taken. Thereafter the sheriff filed a petition in the Superior Court to confiscate the vehicle. Held: The Superior Court was without jurisdiction of the petition and judgment of confiscation and sale is reversed.\nAppeal by defendant from Sink, J., at March Term, 1947, of Davie.\nProceeding in Superior Court upon petition of sheriff of Davie County for confiscation of an automobile of defendant for that intoxicating liquor was found in it, \u2014 heard upon notice to show cause, G. S., 18-6.\nFrom the record on this appeal, these appear to be the facts: Defendant H. E. Eeavis was tried in the Eecorder\u2019s Court of Cooleemee, Jerusalem Township, Davie County, upon warrant- charging the illegal transportation of intoxicating liquors, and the following judgment was entered upon the judgment docket of said court:\n\u201cThe defendant enters a plea of guilty of unlawful possession of one gallon non-tax-paid liquor. After hearing and considering evidence in this case the State accepts this plea and the following judgment is rendered: That the defendant be confined in the common jail of Davie County for a period of six months and assigned to work on the roads . . . This judgment suspended for a period of two years upon the following conditions: First, that he not be guilty of violating any of the State prohibition laws. Second, that he pay a fine of $300.00. Third, that he pay the cost of this action. It is an order of this court that H. E. Eeavis retain a Etiick automobile now held in storage by E. P. Foster, Sheriff. This March 1, 1947. V. S. Gales, Judge of Eecorder\u2019s Court.\u201d\n\u25a0No appeal was taken from this judgment. Under same date the Eecorder issued to the sheriff a written order, directing that he release the car upon payment of cost of storage. The sheriff declined to obey' the order.\nThereafter, under date of 4 March, 1947, E. Paul Foster, as sheriff of Davie County, filed a petition, under oath, to the Honorable H. Hoyle Sink, Judge presiding and holding the courts of the 17th Judicial District of North Carolina, in which he set forth in pertinent part, briefly stated: That on or about 15 February, 1947, he and his deputies seized a 1940 model Buiek automobile, driven by one Howell Eeavis and transporting one gallon of non-tax-paid liquor; that thereupon the automobile was seized and Eeavis was arrested for violating the prohibition laws; that on 1 March, 1947, Eeavis was tried in the Eeeorder\u2019s Court of Jerusalem Township, Davie County, North Carolina, by Eecorder W. S. Gales, and on such trial Eeavis entered a plea of guilty of violating the prohibition laws; that Eeavis bears reputation of dealing in liquor, and for using said automobile for transporting liquor and for a taxi; and that he, the sheriff, is now holding the said automobile and desires to have 'the same confiscated and sold according to law.\nThereupon, the Judge aforesaid ordered that H. E. Eeavis, the owner of said automobile, be and appear before him on 17 March, 1947, in the Superior Court of Davie County, and \u201cshow cause, if any he has, why the aforementioned Buiek automobile should not be condemned and confiscated according to law\u201d- \u2014 which order was duly served. Upon hearing defendant, through his counsel, demurred ore terms to the jurisdiction of the Superior Court to hear and pass upon the question presented on the petition for that it had been finally adjudicated in a court of competent jurisdiction, the said Recorder\u2019s Court, and the automobile released to defendant, by order of that court, which order is pleaded as res judicata,.\nThe Judge reserved his ruling and proceeded to hear oral testimony of the Judge of the Recorder\u2019s Court, offered by the State, as to what transpired in the Recorder\u2019s Court, and the circumstances under which the judgment of record in that court was rendered. Upon cross-examination of the Judge of Recorder\u2019s Court as such witness he testified that in the plea of defendant an oral request was made in open court for the release of the automobile \u2014 and that order of release was made a part of the judgment entered in the book, and the judgment entered upon the records of the Recorder\u2019s Court, as hereinabove quoted, was read in evidence, as was the written order to the sheriff to release the automobile. And-in the course of the testimony the Recorder testified that as he had no one to help him, judgments were announced in open court, and that he wrote up the minutes at night at home.\nAt the conclusion of the introduction of evidence, the Judge held, in so far as the automobile referred to in the petition is concerned, briefly stated: 1. That under the facts found and \u201cunder the statutes of North \"Carolina,, the law automatically confiscates said automobile.\u201d 2. \u201cThat regardless of the manner and form of the judgment or purported judgment of the Recorder in an attempt to release said automobile to the alleged owner Reavis, . . . the said Recorder was without jurisdiction of the subject matter involved, to wit: The automobile, and that it was a matter within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court, and, therefore, any order or attempted order on the part of the Recorder was void.\u201d\nThereupon, the Judge held that Reavis is not entitled to the possession of the automobile, and ordered same advertised for sale and sold as prescribed for vehicles seized in the transportation of illegal liquors, and directed the sheriff of Davie County to proceed with the sale.\nDefendant appeals therefrom to the Supreme Court and assigns error.\nAttorney-General\u2019McMullan and Assistant Attorneys-General Bruton, Rhodes, and Moody for the State.\nAllen \u2022& Henderson and F. D. B. Harding for defendant, appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0018-01",
  "first_page_order": 64,
  "last_page_order": 68
}