{
  "id": 8600039,
  "name": "STATE v. DEWICK W. DOOLEY",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Dooley",
  "decision_date": "1950-06-09",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "311",
  "last_page": "314",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "232 N.C. 311"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:42:59.145817+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STATE v. DEWICK W. DOOLEY."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "DeviN, J.\nThe defendant assigns error in the denial by the court of bis motion for judgment of nonsuit, and also in the court\u2019s instructions to the jury in several particulars to which exceptions were noted.\nThis necessitates consideration of the evidence adduced at the trial, which may be summarized as follows: The evidence offered by the State tended to show that on the evening of 21 July, 1949, between the hours of 8 and 9 p.m. an automobile identified as that of defendant struck an automobile parked next to the curb on North Marshall Street in Winston-Salem. Defendant\u2019s automobile was then backed off and driven through a red light, and after traversing several streets was seen holding up traffic on a busy street while attempt was being made to disengage the bumper of defendant\u2019s car from the fender of another car with which it bad come in contact and to drive it over the curb into the parking space or garage in the rear of the Frances Hotel. The front of defendant\u2019s automobile was damaged. The witness who first observed defendant\u2019s automobile on this occasion testified he saw only one person in it, a man without a shirt and wearing glasses. The State also offered other evidence, largely circumstantial, tending to show that defendant was the driver. When the defendant came from the automobile after it had come to rest in the rear of the hotel, be was beard to say to the spectators who bad assembled, \u201cScatter! Scatter! I wasn\u2019t driving.\u201d And to the officer who came up and inquired where bis car was be replied, \u201cI wasn\u2019t driving.\u201d Two shirts were found in the back of defendant\u2019s automobile.\nDefendant did not testify, but effort was made to show that two men were in the automobile, both without shirts and wearing glasses, and that defendant was not the one driving. Defendant offered two witnesses, one of whom testified be saw defendant\u2019s automobile driven out from the rear of the Frances Hotel about 7:30 p.m. with two men in it, defendant and another, neither wearing a shirt, and that the other man was driving. The other witness, the proprietor of a service station located some two miles distant, testified that between 8 :!5 and 9 p.m. on this date defendant and another man drove up to his place, both without shirts, and the other man was driving the automobile.\nThat defendant\u2019s automobile had been driven recklessly on this occasion was not seriously controverted, but. it was contended the evidence was insufficient to identify the defendant as the driver. About this point the contest was waged. We think,- however, that while no witness positively identified the defendant as- the driver, there was circumstantial evidence of this fact sufficient to carry the case to the jury, and that defendant\u2019s motion for judgment of nonsuit was properly denied.\nThe defendant noted numerous exceptions to the judge\u2019s charge to the jury. Most of these are without merit. But in two instances we think the court inadvertently used language which under the circumstances here disclosed must be held sufficiently prejudicial to require a new trial.\nAs appears from the record before us, the court charged the jury as follows: \u201cYou will take into consideration in appraising the testimony the attitude and the demeanor of the witnesses who have gone upon the stand, the likelihood for bias, for prejudice, for knowing the true facts and testifying thereto, the State -contending and insisting that some of the testimony came from officers on the part of the State, and some came from disinterested witnesses, while the defendant\u2019s witnesses are interested.\u201d :\"\nWhile the reference to the defendant\u2019s witnesses as being interested, in contrast to the disinterestedness-of-fh\u00e9 officers and the State\u2019s witnesses, was stated in the form of a contention, the implication probably found lodgment in the minds of the jury that the testimony of defendant\u2019s witnesses should be appraised by them in the light of their interest. There was nothing in the record to show that either of them was related or in any legal respect interested. These were the only witnesses offered by defendant whose testimony tended to show defendant was not the driver of the automobile on the occasion charged. The suggestion that the defendant\u2019s witnesses were less credible than those testifying for the State, though not so intended- by' the court, likely proved hurtful to defendant\u2019s defense.\nThe defendant also noted exception to the following excerpt from the charge: \u201cThe defendant insists that on the occasion of the officer appearing there and on the occasion of his (defendant\u2019s) coming out from the garage, if you should find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he did come out from behind the garage, as contended for by the State, that such statements as were purportedly made by him are unworthy of your belief in that, as he contends, you should not interpret them to imply guilt upon his part.\u201d\nThe reference Here was to purported statements by the defendant, \u201cI wasn\u2019t driving.\u201d What was doubtless- meant was that, in reply to the State\u2019s contention that by repeated denials that be was driving the defendant did \u201cprotest too much,\u201d the defendant contended this should not be interpreted to imply guilt. However, the instruction from the court, as it appears in the record, that the defendant contended such statements were \u201cunworthy of your belief\u201d was likely to be misunderstood by the jury to the defendant\u2019s prejudice.\nUnder the circumstances we think there should be another bearing, and it is so ordered.\nNew trial.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "DeviN, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney-General McMullan and Assistant Attorney-General Bruton for the State, appellee.",
      "W. Dennie Spry and Richmond Rucker for defendant, appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE v. DEWICK W. DOOLEY.\n(Filed 9 June, 1950.)\n1. Automobiles \u00a7 30d\u2014\n\u25a0 Circumstantial evidence tending to identify defendant as tlie driver of tlie car which ivas driven in a reckless manner, held sufficient to be submitted to the jury. G.S. 20-140.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 53j\u2014\nAfter instructing- tlie jury that in appraising the testimony it should take into consideration the demeanor of the Avitnesses, the likelihood for bias, and their knowledge of tlie facts, the court charged that the State contended that its testimony came from officers and from disinterested witnesses Avhile defendant\u2019s Avitnesses Avere interested. There was nothing in the record to show that either of defendant\u2019s Avitnesses was interested. Held: The reference to defendant\u2019s Avitnesses as being interested must be held for prejudicial error even though contained in the statement of contentions. \u2022 . .\n3. Criminal Laiv \u00a7 53k\u2014\nIn this prosecution for reckless driving the State contended that defendant\u2019s repeated denials that\u201d lie ivas driving, made immediately after he left the car, and before he Avas charged, indicated consciousness of guilt. Held: A charge that defendant contended that such statements purportedly made by bim were unworthy of belief, in stating his contention, must be held for prejudicial error.\nAppeal by defendant from Sink, J., November Term, 1949, of Forsyth. New trial.\nTbe defendant was charged with reckless driving in violation of G S. 20-140. From judgment imposing sentence, consequent upon a verdict of guilty, tbe defendant appealed.\nAttorney-General McMullan and Assistant Attorney-General Bruton for the State, appellee.\nW. Dennie Spry and Richmond Rucker for defendant, appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0311-01",
  "first_page_order": 359,
  "last_page_order": 362
}