{
  "id": 8625844,
  "name": "A. C. WARD v. MARSHALL BOWLES and THE BLUE BIRD TAXICAB COMPANY, INC.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Ward v. Bowles",
  "decision_date": "1947-12-10",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "273",
  "last_page": "275",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "228 N.C. 273"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:52:37.324265+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "A. C. WARD v. MARSHALL BOWLES and THE BLUE BIRD TAXICAB COMPANY, INC."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "BarNhill, J.\nOn this record plaintiff was lawfully in the intersection, standing in a position where he was clearly visible to the driver of the defendant\u2019s taxicab as the latter approached the intersection. The taxi driver, had he been keeping a proper lookout, could have seen him in ample time to avoid a collision. Instead he \u201ccut the corner\u201d in violation of G. S. 20-153 (a) without giving any signal or warning of his approach. The collision resulted. These circumstances, unrebutted as they are on this record, warrant an inference of negligence and are sufficient to require the submission of appropriate issues to the jury.\nThe defendant Bowles, it is true, was at the time driving on a green light, but that fact did not relieve him of the duty to exercise proper care for the safety of a pedestrian who had lawfully entered and was standing in the 'intersection when he approached.\nThe facts are not such as to require or permit the conclusion that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.\nThere is no evidence that either plaintiff or his employer had given notice of non-acceptance of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, G. S. Chap. 97, under the terms'of G. S. 97-4. It must be presumed, therefore, that both the City of High Point and the plaintiff at the time of the accident were bound by the provisions of that Act. G. S. 97-3. The plaintiff, at the time he received his injuries, was engaged in the discharge of his duties as a police officer of said city. He never filed any claim for compensation against the city. These facts, the defendants contend, preclude plaintiff from instituting any action against them and support the judgment of nonsuit entered in the court below.- The contention is untenable.\nWhen an employee and his employer have accepted the provisions of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, the rights and remedies respecting compensation for personal injuries received while about his master\u2019s business, granted the employee by the Act, are exclusive as against the employer only. G. S. 97-10. A third-party tort-feasor is subject to suit even though compensation is,paid or liability therefor is acknowledged by the employer. G. S. 97-10. While the rights of the employee, as against a third party after claim for compensation is filed, are limited, G. S. 97-10, there is nothing in the Act which denies him the right to waive his claim against his employer and pursue his remedy against the alleged tort-feasor by common law action for negligence.,\nTh\u00e9 fact that the plaintiff may have been insured against the defendants\u2019 negligence, either directly or by virtue of the statute, is of no protection to the defendants from suit for their alleged wrongful act\u2019.\nThe judgment below is\nEeversed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "BarNhill, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Uaworih <& Maitoclcs for plaintiff appellant.",
      "Gold, McAnally Gold for defendant appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "A. C. WARD v. MARSHALL BOWLES and THE BLUE BIRD TAXICAB COMPANY, INC.\n(Filed 10 December, 1947.)\n1. Automobiles \u00a7\u00a7 16, 18h (2)\u2014\nEvidence that when a pedestrian had traversed about half of an intersection in the pedestrian lane on a green light, the light changed, and the pedestrian stopped in the center of the street, and that the driver of a cab, approaching from the pedestrian\u2019s right in the left-turn lane, cut to his left and struck the pedestrian when about half of the front of the cab was to the left of the center line of the street, is held sufficient to be submitted to the jury on the issue of negligence, since the driver of the cab could have seen the pedestrian in ample time to have avoided a collision had he been keeping a proper lookout, and since the evidence discloses that the driver \u201ccut the corner\u201d in violation of G. S., 20-153 (a), without giving any signal or warning of his approach.\n2. Automobiles \u00a7 8i\u2014\nThe fact that a motorist has the green light in traversing an intersection does not relieve him of the duty to exercise proper care for the safety of a pedestrian who has lawfully entered the intersection and is standing in the center of the street.\n3. Automobiles \u00a7 18h (3)\u2014 . '\nA pedestrian who starts across an intersection with the green light and is caught by the changing lights cannot be held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in standing in the center of the street.\n4. Master\u2019 and Servant \u00a7 41\u2014\nThe remedies given an employee under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act ar.e exclusive as against the employer only, G. S., 97-10, and the Act does not preclude an employee from waiving his claim against his employer and pursuing his remedy against a third-party tort-feasor by common law action for negligence, although his rights against such third party after a claim for compensation is filed, are limited.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Shuford, Special Judge, October Term, 1947, Guilford (High Point Division).\nReversed.\nCivil action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from taxicab-pedestrian collision.\nTbe plaintiff was, at the time of the accident complained of, a police officer of the City of High Point. About 11 rOO p.m. on 19 September 1943 he started across North Main Street of High Point at the south end of the Main Street bridge. He was going from east to west, within the lane marked for pedestrians, on the green traffic light. When he got about midway the street, the light changed to red, and he stopped at the edge of the center or left-turn vehicular traffic lane.\nHe saw the corporate defendant\u2019s taxicab being operated by defendant Bowles, at the north end of the bridge, approaching in the left-turn lane. He turned to look to the south and as he looked back to the north the defendant\u2019s taxi \u201cwas right on\u201d him. \u201cThe driver of the cab cut short and just about half of the front of the cab was in the northbound fast lane\u201d when it struck plaintiff. The plaintiff suffered certain personal injuries which ho says developed and grew worse as time passed.\nAt the conclusion of the evidence for plaintiff, the court, on motion of defendants, dismissed the action as in case of nonsuit and plaintiff appealed.\nUaworih <& Maitoclcs for plaintiff appellant.\nGold, McAnally Gold for defendant appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0273-01",
  "first_page_order": 319,
  "last_page_order": 321
}