{
  "id": 8628556,
  "name": "STATE v. W. H. BRYANT",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Bryant",
  "decision_date": "1949-11-09",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "106",
  "last_page": "108",
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      "type": "official",
      "cite": "231 N.C. 106"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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    {
      "cite": "230 N.C. 312",
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    {
      "cite": "230 N.C. 174",
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    {
      "cite": "224 N.C. 527",
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    {
      "cite": "230 N.C. 470",
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:38:15.383158+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STATE v. W. H. BRYANT."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Devin, J.\nThere was evidence on the part of the State that 29 January, 1949, a police officer went with one Ivy Riddick to the latter\u2019s home, and found the defendant in a room therein and close by in a heater a quantity of tickets, or pieces of paper marked with numbers, which the officer testified were \u201cbutter and egg\u201d lottery tickets. Apparently the defendant had unsuccessfully attempted to burn the tickets. Riddick testified he had at the direction of defendant delivered the tickets to him there. The officer also testified, over objection, that he had shortly before visited the defendant in his home and found therein lottery tickets of the same kind and type. Defendant\u2019s objection to this testimony cannot be sustained since it throws light on defendant\u2019s intent, guilty knowledge, system, and tends to show defendant\u2019s purposeful possession of the lottery tickets where found, as well as supporting the State\u2019s view that defendant was engaged in operating a lottery. S. v. Fowler, 230 N.C. 470, 53 S.E. 2d 853; S. v. Edwards, 224 N.C. 527, 31 S.E. 2d 516.\nThe defendant assigns as error that the court in charging the jury defined reasonable doubt as one \u201cgrowing out of the evidence in the case and supported by common sense and reason,\u201d citing S. v. Tyndall, 230 N.C. 174, 52 S.E. 2d 272, and S. v. Braxton, 230 N.C. 312, 52 S. E. 2d 895, where it was pointed out that a reasonable doubt may arise out of a lack of evidence or from its deficiency. However, we observe that immediately following the use of the language complained of, the court instructed the jury, \u201cIf, after considering, comparing and weighing all the evidence in the case you cannot say you have an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of defendant\u2019s guilt, then you have a reasonable doubt about it, otherwise not.\u201d Considering the entire charge of the court as to the burden of proof and in defining reasonable doubt, we conclude that the defendant\u2019s exception on this ground cannot be sustained. S. v. Wood, 230 N.C. 740, 55 S.E. 2d 491. It may be noted that this case was tried below before the decisions in the Tyndall and Braxton cases were issued.\nIn the trial we find\nNo error.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Devin, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney-General McMullan and Assistant Attorney-General Rhodes for the State.",
      "W. H. Yarborough for defendant, appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE v. W. H. BRYANT.\n(Filed 9 November, 1949.)\n1. Criminal Raw \u00a7 29b\u2014\nIn a prosecution for possession of lottery tickets, testimony that on another occasion a short time previously like tickets had been found in defendant\u2019s home, is held competent as tending to show intent, guilty knowledge, system, purposeful possession of the tickets charged, and \u00e1s supporting the State\u2019s view that defendant was engaged in operating a lottery.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 5Sb\u2014\nA charge that reasonable doubt is one growing \u201cout of the evidence\u201d will not be held for prejudicial error when immediately thereafter the court instructs the jury that, if after considering all the evidence, the jury did not have an abiding conviction of defendant\u2019s guilt to a moral certainty, then the jury would have a reasonable doubt.\nAppeal by defendant from Williams, J., March Term, 1949, of Wake. No error.\nThe defendant was charged with operating a lottery and with having in his possession a quantity of numbers tickets, in violation of G.S. 14-290 and G.S. 14-291.1. The jury returned verdict of guilty as charged, and from judgment imposing sentence the defendant appealed.\nAttorney-General McMullan and Assistant Attorney-General Rhodes for the State.\nW. H. Yarborough for defendant, appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0106-01",
  "first_page_order": 156,
  "last_page_order": 158
}