{
  "id": 8613034,
  "name": "MARY VAIL CAMERON v. BRUCE CAMERON",
  "name_abbreviation": "Cameron v. Cameron",
  "decision_date": "1950-11-22",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:42:59.145817+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "MARY VAIL CAMERON v. BRUCE CAMERON."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Devin, J.\nThe ruling of Judge Parker in denying plaintiff alimony pendente lite in her action for divorce a mensa was based upon the findings \u201cthat the plaintiff voluntarily left the defendant\u2019s home on or about the night of September 1, 1948, of her own free will and accord; that the defendant has not abandoned the plaintiff, nor has defendant maliciously turned plaintiff out of doors; that defendant has not offered any indignities to the person of the plaintiff as to render her condition intolerable arid life burdensome.\u201d These findings are supported by evidence and negative each of the allegations in plaintiff\u2019s complaint upon which her action is based and upon which the motion for alimony pending the action whs made. Carnes v. Carnes, 204 N.C. 636, 169 S.E. 222.\nThe court found \u201cthat the plaintiff was not a fit and suitable person to have at any time the custody of Mary Yail Cameron and Diana Banning Cameron.\u201d The evidence in the record is sufficient to support this finding, and also the finding that defendant is a fit, proper and suitable perspn to have custody of the children. Provision was made in the order which, would enable plaintiff to see her children at reasonable hours three times a week. It was also found that the best interest of the children would be served by the award of custody as thus determined.\nThe court declined to find from the evidence offered that the plaintiff had committed adultery as alleged in the defendant\u2019s cross-action, but found that the plaintiff in her reply and in her oral testimony had denied in good faith that she had committed adultery and had expressed her desire to contest the issue. In view of its far-reaching effect the court expressed the natural hesitation of a judge to make such a finding without the aid of a jury. Consequently', since no finding was made on this question and no order entered based thereon, it is still open to the plaintiff to exercise her common law right to move for an allowance for subsistence pending the action to enable her to make her defense to the charges contained in defendant\u2019s cross-action.\nThe order requiring defendant to pay counsel fees and suit money in the sum of $3,500 pendente lite to enable plaintiff to defend against the charge of adultery was not objected to by defendant. Plaintiff, however, excepted to this order on the ground that the amount was inadequate in view' of the circumstances of this case and the wide range the evidence Las taken, and tbe effort and expense required to rebut tbe testimony offered by the defendant on tbe charges contained in bis cross-action. This was a matter resting in tbe sound discretion of tbe judge who bad before him all tbe facts presented at that time. Davidson v. Davidson, 189 N.C. 625, 127 S.E. 682. However, we see no reason why tbe plaintiff may not be permitted to renew her motion for this purpose upon proper notice, if additional facts are made to appear.\nTbe court found that tbe plaintiff bad no property and only a meager earning ability, and that tbe defendant was a man of wealth. Though tbe plaintiff is precluded from alimony pendente Hie in her action for divorce a mensa by reason of tbe court\u2019s findings hereinbefore referred to, which we affirm, nevertheless under tbe common law in tbe defendant\u2019s cross-action for divorce a vincula on tbe ground of adultery, upon a finding that \u2022she has not sufficient means whereon to subsist pending tbe suit and to \u25a0defray tbe necessary and proper expenses of presenting her defense -thereto, and that her husband is a man of wealth, an award for this \u25a0purpose may be made in tbe defendant\u2019s cross-action. Medlin v. Medlin, 175 N.C. 529, 95 S.E. 857; Holloway v. Holloway, 214 N.C. 662, 200 S.E. 436; Covington v. Covington, 215 N.C. 569, 2 S.E. 2d 558; Welch v. Welch, 226 N.C. 541, 39 S.E. 2d 457; Webber v. Webber, 79 N.C. 572. Though plaintiff made her motion for alimony pendente lite in her action -for divorce a mensa, which was denied, this would not prevent her from amoving for this purpose in tbe cross-action of tbe defendant for divorce <on tbe ground of adultery.\nTbe plaintiff included in her assignments of error exception noted to \u2022the introduction in evidence at tbe bearing of certain letters which are iset out in tbe record. It was urged that these letters were inadmissible .\u25a0and prejudicial, and that tbe findings and orders below should for this -reason be set aside.\nIt was testified these letters were found in tbe plaintiff\u2019s private desk \"in tbe home in Wilmington. Plaintiff in her complaint bad referred to 'the fact that her desk had been rifled and her personal papers removed, -and she described their character as letters from members of her family, 'business correspondence and \u201ctwo or three letters and telegrams from men \u2022acquaintances of tbe plaintiff.\u201d Plaintiff argued tbe incompetency of these letters for any purpose, for tbe reason that they were not identified, 'it bad not been shown by whom they were written, and in any event their \u00abcontents were hearsay.\nThough tbe letters referred to were not admissible as evidence of adultery, we are not inclined to reverse the result below because of their introduction at the bearing. Tbe retention of letters, apparently addressed to the plaintiff, in her private desk, together with her references to them fin her complaint, would give rise to tbe inference of her knowledge of their contents and acquiescence and assent thereto. 1 Wigmore, sec. 260; 2 Wigmore, sec. 1073. The fact of the preservation among her personal papers of letters of this type from \u201cmen acquaintances\u201d might properly be considered as corroboratory of defendant\u2019s evidence as to the plaintiff\u2019s fitness to have the custody of the children and as tending to support defendant\u2019s contention that plaintiff had not in good faith renewed marital relations with defendant after a period of separation. As the hearing was before the judge on a preliminary motion, the ordinary rules as to the competency of evidence applied in a trial before a jury are to some extent relaxed, for the reason that the judge with knowledge of the law is able to eliminate from the testimony he hears that which is immaterial and incompetent, and consider only that which tends properly to prove the facts to be found. 64 C.J. 1202. For the same reason the exception to evidence as to phone calls we think insufficient to require setting aside the findings and orders entered below.\nThe Judge heard both parties at length and considered the voluminous evidence presented, and made carefully considered findings based thereon. These we will not disturb.\nExcept as herein modified, the judgment of .the court is\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Devin, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Welch Jordan and Butler <& Butler for plaintiff, appellant.",
      "Stevens, Burgwyn <& Mintz, Jeff D. Johnson, Jr., and Howard H. Hubbard for defendant, appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "MARY VAIL CAMERON v. BRUCE CAMERON.\n(Filed 22 November, 1950.)\n.1. Divorce and Alimony \u00a7 IS\u2014\nMotion for alimony pendente Ute in the wife\u2019s action for divorce from bed and board is properly denied upon tbe court\u2019s findings supported by evidence negativing eacb of tbe allegations in plaintiffs complaint upon which her action is based and upon which the motion for alimony pendente lite is made.\n2. Divorce and Alimony \u00a7 19\u2014\nThe court\u2019s order awarding the custody of the children to their father, with provision that their mother should see them at reasonable times, will be upheld where the evidence supports the court\u2019s findings that the father is a fit, proper, and suitable person to have their custody and that their mother is not a fit and suitable person, and that the best interests of the children would be served by such award of their custody.\n3. Divorce and Alimony \u00a7 12\u2014\nThe amount to be allowed as counsel fees to plaintiff\u2019s attorneys in her action for divorce a mensa et thoro is within the sound discretion of the trial judge, but such award does not preclude plaintiff from thereafter seeking an increased award upon a showing of additional facts.\n4. Same\u2014\nThe trial court denied plaintiff\u2019s motion for alimony pendente lite in her action for divorce a mensa et thoro upon supporting findings, but declined to find that she had been guilty of adultery. Held: The denial of alimony pendente lite in her suit for divorce a mensa does not preclude her, in the husband\u2019s cross-action for divorce a vinculo on the ground of adultery, from moving under the common law for subsistence pending the action, when the husband is a man of wealth and she is without means to defray the necessary and proper expenses of presenting her defense that she had not committed adultery and she has expressed her desire to contest the issue.\n5. Same\u2014\nWhen the trial court\u2019s determination of a motion for alimony pendente lite is predicated upon proper findings supported by competent evidence, the order will not be disturbed because of the general admission of evidence competent for a restricted purpose, or the admission of incompetent evidence, since it will be presumed that the judge in making the findings considered only that testimony properly tending to prove the facts to be found.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Parker, J., March Term, 1950, of Sampson-\nModified and affirmed.\nThis action was instituted by plaintiff for divorce a mensa ei thoro. In her complaint she asked for alimony pendente lite and suit money,, and also for custody of two children of the marriage.\nThe defendant answered denying plaintiff\u2019s accusations, and set up a cross-action for divorce a vinculo on the ground of adultery. The case was here at Fall Term, 1949, on defendant\u2019s appeal from an order allowing alimony pendente lite and counsel fees. For error found the cause was remanded to the Superior Court of Sampson County. Oameton v. Cameron, 231 N.C. 123, 56 S.E. 2d 384.\nA second hearing on these motions was had before Judge Parker at March Term, 1950, of Sampson Superior Court, and an order was entered denying plaintiff\u2019s motion for alimony pendente lite in her action, denying plaintiff\u2019s plea for custody of the children and allowing plaintiff counsel fees for her defense to defendant\u2019s cross-action.\nPlaintiff excepted and appealed.\nWelch Jordan and Butler <& Butler for plaintiff, appellant.\nStevens, Burgwyn <& Mintz, Jeff D. Johnson, Jr., and Howard H. Hubbard for defendant, appellee."
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  "file_name": "0686-01",
  "first_page_order": 734,
  "last_page_order": 738
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