{ "id": 8611319, "name": "GERALDINE C. CARTER v. RONALD W. CARTER", "name_abbreviation": "Carter v. Carter", "decision_date": "1950-11-08", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "614", "last_page": "617", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "232 N.C. 614" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "11 S.E. 2d 280", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 N.C. 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8620021 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/218/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 S.E. 98", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 N.C. 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8657453 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/182/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 S.E. 456", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628791 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/197/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 S.E. 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 N.C. 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630170 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/195/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 S.E. 2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 N.C. 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625719 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/228/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 S.E. 285", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 N.C. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624501 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/207/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 S.E. 2d 20", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 N.C. 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628368 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/228/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 S.E. 2d 6", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 N.C. 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628075 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/228/0680-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 391, "char_count": 7290, "ocr_confidence": 0.485, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.811974075640927e-07, "percentile": 0.951439446855782 }, "sha256": "39a9c19101d5fa364fb25f4beb9ef5420bae273c277b961c673cecf2dac9e0e7", "simhash": "1:fc299f6f74028e19", "word_count": 1279 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:42:59.145817+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GERALDINE C. CARTER v. RONALD W. CARTER." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BarNHill, J.\nThe testimony offered at the hearing is not brought forward in the record. Therefore, it must be presumed that the findings of fact are supported by competent evidence. Hughes v. Oliver, 228 N.C. 680, 47 S.E. 2d 6; Roach v. Pritchett, 228 N.C. 747, 47 S.E. 2d 20; Radeker v. Royal Pines Park, Inc., 207 N.C. 209, 176 S.E. 285.\nUpon the facts found, the one question presented for decision is this: Is the child born to plaintiff and defendant prior to their intermarriage a child of the marriage within the meaning of G-.S. 50-13? We are constrained to answer in the affirmative.\nG-.S. 49-12 provides that when the mother of an illegitimate child and the reputed father of such child shall intermarry at any time after the birth of such child, the child \u201cshall in all respects after such intermarriage be deemed and held to be legitimate and entitled to all the rights in and to the estate, real and personal, of its father and mother that it would have had had it been born in lawful wedlock.\u201d\nUnder G.S. 50-13, the judge may enter an order in a divorce action, either before or after final judgment therein, requiring the father to furnish support for the education and maintenance of the \u201cminor children of the marriage\u201d which is the subject matter of the action. Winfield v. Winfield, 228 N.C. 256, 45 S.E. 2d 259.\nIn part these two sections of our statutes regulate the family circle and define the rights and responsibilities of members of that circle. They must therefore be construed in pari materia.\nFrom and after the marriage of the mother and the reputed father of an illegitimate child, such child shall be deemed and held to be legitimate just as if it had been born in lawful wedlock. In a divorce action the father of a child of the marriage may be required to support such child. In brief, these are the pertinent provisions of the two sections.\nWhen used in reference to a child, \u201clegitimate\u201d means \u201clawfully begotten,\u201d \u201cborn in wedlock,\u201d \u201chaving or involving full filial rights and obligations by birth.\u201d Webster\u2019s New Int. Die., 2d Ed.\nG.S. 49-12 gives to the word \u201clegitimate\u201d a new or additional meaning not strictly within its ordinary definition. It is within the legislative power to define the sense in which words are employed. For it to do so is not an invasion of the province of the courts. 50 A.J. 253. Instead, we adopt the meaning impressed upon words by legislative enactment, for we are bound to follow the intent and purpose of its acts.\nSo then, in determining the status and rights of the child of plaintiff and defendant under the circumstances here existing, we are enjoined by the Legislature to hold that it is legitimate, that is, that it was lawfully begotten, was born in wedlock, and possesses full filial rights and obligations by birth. This being true, we must conclude that it is in law a minor child of the marriage of the plaintiff and defendant. Stewart v. Stewart, 195 N.C. 476, 142 S.E. 577; In re Estate of Wallace, 197 N.C. 334, 148 S.E. 456. If it was lawfully begotten and born in wedlock \u2014as, under tbe statute, we must conclude \u2014 it is a child of the marriage within the meaning of G.S. 50-13.\nThe use of the word \u201creputed\u201d rather than \u201cputative\u201d in G.S. 49-12 \u201cwas intended merely to dispense with absolute proof of paternity, so that, if the child is \u2018regarded,\u2019 \u2018deemed,\u2019 \u2018considered,\u2019 or \u2018held in thought\u2019 by the parents themselves as their child, either before or after marriage, it is legitimate.\u201d Bowman v. Howard, 182 N.C. 662, 110 S.E. 98.\nOn the hearing of a motion of this kind, whether the child is \u201ca minor \u2022child of the marriage\u201d is perhaps a question of fact rather than an issue of fact. Even so, the trial judge had the authority to call a jury to his .aid to hear the evidence and determine the question at issue. Barker v. Humphrey, 218 N.C. 389, 11 S.E. 2d 280. It was to this end that the motion was transferred to the civil issue docket. The allowance of support for the child, pending final hearing, was not improper.\nThe judgment entered in the court below is\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "BarNHill, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Sutton & Greene for plaintiff appellee.", "Jones, Reed & Griffin for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GERALDINE C. CARTER v. RONALD W. CARTER.\n(Filed 8 November, 1950.)\n1. Appeal and Error \u00a7 40d\u2014\nWhere the testimony offered at the hearing is not brought forward in the record, it will be presumed that the findings of fact are supported by competent evidence.\n3. Divorce and Alimony \u00a7 17\u2014\nG.S. 49-12 and G.S. 50-13 must be construed in pari materia, and therefore where the reputed father of a child marries the child\u2019s mother after its birth, such child is deemed legitimate just as if it had been born in lawful wedlock, G.S. 49-12, and such child is a minor child of the marriage within the purview of G.S. 50-13, and the father may be required to furnish support for such child upon motion made either before or after decree of divorce.\n3. Statutes \u00a7 5a\u2014\nThe General Assembly may define a word used in a statute and give it new or additional meaning not strictly within its ordinary definition, which meaning the courts must follow to effectuate the intent and purpose of the legislative act.\n4. Divorce and Alimony \u00a7 18\u2014\nWhether a child is a \u201cminor child of the marriage\u201d within the purview of G.S. 50-13 may be a question of fact rather than an issue of fact, but even so, the trial court may call a jury to its aid to hear the evidence and determine the question.\nAppeal by defendant from Williams, J., March Term, 1950, LeNOir.\nAffirmed.\nDivorce action, beard on motion for allowance for the education and maintenance of the minor child of the marriage as provided by G.S. 50-13.\nThe child in question was born to plaintiff shortly before her marriage to defendant. She and defendant were married 4 November 1946, pending an action against defendant for the support of said child in which he was charged with her paternity. Shortly after the marriage they separated. After two years had elapsed, plaintiff instituted this action for divorce under G.S. 50-6. Since that time defendant had contributed nothing toward the support of said child. A final decree of divorce was entered at the January Term, 1950, Lenoir Superior Court.\nOn 10 February 1950, plaintiff entered a motion in the cause for an order requiring defendant to pay plaintiff a reasonable sum at stated intervals \u201cfor the tuition and maintenance of the said minor child of plaintiff and defendant.\u201d The defendant filed answer to the motion in which he alleges the birth of said child to plaintiff before she and he intermarried and denies that he is the father of said child or that it is a child \u201cborn to the marriage between him and . . . plaintiff.\u201d\nThe motion came on for hearing out of the county, at Kenansville, N. C., by consent. The court below, \u201cafter hearing the evidence of the respective parties and the arguments of counsel,\u201d found the facts, including the finding that defendant \u201cwas the putative father of said child.\u201d It thereupon transferred the motion to the civil issue docket to the end that defendant may have a jury trial on the question of paternity, and ordered that the defendant, pending hearing before a jury, pay $30 per month for the support and maintenance of said child and certain attorneys\u2019 fees. Defendant excepted and appealed.\nSutton & Greene for plaintiff appellee.\nJones, Reed & Griffin for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0614-01", "first_page_order": 662, "last_page_order": 665 }