{ "id": 8624639, "name": "STATE v. EUGENE EDWARDS and ROY L. JOHNSON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Edwards", "decision_date": "1947-11-05", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "153", "last_page": "155", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "228 N.C. 153" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "224 N. C., 645", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8611534 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/224/0645-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 N. C., 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8601788 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/224/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 N. C., 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627957 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/221/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 S. E., 96", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 N. C., 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8614056 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/200/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 S. E., 604", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 N. C., 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8599333 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/199/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 N. C., 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8613471 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/226/0097-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 322, "char_count": 5119, "ocr_confidence": 0.441, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0729814010869676e-07, "percentile": 0.7580248887097278 }, "sha256": "5484b3f97c437d4c909d939253539fee6da9940ccfb0ee102286cd34d52cc8bd", "simhash": "1:df6bdb6e369f8c75", "word_count": 868 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:52:37.324265+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE v. EUGENE EDWARDS and ROY L. JOHNSON." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "DeviN, J.\nThe defendants\u2019 assignment of error based upon the ruling of the trial court in permitting extended cross-examination of the defendants and their witnesses in the effort by the State to impeach the accuracy and credibility of their testimony, cannot be sustained. The limits of legitimate cross-examination are largely within the discretion of the trial judge, and his ruling thereon will not be held for error in the absence of showing that the verdict was improperly influenced thereby. S. v. Stone, 226 N. C., 97, 36 S. E. (2d), 704; S. v. Beal, 199 N. C., 278, 154 S. E., 604.\nTbe defendants expepted to the court\u2019s charge to the jury in that in several particulars pointed out the court misstated the evidence. But a comparison of the language and expressions used by the court in stating the evidence, of which defendants now complain, with the testimony of the witnesses as shown by the record, reveals that there was no material variance between the two. While the exact language of the witnesses may not have been used, the substance of their testimony seems to have been fairly stated to the jury, and no harm to the defendants\u2019 cause or prejudicial effect is discernible. Nor was the court\u2019s attention called to any incorrect reference to the evidence. The other portions of the charge excepted to, when considered in connection with the entire charge, do not show prejudicial error. S. v. Sterling, 200 N. C., 18 (23), 156 S. E., 96.\nThe defendants\u2019 exception to the failure of the court properly to declare and apply the law relating to the charge of assault with a deadly weapon, cannot avail the defendants on this record, since it appears that the defendants were convicted of the larceny of an automobile, in the perpetration of which the assault was alleged to have been committed, and were sentenced for terms of two to four years, while the sentences for assault were for two years, to run concurrently with the sentences in the larceny case. Thus, no additional punishment was imposed nor other injury sustained by the defendants growing out of the indictment for assault with deadly weapon. S. v. Smith, 221 N. C., 400, 20 S. E. (2d), 360; S. v. Graham, 224 N. C., 347, 30 S. E. (2d), 151; S. v. Weinstein, 224 N. C., 645, 31 S. E. (2d), 920.\nThere was no motion for judgment of nonsuit. The State\u2019s evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict and judgment. In the trial we find\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "DeviN, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney-General McMullan and Assistant Atiorneys-General Bruton, Rhodes, and Moody for the State.", "Charles Aycoclc Poe for defendants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE v. EUGENE EDWARDS and ROY L. JOHNSON.\n(Filed 5 November, 1947.)\n1. Criminal Daw \u00a7 42c\u2014\nThe limits of legitimate cross-examination are largely within the discretion of the trial judge, and his ruling thereon will not be held for error in the absence of showing that the verdict was improperly influenced thereby.\n2. Criminal Daw \u00a7 53d\u2014\nExceptions to the manner in which the court stated the testimony, not brought to the court\u2019s attention, cannot be sustained when it appears that the court, though it may not have used the exact language of the witnesses, fairly stated the substance of their testimony and no harm or prejudicial effect to defendant\u2019s cause is discernible.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 81c (2) \u2014\nExceptions to the charge will not be sustained when the charge construed contextually is free from prejudicial error.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 81c (4)\u2014\nWhere defendants are convicted on two separate charges, and the sentences thereon run concurrently, exception relating solely to the charge carrying the shorter sentence cannot be held prejudicial.\nAppeal by defendants from Harris, J., at March Term, 1947, of Wake.\nNo error.\nThe defendants were charged with the larceny of an automobile, the property of Yellow Cab Company, and also with an assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill upon the person of Jack Wilson.\nBy consent these cases were consolidated and tried together. The State\u2019s evidence tended to show that during a strike of taxicab drivers the defendants at night entered a taxicab driven by the witness Wilson and directed him to drive them to a certain street and number, and on arriving there assaulted him with a deadly weapon, and stole the taxicab. The cab was later found wrecked. The defendants denied guilt of these charges, and offered evidence tending to show that they were elsewhere at the time of the commission of the alleged offenses. The defendants were not strikers dr taxi drivers. On cross-examination both defendants admitted they had been previously convicted of other criminal offenses.\n. There was verdict of guilty of larceny as charged and of assault with deadly weapon. Judgment was rendered sentencing them to not less than two nor more than four-years in jail to be assigned to work under the State Highway and Public Works Commission in the larceny case, and in the assault case to two years in jail to be assigned to work under State Highway and Public Works Commission, the sentence in the assault case to run concurrently with the sentence in the larceny case.\nThe defendants appealed, assigning errors.\nAttorney-General McMullan and Assistant Atiorneys-General Bruton, Rhodes, and Moody for the State.\nCharles Aycoclc Poe for defendants." }, "file_name": "0153-01", "first_page_order": 199, "last_page_order": 201 }