#### STATE v. CLELLAN WARREN.

(Filed 20 April, 1949.)

Automobiles § 34b—

Power to suspend or revoke an automobile driver’s license is vested exclusively in tbe State Department of Motor Yebicles, subject to the right to review by the Superior Court, G.S. 20, Art. 2, and a provision in a judgment in a prosecution for violation of a statutory provision regulating the operation of motor vehicles, that defendant’s license be surrendered and that defendant not operate a motor vehicle on the public highways for a stipulated period, is void and will be stricken on appeal.

*300Appeal by defendant, Clellan Warren, from Harris, J., and a jury at the December Term, 1948, of the Superior Court of Wake County.

Tbe jury found upon an appropriate warrant and conflicting evidence that the defendant was guilty of the misdemeanor of driving a motor vehicle on a public highway at a speed in excess of that prescribed by subsection (b)2 of G.S. 20-141 as rewritten by section 17 of Chapter 1067 of the 1947 Session Laws. Judgment was thereupon pronounced against him as follows :

(1) That the defendant “be confined in the common jail of Wake County for a term of six months and assigned to work the public roads under the order and direction of the State Highway and Public Works Commission, said sentence suspended for two years upon condition that defendant pay the costs and remain law-abiding and of good behavior”; and (2) that the defendant surrender his driver’s license to the Clerk of the Superior Court not later than 20 December, 1948, and not operate a motor vehicle on the public highways for a period of six months.

The defendant excepted to the judgment and appealed, assigning as error the provision of the judgment requiring him to surrender his license to drive motor vehicles and prohibiting him from operating such vehicles for the period specified.

Attorney-General McMullan and Assistant Attomeys-General Bruton, Rhodes, and Moody for the State.

William T. Hatch and Ray B. Brady for the defendant, appellant.

ErviN, J.

Under the Uniform Drivers’ License Act, the power to suspend or revoke an automobile driver’s license is vested exclusively in the State Department of Motor Vehicles, subject to the right of review by the Superior Court. G.S. 20-Art. 2. Consequently, the provision of the judgment of the trial court requiring the defendant to surrender his license to drive motor vehicles and prohibiting him from operating such vehicles for a period of six months is void, and is hereby stricken out. S. v. Cooper, 224 N.C. 100, 29 S.E. 2d 18; S. v. McDaniels, 219 N.C. 763, 14 S.E. 2d 793.

Error.