{ "id": 12165830, "name": "YOUNG A. MEDLIN v. L. R. POWELL, JR., and HENRY W. ANDERSON, as Receivers of SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Medlin v. Powell", "decision_date": "1948-10-13", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "323", "last_page": "326", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "229 N.C. 323" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "208 Ark., 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1478744 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/208/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 Mo., 1232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "case_ids": [ 1910759 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo/354/1232-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Va., 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Va.", "case_ids": [ 1974532 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/va/181/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Ga. App., 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 1530206 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/73/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Utah, 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Utah", "case_ids": [ 8868086 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/utah/109/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App., 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5646716 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/317/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Cal. App. (2d), 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4713749 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/73/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 L. Ed., 610", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "220 Minn., 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Minn.", "case_ids": [ 385461 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/minn/220/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Minn., 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Minn.", "case_ids": [ 384282 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/minn/221/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 F. Supp., 764", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 603654 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/71/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 F. Supp., 683", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 603709 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/71/0683-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 U. S., 229", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8286679 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/241/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 A. L. R., 967", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 U. S., 54", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 364279 ], "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/318/0054-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 532, "char_count": 8942, "ocr_confidence": 0.505, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.72892633419842e-08, "percentile": 0.35912730819441596 }, "sha256": "d0eb2a60344e8c4cf715aa20ba025b196c2895ca2ba5023cb05e5f3f8dc74546", "simhash": "1:87f808d7bcffd6d6", "word_count": 1603 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:16:54.231798+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "YOUNG A. MEDLIN v. L. R. POWELL, JR., and HENRY W. ANDERSON, as Receivers of SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY COMPANY." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Denny, J.\nSince the adoption of the amendment to the Federal Employers\u2019 Liability Act, on 11 August, 1939, 53 Stat., 1404, 45 U. S. C. A. 54, the doctrine of assumption of risk is no longer a defense in actions arising under the Act, if the employee\u2019s injury or death resulted in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of the defendant carrier. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U. S., 54, 87 L. Ed., 610, 143 A. L. R., 967. Prior to the adoption of the above amendment, the assumption of risk as a defense had been abolished only where the negligence of the carrier had been in violation of some statute enacted for the safety of employees. Jacobs v. Southern R. Co., 241 U. S., 229, 60 L. Ed., 970.\nWe think the ruling of the court below' is sustained by the overwhelming weight of authority.\nIt is said in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra: \u201cWe hold that every vestige of the doctrine of assumption of risk was obliterated from the law by the 1939 amendment, and that Congress, by abolishing the defense of assumption of risk in that statute, did not mean to leave open the identical defense for the master by changing its name to \u2018non-negligence.\u2019 \u201d And after discussing at some length the difficulties courts have encountered in actions brought under the provisions of the Federal Employers\u2019 Liability Act, with particular reference to the difficulty of distinguishing between contributory negligence and assumption of risk, the Court said: \u201cIt was this maze of law which Congress swept into discard with the adoption of the 1939 amendment to the Employers\u2019 Liability Act, releasing the employee from the burden of assumption of risk by whatever name it was called. The result is an Act which requires cases tried under the Federal Act to be handled as though no doctrine of assumption of risk had ever existed.\u201d\nIt seems clear to us that if the doctrine of assumption of risk had never been recognized as a defense, it would certainly be improper to permit it to be so pleaded. Moreover, the identical question presented on this appeal, was decided in the case of Gray v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (District Court S. D., N. Y.), 71 F. Supp., 683, in which the Court said: \u201cIn order to recover, plaintiff must prove that his injuries resulted, at least in part, from the negligence of one or more of defendant\u2019s employees. If he makes such proof, the Act provides that assumption of risk is no defense. If he fails to make such proof, he will be nonsuited and whether or not he assumed the risk of his employment is immaterial. Therefore, this defense is insufficient in law and must be stricken.\u201d Likewise, in Eckenrode v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (District Court E. D. Penn.), 71 F. Supp., 764, the Court held : \u201cThe Tiller case made it plain that under the Statute every phase of the doctrine of assumption of risk is completely eliminated, and it must not enter into the Court\u2019s consideration either as a defense or, upon the issue of negligence, as an element in determining the measure of the employer\u2019s duty of care to the injured employee. The practical effect of the Tiller decision upon the present case is that, for the purpose of determining what duty of care Sunderlin (the acting engineer) owed to Eckenrode, the latter must be treated as though he were a non-employee in a position in which he had a right to be. However, while the fact that he was an employee in no way reduced the duty of care which the defendant owed him, neither did it increase it.\u201d\nIn the case of Pratt v. Louisiana & A. Ry. Co., 135 Fed. (2d), 692, the Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, held in an action similar to the one before us, \u201cThe defense of assumption of risk is not good; the only question is whether the carrier was negligent and, if so, whether that negligence was the proximate cause of Pratt\u2019s injury.\u201d\nAlso, the Supreme Court of Minn, said in the case of Jacobson v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 221 Minn., 454, 22 N. W. (2d), 455: \u201cIn determining whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence and whether, as defendant claims, his contributory negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident, it is our plain duty to lay out of mind any question of whether he was guilty of assumption of risk, because that defense was entirely obliterated by the 1939 amendment of the act. Crawford v. D. M. & I. R. Ry. Co., 220 Minn., 225, 19 N. W. (2d), 384. The defense of assumption of risk is not to be let in under tire label of contributory negligence. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U. S., 54, 63 S. Ct., 444, 88 L. Ed., 610, 143 A. L. R., 967.\u201d\nIn Perrett v. Southern Pac. Co., 73 Cal. App. (2d), 30, 165 Pac. (2d), 751, the Court said: \u201cThere can be no doubt but that under the majority opinion (in the Ttiler case) it is error of a most serious nature to interject into a case, since 1939, the doctrine of assumption of risk, however disguised. There can be no doubt that since 1939, an employee cannot recover unless he pleads and proves negligence on the part of the employer. . . . When the jury is told that defendant can be held liable only upon proof of negligence, the defendant has received all of the protection to which it is entitled. To further tell the jury that the plaintiff assumes the risks of injury incident to his employment when the rvork is being done in the usual and ordinary way and without negligence on the part of defendant and that unless there was an unusual jerk out of the ordinary the jury must find for the defendant, is to assume that a \u2018normal\u2019 jerk cannot be the result of negligence. That is not the law since 1939.\u201d Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. v. Peeler, 140 Fed. (2d), 865.\nThe authorities support the view that in actions brought under the provisions of the Federal Employers\u2019 Liability Act, where it is alleged the employee\u2019s injury or death resulted in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents or employees of the defendant carrier, recovery depends solely on whether or not the defendant carrier was negligent and if so did such negligence contribute to the injury of the employee. In such cases assumption of risk as a defense, has been abrogated. Roberts v. United Fisheries Vessels Co., 141 F. (2d), 288; Stewart v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 137 F. (2d), 527; McGivern v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 132 F. (2d), 213; Patznsky v. Lowden, 317 Ill. App., 613, 47 N. E. (2d), 338; Henry v. Norton, 66 N. Y. S. (2d), 317; Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 Utah, 398, 166 Pac. (2d), 501; Tankersley v. Sou. Ry. Co., 73 Ga. App., 88, 35 S. E. (2d), 522; Beamer v. Virginian Ry. Co., 181 Va., 650, 26 S. E. (2d), 43; Francis v. Terminal R. Assn. of St. Louis, 354 Mo., 1232, 193 S. W. (2d), 909; Kansas City Sou. Ry. Co. v. Hopson, 208 Ark., 548, 186 S. W. (2d), 946; Kansas City Sou. Ry. Co. v. Chandler (Texas), 192 S. W. (2d), 304.\nThe judgment of the court below is\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Denny, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Thos. J. Lewis, of Atlanta, t\u00eda.; J. M. Peace, and A. A. Bunn for plaintiff.", "Pittman, Bridgers & Hieles and, Murray Allen for defendants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "YOUNG A. MEDLIN v. L. R. POWELL, JR., and HENRY W. ANDERSON, as Receivers of SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY COMPANY.\n(Filed 13 October, 1948.)\n1. Master and Servant \u00a7 27\u2014\nThe doctrine of assumption of risk, which constituted a defense under the Federal Employers\u2019 Liability Act except in cases where the negligence of the carrier consisted in the violation of some statute enacted for the safety of employees, 45 U. S. C. A. 54, was entirely abrogated by the amendment of 1939, 53 Stat., 1404, and since the amendment, assumption of risk in any guise or form is not available to the carrier as a defense.\n2. Same\u2014\nSince the amendment of 1939, the doctrine of assumption of risk is entirely immaterial in an action under the Federal Employers\u2019 Liability Act, and therefore the carrier\u2019s idea of assumption of risk as a plea in bar is properly stricken from the answer upon motion of plaintiff employee.\nAppeal by defendants from Williams, J., at June Term, 1948, of Vance.\nThis is an action to recover for personal injuries under the provisions of the Federal Employers\u2019 Liability Act.\nThe plaintiff alleges in his complaint, that on the 9th day of January, 1946, he was in the employ of the defendants as a flagman and brakeman on one of the defendants\u2019 trains, which was being operated in interstate commerce; that he was injured by the negligence of the defendants\u2019 engineer, who was in charge of the train.\nThe defendants filed an answer denying plaintiff\u2019s allegations of negligence and pleaded the assumption of risk as a plea in bar of his right to recover.\nThe plaintiff moved the court to strike the plea in bar from the defendants\u2019 answer, on the ground that it is not a legal defense under the Federal Employers\u2019 Liability Act, and evidence in support of such plea would not be admissible in the trial of the action.\nThe motion was allowed, and defendants appeal and assign error.\nThos. J. Lewis, of Atlanta, t\u00eda.; J. M. Peace, and A. A. Bunn for plaintiff.\nPittman, Bridgers & Hieles and, Murray Allen for defendants." }, "file_name": "0323-01", "first_page_order": 377, "last_page_order": 380 }