{ "id": 8629354, "name": "STATE v. ROBERT L. SUTTON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Sutton", "decision_date": "1949-04-13", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "244", "last_page": "247", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "230 N.C. 244" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "122 S.E. 17", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "187 N.C. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8654132 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/187/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 S.E. 2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "221 N.C. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627123 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/221/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12167363 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12164507 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 S.E. 2d 615", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 N.C. 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8602342 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/223/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 S.E. 435", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. 12", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626742 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/197/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 S.E. 170", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 N.C. 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11269962 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/184/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 S.E. 630", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 N.C. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628938 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/214/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 S.E. 2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 N.C. 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624589 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/228/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 S.E. 2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 N.C. 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627978 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/228/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 S.E. 2d 751", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 N.C. 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8605178 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/223/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 L. Ed., 570", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "case_ids": [ 3617833 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/180/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 U.S. 356", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3617833, 1250777 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/180/0356-01", "/alaska-fed/1/0671-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 532, "char_count": 9914, "ocr_confidence": 0.478, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.1480674384609866e-07, "percentile": 0.8624755729001962 }, "sha256": "c921d2b9704f8451ed306c6dc30ce7409ae0e87954b92e97aac50344e0a7886f", "simhash": "1:1ce3f5c2c89ba6c9", "word_count": 1742 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:28:13.210119+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE v. ROBERT L. SUTTON." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BabNHill, J.\nThe court below in its charge instructed the jury as follows:\n\u201cThere has been testimony offered regarding the character and the conduct of Louise Ramsey and her aunt, Edna' Davis, and Sallie Ramsey and her aunt, Edna Davis. The Court charges you that while this testimony is not competent as bearing upon the question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant, that it is material for you to consider only as bearing on the inclination, disposition, likelihood or the lack of it, of the defendant to indulge in this manner of conduct.\u201d\nWhether this instruction, as it appears in the record, conveys the thought the trial judge had in mind at the time or expresses with exactness just what he did say, we are unable to determine. In any event, we must take it as we find it.\nHow evidence tending to show that these three women were immoral, lascivious, dissolute characters could have any material bearing on \u201cthe inclination, disposition, likelihood or lack of it, of the defendant\u201d to indulge in similar unbridled conduct or to show intent, design, or guilty knowledge of the defendant, or to identify the person charged, we are unable to perceive. To have his inclination and disposition to indulge in immoral acts judged by their conduct saddled upon him a burden the law does not contemplate.\nWhile we do not recognize a broadside exception to the charge but require an assignment of error of this kind to point out wherein the judge failed to comply with G.S. 1-180, it is sometimes difficult to decide on which side a particular assignment falls. Here, however, we think the combination of exceptions and assignments brings the defendant under the wire and sufficiently presents his contention that the court below inadvertently failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of G.S. 1-180.\nHe excepts in part for that the court failed to instruct the jury in respect to the particular issues arising on the evidence and apply the law thereto in such manner as to enable the jury to understand the essential elements of the crime charged. Then, in each instance where the court arrayed the facts in the form of a contention, he excepts \u201cfor that the Court failed to instruct the jury as to the law arising on evidence of this character.\u201d\nThe court, in charging the jury, read the statute, G.S. 14-26, and the bill of indictment; charged on the presumption of innocence; defined reasonable doubt and properly placed the burden of proof. It then gave the contentions of the State on the one hand and the defendant on the other. It likewise gave the quoted instruction and charged the jury as to how they should consider \u201ccharacter testimony\u201d and testimony of defendant.\nIn summary, this is the sum total of the charge. At no time was the jury instructed that in order to convict, the State must prove not only an act of illicit sexual intercourse between defendant and the girl, but also that she was under sixteen years of age and, at the time, had never had sexual intercourse with any other man. The elements of age and virginity are not mentioned, even in the statement of contentions, except that it is stated the defendant contends the prosecutrix \u201cis a young girl guilty of lascivious conduct\u201d and \u201cthat she was not a virgin on the 9th day of January, 1947, as contended for by the State of North Carolina.\u201d\nTherefore, under the charge considered contextually, the one issue submitted to the jury was as to whether there had been illicit relations between the defendant and the prosecutrix. The inadvertence of the court in failing to state and explain the other essential elements of the crime and relate them to the evidence in the case must be held for error.\n\u201cThe chief object contemplated in the charge of the judge is to explain the law of the case, to point out the essentials to be proved on the one side and on the other, and to bring into view the relation of the particular evidence adduced to the particular issue involved. Bird v. U. S., 180 U.S. 356, 45 L. Ed., 570.\u201d S. v. Friddle, 223 N.C. 258, 25 S.E. 2d 751; S. v. Jackson, 228 N.C. 656, 46 S.E. 2d 858.\nWhen a person is on trial, charged with having committed a statutory crime, it is not sufficient for, the court merely to read the statute under which he stands indicted. The statute- should be explained, the essential elements of the crime thereby created outlined and the law as thus defined should be applied to the evidence in the case. S. v. Flinchem, 228 N.C. 149, 44 S.E. 2d 724; S. v. Friddle, supra; Spencer v. Brown, 214 N.C. 114, 198 S.E. 630; Bowen v. Schnibben, 184 N.C. 248, 114 S.E. 170. This \u201ccalls for instructions as to the law upon all substantial features of the case.\u201d Williams v. Coach Company, 197 N.C. 12, 147 S.E. 435; McNeill v. McNeill, 223 N.C. 178, 25 S.E. 2d 615, and cases cited; Lewis v. Watson, 229 N.C. 20; S. v. Fain, 229 N.C. 644.\nThus it is, on a prosecution under G.S. 14^26, the failure of the court to give the jury a correct charge on the element of age is error. S. v. Isley, 221 N.C. 213, 19 S.E. 2d 875.\nWhile here the age of the prosecutrix does not seem to be seriously questioned, the chastity of the girl at the time of the alleged offense as well as the identity of the offender is vigorously contested. Hence, the defendant was entitled to have the court instruct the jury fully as to the essential elements of the crime and to relate this law to the evidence in the case;\nEvidence of an alibi is substantive and the defendant was entitled to an instruction as to the legal effect of his evidence of alibi, if believed and accepted by the jury. S. v. Melton, 187 N.C. 481, 122 S.E. 17.\nFor the reasons stated there must be a\nNew trial.", "type": "majority", "author": "BabNHill, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney-General McMullan and Assistant Attorneys-General Bruton, Rhodes, and Moody for the State.", "W. R. Francis, John M. Queen, Hugh E. Monteith, and David M. Hall for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE v. ROBERT L. SUTTON.\n(Filed 13 April, 1949.)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 77d\u2014\nThe Supreme Court is bound by tbe record.\n2. Rape \u00a7 19\u2014\nIn this prosecution of defendant for carnal knowledge of a female child over twelve and under sixteen years of age, defendant offered evidence of the immortal character of prosecutrix and her sister and aunt. Held: A charge that such testimony was not competent upon the question of defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence, but that it was material as bearing upon the likelihood of defendant to indulge in such conduct, is prejudicial error.\nS.Criminal Law \u00a7 78e (1) \u2014\nA broadside exception to the charge will not be considered, but appellant must point out wherein the charge failed to comply with the provisions of G.S. 1-180.\n4. Same\u2014\nWhere the only part of the charge applying the law to the evidence in the case is the statement of the respective contentions of the parties, exceptions for failure of the court to instruct the jury as to the law arising on the evidence, taken in each instance where the court arrayed the facts in the form of a contention, are sufficient to present defendant\u2019s contention that the charge failed to comply with G.S. 1-180.\n5. Rape \u00a7 19\u2014\nWhere defendant, in a prosecution for carnal knowledge of a girl over twelve and under sixteen years of age, offers evidence of the immoral character of the prosecutrix and denies his identity as the perpetrator of the offense, an instruction which omits the age and chastity of prosecu-trix as elements of the offense fails to meet the mandatory requirements of G.S. 1-180, and an exception thereto will be sustained. G.S. 14-26.\n6. Criminal Law \u00a7 53d\u2014\nIn a prosecution for a statutory crime it is not sufficient for the court merely to read the statute and the indictment, but the court, in discharging its duty to charge on all substantial features of the case, should explain the statute and outline the essential elements of the offense, and apply the law as thus defined to the evidence in the case. G.S. 1-180.\n7. Same\u2014\nEvidence of an alibi is substantive, and defendant is entitled to an instruction as to the legal effect of his evidence of alibi, if believed by the jury.\nAppeal by defendant from Sink, J., October Term, 1948, JacksoN. New trial.\nCriminal prosecution under G.S. 14-26, on bill of indictment charging carnal knowledge of a female child over twelve and under sixteen years of age.\nThe evidence for the State tends to show that on 9 January 1947, on her thirteenth birthday anniversary, Sallie Ramsey was picked up near her home hy defendant and carried on his car to a deserted spot off the main highway and near an old corn mill; that there he had sexual intercourse with her on the back seat of his automobile; that this was the first time the girl had had intercourse with any person; and that thereafter illicit relations were maintained by the defendant and the prosecutrix over a period of several months, the defendant taking her to various places for that purpose.\nThe evidence for the State likewise tends to show that defendant engaged in illicit relations with Sallie Ramsey\u2019s younger sister and probably with her aunt, Edna Davis, the aunt conniving to get the parties together at various times. There was also evidence of other incriminating facts and circumstances.\nThe evidence for the defendant tended to show that he was not acquainted with the prosecuting witness or her sister or aunt; that while she and her sister and aunt had been guilty- of unseemly conduct, the man involved was named Ramsey; that defendant never associated with either one of the women. There was also evidence tending to show that it was impossible for defendant to have been at the places on the occasions and at the times testified to hy the State\u2019s witnesses. Defendant likewise offered evidence of his good reputation.\nThe jury returned .a verdict of guilty. The court pronounced judgment of imprisonment in the State\u2019s Prison for a term of not less than twenty or more than thirty years. Defendant excepted and appealed.\nAttorney-General McMullan and Assistant Attorneys-General Bruton, Rhodes, and Moody for the State.\nW. R. Francis, John M. Queen, Hugh E. Monteith, and David M. Hall for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0244-01", "first_page_order": 300, "last_page_order": 303 }